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PREFACE 
 
 
 
The Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets awards fellowships each year to 
outstanding second year Stern MBA students to work on independent research projects under a 
faculty member's supervision. Five research projects completed by the Glucksman Fellows of 
2004-2005 are included in this special issue of the Finance Department Working Paper Series. 
These papers focus on important topics in empirical finance. 
John McDowell, under the supervision of Robert Whitelaw, examines the impact on stock prices 
of announcements of informal and formal SEC investigations. Min Xu, under the direction of 
Paul Wachtel, analyzes China’s Non-Performing Loan (NPL) resolution effort. Jelena Strelcova, 
under the supervision of Eli Bartov, examines the differences in performance between US public 
companies run by female CEOs and comparable US public companies run by male CEOs. Chris 
Ireland, under the direction of Edward Altman, examines the financial distress and bankruptcies 
within the electric power industry during 2002. Matias Brechner, under the supervision of David 
Backus, examines capital restrictions as an explanation for the stock market boom experienced in 
Argentina in the middle of its financial and economic collapse. These papers, reflecting the 
research effort of five outstanding Stern MBA students, are summarized in more detail in the 
Table of Contents on the next two pages. 
 
       William L. Silber, Director   
      Glucksman Institute     
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I. Introduction 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission was formed as a result of the stock market 
crash of 1929. During the crash, the market value of securities listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange dropped 83%, from $89 billion to $15 billion. Some of the causes of the crash were 
found to be a pre-crash speculative frenzy, artificially inflated trading activity, false and 
misleading information published by companies listed on the exchange, and insider trading.1 
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate 
companies that wanted to raise capital through the financial markets. The SEC was formed in 
1934 to enforce these laws, protect investors, and maintain the integrity of the markets. SEC 
investigations have been a vital tool to allow the SEC to fulfill its objectives. 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide insight on the events that surround the 
announcement of an SEC investigation of a company, which includes the equity market’s 
reaction to the announcement, the events leading up to the announcement, and the performance 
of the stock following the announcement. One cannot discuss investigations of fraud without 
considering corporate governance. This paper will also test the hypothesis that companies with 
strong corporate governance have lower agency costs, so investors’ reactions to accusations of 
possible fraud will be less severe. 
II. Background on SEC Investigations 
 Following an announcement by a company that it will restate past earnings, the SEC will 
generally commence an informal investigation that looks into the events that led up to the 
restatement. As the investigation proceeds, if the SEC finds sufficient reason to believe that fraud 
                                                 
1 Afterman, Allan B., SEC Regulation of Public Companies, (Prentice-Hall, 1995). 
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did occur, the SEC can issue a formal order of investigation. The formal order allows the SEC to 
issue subpoenas that provide greater access to company documents and executives. A formal 
order may also be issued without a prior informal investigation. The SEC does not publicly 
announce the initiation of SEC investigations. Therefore, disclosure comes as a result of the 
company issuing a press release or through a filing made by the company with the SEC.  
There is a clear distinction between the wording companies will use when they disclose 
informal and formal investigations. Investors will try to value the immensity of the investigation 
through the information provided by the company. Therefore, it is important to analyze the two 
types of investigations separately. 
III. Data Sample 
 Because the SEC does not publicly disclose the initiation of an investigation, to gather 
the sample data I was reliant on the companies to disclose the event to investors through its 
annual filings with the SEC.  
The sample time period for events to occur was defined to be 1998 through 2003. There 
were between 8,000 and 11,000 10-K’s filed with the SEC each year from 1998 to 2004. A 
program was used to download all 10-K’s filed with the SEC during this period from the SEC 
website. Another program searched through each 10-K, looking for announcements of SEC 
investigations. Two methods were used to find the disclosures: 1) the program searched for the 
“Legal Proceedings” section of each 10-K. Within this section, any mention of the SEC (or any 
variant on the name) was flagged. 2) The program searched the entire text of the 10-K for any 
mention of the SEC (or any variant on the name). It then searched for words such as 
investigation, complaint, injunction, action against, violation, or enforcement action within two 
text lines of the SEC reference. The program flagged all matches.  
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Because the layout and format of the 10-K’s varied for each filing, and often the words 
SEC and investigation were in close proximity, but not as the result of an SEC investigation 
disclosure (particularly within the Sarbanes-Oxley sections of later filings), the program flagged 
many false positives. Each reference found by the program was manually checked to narrow 
down the list to actual SEC investigations of companies. SEC investigations relating solely to the 
actions of current or previous company executives were not included. 
From this list I was able to backtrack from the original 10-K filing, looking in previous 
year’s annual, quarterly, and current filings, as well as press releases to arrive at the exact date 
that the investigation was made public. For each investigation reference, I also looked for the 
data relating to the informal or formal investigation announcement, depending on which was 
originally found.  If there were no press releases or 8-K filings with the SEC that referenced the 
investigation, I had to rely on the first occurrence of the investigation within a quarterly or 
annual filing as the date that the investigation was made public. Of the entire sample of informal 
and formal investigations, 65% were found in press releases, 7% in 8-K’s, 12% in quarterly 
reports, and 16% in annual reports. 
The data sample for which returns existed within the CRSP database consists of 71 
informal investigation and 174 formal investigation events. For 34 companies, announcements of 
informal and formal investigations were found. Therefore, 34 companies that are included in the 
formal investigation sample are also included in the sample of informal investigations.  
This procedure produced an unbiased sample of SEC investigations. The search program 
undoubtedly missed some SEC investigation references, or some companies may have chosen 
not to disclose an investigation within its annual reports. Therefore, the data sample should not 
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be considered to be the entire universe of SEC investigations that were announced during the 
sample period.  
IV. Data Analysis Tools 
 The Eventus software program was used to calculate the abnormal returns of the stocks 
following the announcements of the investigations. Eventus analyzes stock returns that it reads 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. For each stock, it estimates a 
beta using an estimation period that ends before the event date. It then calculates the abnormal 
return for the stock during the event window by subtracting from the actual return the normal 
return for the stock, given the market’s return during the event window. The market was defined 
to be a value weighted portfolio of all stocks within the CRSP database during the event period. 
The CRSP database includes stock price, volume, and return information from the NYSE, 
AMEX, and Nasdaq markets. 
 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) provides research on corporate 
governance, proxy voting, and corporate responsibility issues. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick used 
data published by the IRRC to construct a governance index that covers about 1,500 companies. 
The index is a measurement of the balance of power between shareholders and managers. A 
rating for each firm is calculated by adding one point for each provision that reduces shareholder 
rights, with a maximum rating of 24. Firms with low governance index ratings will have low 
management power and strong shareholder rights. Firms with high governance index ratings will 
have high management power and weak shareholder rights.2 
 OptionMetrics is a database of historical price and implied volatility data for the U.S. 
equity and index options markets. OptionMetrics computes a volatility surface through 
                                                 
2 Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (Feb 2003), 107-155. 
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interpolation of implied volatilities of similar options. OptionMetrics volatility surface was used 
to analyze the change in the implied volatilities of the options on the underlying stocks in the 
investigation samples on the days leading up to the announcements.  
V. Event Study Results 
 A window of -1 to +1 days from the event date was used to calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the informal and formal investigations. During the window around the 
announcement of informal investigations, the mean cumulative abnormal return is -6.18%, 
significant at 0.1%. The median abnormal return is -3.15%. During the window around the 
announcement of formal investigations, the mean cumulative abnormal return is -6.23%, 
significant at 0.1%, with a median abnormal return of -3.05%.  
The abnormal return for the sample of 34 companies that had previous informal 
investigation announcements is -8.50%, significant at the 0.1% level. The additional decline in 
value results from the escalation to a formal order, which implies a longer investigation period 
resulting in higher legal expenses, and the SEC found sufficient reason to continue the 
investigation. The average number of days between the informal and formal investigation 
announcements in the sample is 138 days. Some companies in the formal investigation sample 
may have had previous informal investigations that occurred before the beginning of the sample 
period. Therefore, the analysis of returns for companies in the formal investigation sample that 
are not included in the informal investigation sample is not relevant.  
VI. Events Prior to Announcement Date 
The decline in market value as a result of the announcement of an informal or formal 
investigation is similar; for both events, there is an abnormal return of about -6%. However, 
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informal and formal investigations differ greatly with respect to the events that lead up to the 
announcement. Put and call option implied volatilities were used to analyze the market’s 
uncertainty of the stock’s value prior to the investigation announcements. Implied option 
volatility has been found to be a very good predictor of future volatility for stock indexes3 and 
individual stocks4.  
Option volatility surfaces calculate the implied volatilities on virtual options with the 
same maturity and delta ratio at different points in time. The implied volatility is computed 
through interpolation using traded options with maturities and delta ratios that straddle the 
maturities and delta ratios of the options in the volatility surface. Therefore, the effects of time to 
maturity and movement of the underlying asset price are not reflected in the volatility surface. 
The change in implied volatilities across time is only a function of the markets perception of the 
future distribution of the underlying asset’s value.  
The implied volatilities of at the money puts and calls with 30 days and 60 days to 
maturity were compared for each day leading up to the event for informal and formal 
investigations. 30 and 60 day maturity options were chosen because of their high liquidity. For 
each trading day prior to the event, the average implied volatility across the sample for each 
option was computed. Option data is not available for all stocks within the investigation samples. 
The table below provides the range of the number of stocks with available option data that were 
included in the daily average implied volatilities, and the two graphs chart the results. 
Informal Investigations Formal Investigations
Option Data Option Data
30 Day ATM Calls and Puts 36 to 42 79 to 86
60 Day ATM Calls and Puts 39 to 43 84 to 92  
                                                 
3 Christensen, B.J., N.R. Prabhala, “The Relation Between Implied and Realized Volatility,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 50 (1998) 125-150. 
4 Lamoureux, Christopher G., William D. Lastrapes, “Forecasting Stock-Return Variance: Toward an Understanding 
of Stochastic Implied Volatilities,” The Review of Financial Studies (1993 Volume 6, number 2) 293-326. 
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The graph of the implied volatilities for options of informal investigation events shows a 
steady increase across the 35 day period; on the days leading up to the event, the value of at the 
money puts and calls is steadily increasing. The graph of the implied volatilities for options of 
formal investigation events shows a sudden rise at about 8 to 10 trading days prior to the event. 
There is a steady, slight decline in the implied volatilities of at the money options at days greater 
than 10, but at day 10, the 60 day options’ implied volatilities begin to rise and at 8 days prior, 
the 30 day options’ implied volatilities jump. 
 Informal investigations generally follow earnings restatements. Earnings restatements 
increase the uncertainty about the firms’ value as the market attempts to assess the implications 
for future earnings and cash flows. There is also additional uncertainty due to the possibility of 
an SEC investigation and the most probable outcome if it were to occur. This uncertainty is 
reflected in the steady rise in implied volatilities prior to informal investigation announcements. 
In contrast, the announcements of formal investigations are most likely unexpected. At 
days greater than 10 prior to formal investigation announcements, the market’s uncertainty of 
future prices is declining. The sudden increase in implied volatility 8 to 10 days before the 
announcement suggests the existence of information events prior to the investigation 
announcement that increases investors’ uncertainty.  
For both types of investigations, the market’s uncertainty of the stock’s value prior to the 
actual announcement is relatively high. However, neither type of investigation announcement is 
completely anticipated, which is reflected in the large negative abnormal return and the jump in 
implied volatilities as a result of the announcements.  
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VII. Breakdown of Abnormal Returns 
The following table shows the abnormal returns for informal and formal investigations, 
broken down by market capitalization one week prior to the event, the year of the event, and 
governance index rating.  
N Mean Significance N Mean Significance
Overall 71 -6.18% 0.1% 174 -6.23% 0.1%
Market Cap
Micro 21 -3.89% 0.1% 73 -7.23% 0.1%
Small 15 -12.14% 0.1% 27 -7.83% 0.1%
Medium 19 -6.34% 0.1% 25 -8.42% 0.1%
Large 16 -3.40% 1.0% 48 -2.78% 0.1%
Year
1998 3 -3.24% 15 -8.28%
1999 5 -13.86% 11 -6.09%
2000 4 -20.59% 23 -7.65%
2001 4 -2.16% 19 -5.62%
2002 34 -3.86% 51 -5.71%
2003 21 -6.54% 55 -5.78%
Market
Bull ('98, '99, '03) 29 -7.46% 0.1% 81 -6.29% 0.1%
Bear ('00, '01, '02) 42 -5.29% 0.1% 93 -6.17% 0.1%
G Index
Gov >= 9 23 -4.17% 0.1% 46 -7.06% 0.1%
Gov < 9 20 -3.19% 5% 40 -5.48% 0.1%
Formal InvestigationsInformal Investigations
 
 Large market capitalization companies have a smaller decline in value than smaller 
capitalization companies. The market believes that the risk and expenses associated with a SEC 
investigation can be better absorbed by large capitalization companies. Large capitalization 
companies are more deeply covered by analysts. Investors may believe that they better 
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understand the risks associated with large capitalization stocks, so there is less of a reaction to 
the investigation announcements. 
 If 1998, 1999, and 2003 are defined to be bull markets and 2000, 2001, and 2002 to be a 
bear market, the data shows that the market reacts differently to informal investigation 
announcements during each type of market. There is a much smaller decline in value during bear 
markets. 
 To analyze the event results by governance index rating, the most recent governance 
rating prior to the date of the event was used. The average governance rating for all companies 
within the IRRC database for the rating periods 1998, 2000, and 2002 is 8.93. Therefore, the 
abnormal returns given the companies governance index rating relative to the index average is 
computed. Governance ratings are not available for all companies within the sample, so analysis 
by this index reduces the samples. 
 A high governance rating indicates weak shareholder rights and poor corporate 
governance. As may be expected, companies with better corporate governance have a smaller 
decline in value. For companies with strong governance, investors believe that the processes are 
in place to prevent fraud, and if it did occur, for it to be remedied with haste and minimal 
additional expense. 
 The data shows that companies with large market capitalization and companies with 
strong corporate governance will have the smallest decline in market value as a result of the 
announcement of an SEC investigation. However, it is not true that larger market capitalization 
companies have stronger corporate governance; rather, it is the opposite. Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick found a correlation of 0.15, significant at the 1% level, between market capitalization 
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and the governance index rating. 49% of the firms within the highest decile of the governance 
index (the companies with the weakest shareholder rights), are included in the S&P 500.5 
 The following table shows the correlation between the abnormal returns, a dummy 
variable representing large capitalization firms, and the governance index rating for the informal 
and formal investigation samples. 
Return Large Cap Return Large Cap
Large Cap 0.082 Large Cap 0.136
P-value 0.499 P-value 0.075
Gov Rating -0.013 0.303 Gov Rating -0.079 0.357
P-value 0.936 0.048 P-value 0.472 0.001
Informal Investigations Formal Investigations
 
 There is a significant positive correlation between the large capitalization dummy 
variable and the governance rating, and the abnormal returns have a greater correlation with the 
large capitalization dummy variable than the governance rating. This suggests that corporate 
governance is not the dominant factor affecting the market’s reaction to the announcement of 
SEC investigations. 
It is interesting to note that the number of investigation events increases significantly in 
2002. There are several reasons that may explain this increase. The public unraveling of Enron 
began in October 2001. Enron was shortly followed by several corporate scandals, such as Tyco, 
WorldCom, Xerox, Adelphia, Merrill Lynch, and Arthur Anderson. This series of corporate 
fraud rattled investors and made them weary of company management; it created doubt about the 
integrity of the system.6 Therefore, the SEC would want to step up its enforcement actions to 
catch the fraud before investors are harmed and renew the public’s trust in the system. 
                                                 
5 Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (Feb 2003), 107-155. 
6 Skousen, Fred K., Steven M. Glover, Douglas F. Prawitt, An Introduction to Corporate Governance and the SEC, 
(Thomson, 2005). 
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 The beginning of 2000 marked the bursting of the technology bubble and the subsequent 
recession. During periods of low profitability, it is more difficult to disguise and sustain 
accounting fraud. Therefore, there will be more accounting restatements, followed by SEC 
investigations. 
The following table shows the number of investigations that were opened by the SEC and 
formal orders issued during its fiscal years, which end September 30.7 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Investigations Opened 520 558 570 479 910
Formal Orders Issued 282 345 324 300 254  
In the fiscal year 2003, the SEC almost doubles the number of investigations opened. The last 
three months of 2002 that coincide with the SEC’s fiscal year 2003 could explain some of the 
increase in investigations in the sample that were made public in 2002. However, the events in 
the sample are defined to be the day that the investigation is made public by the company. The 
increase in the number of events for 2002 is more likely the result of an increase in the number 
of disclosures of SEC investigations, which may have been initiated in previous years. 
VIII. Calendar Portfolios 
 To analyze how the stocks in the samples performed following each event, calendar 
portfolios were constructed. At two days following the announcement of the investigation, one 
share of the stock is added to the portfolio and is held in the portfolio for a defined period of 
time. If at any time during the holding period the stock is delisted, the stock is sold from the 
portfolio the following day. Therefore, the calendar portfolios include the delisting return. 
Abnormal returns for the portfolio were computed using the capital asset pricing model and 
                                                 
7 From SEC Annual Reports for 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml 
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Fama French three factor model. The charts below show the abnormal returns for the portfolios 
for different holding periods. 
Informal Investigation Calendar Portfolios
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Formal Investigation Calendar Portfolios
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 The change in abnormal returns for increasingly longer holding periods for the informal 
investigation portfolios and formal investigation portfolios are very similar. The graphs show 
that following the announcement of an SEC investigation, the stock will continue to 
underperform the market for the next three months. However, after three months, the returns 
improve and the stock returns to breakeven within one year. 
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IX. Conclusion 
Informal SEC investigations generally follow earnings restatements. The implied 
volatilities on put and call options show that prior to the informal investigation announcements 
the market’s uncertainty of future prices is increasing. Following the announcement, the stock 
has an abnormal return of -6.18%. The announcements of formal investigations, in comparison, 
are unexpected. Implied option volatilities do not steadily increase prior to the announcement 
event. Rather, the options show a jump in implied volatility at 8 to 10 days prior to the event. 
Following the formal investigation announcement, the stock has an abnormal return of -6.23%.  
Due to the disclosure of an SEC investigation, the company loses six percent of its 
market value. The six percent in lost value is the market’s assessment of the future legal fees and 
settlement fines, and loss due to a decline in the market’s perception of the company’s corporate 
governance standards. However, it is arguable how heavily the market weighs corporate 
governance, so the loss due to a decline in corporate governance may only be a small portion. In 
the case of the announcement of an SEC investigation, corporate governance is not the main 
factor that affects the amount of value lost. Whether or not the company has a large market 
capitalization has a greater correlation with the abnormal returns.  
For the three months following the investigation announcement, the value of the stock 
continues to underperform the market, as new information regarding the extent of the 
investigation and possible fraud is released. However, after three months, the stocks reflect a 
regression towards the mean; the stocks in the investigation portfolios outperform the market. 
For a holding period of one year, the investigation portfolios have a return that is about equal to 
that of the market. 
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Appendix: 
Top 10 Biggest Decliners 
 
Announcement 
Date
Market 
Cap (-7 
Days)
Governance 
Rating
Abnormal 
Return
Informal Investigations
1. DYNACQ HEALTHCARE INC 12/18/03 224 -80.11%
2. EBT INTERNATIONAL INC/INSO CORP 02/01/99 388 -77.14%
3. PINNACLE HOLDINGS INC 08/07/00 2,717 -39.03%
4. LUMENIS LTD 02/25/02 518 -38.61%
5. NASH FINCH CO 11/08/02 158 15 -34.11%
6. COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL INC 02/22/02 15,586 9 -27.58%
7. SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES INC 02/15/02 3,058 8 -26.70%
8. MAXIM GROUP INC 07/13/99 162 -22.95%
9. CMS ENERGY CORP 05/10/02 2,703 9 -20.71%
10. IMCLONE SYSTEMS INC 01/25/02 1,547 4 -19.75%
Formal Investigations
1. PENNCORP FINANCIAL GROUP INC 08/20/98 319 6 -79.37%
2. ANIKA THERAPEUTICS INC 05/30/00 82 -77.93%
3. INTERWORLD CORP 04/03/01 9 -77.71%
4. ENTERASYS NETWORKS INC 02/01/02 1,986 10 -57.86%
5. NASH FINCH CO 02/05/03 99 15 -54.12%
6. L90 INC/MAXWORLDWIDE INC 02/04/02 51 -39.50%
7. PINNACLE HOLDINGS INC 10/12/00 1,250 -33.90%
8. CRYOLIFE INC 08/05/03 144 -32.88%
9. CENDANT CORP 07/14/98 19,100 11 -32.05%
10. CRITICAL PATH INC 04/05/01 116 -27.56%
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 I. Introduction1 
 Despite its impressive economic growth, China also has one of the largest 
non-performing loan (NPL) portfolios in the world.  According to the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), major commercial banks2 carried NPLs of RMB 1.7 
trillion on their balance sheets as of December 31, 2004, representing 13 percent of total 
loans.  This NPL figure does not include the RMB 1.05 trillion3 of NPLs remaining on the 
balance sheet of four asset management corporations (AMCs), which were established in 
1999 as decentralized vehicles to manage and dispose of NPLs they had purchased from the 
four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).  These official figures reveal NPLs of about 
RMB 2.8 trillion or $340 billion in the financial system.  However, various sources estimate 
that the total amount of non-performing assets (NPAs) in the system, which includes not only 
NPLs, but also debt-equity swaps and repossessed collateral, is even higher.  
PricewaterhouseCooper's’ China NPL Investor Survey 2004, for example, estimates this 
figure to be about $500 billion.  Standard & Poor’s is more pessimistic, estimating that it 
would cost $656 billion to resolve bad loans at all of China’s banks (Cheng and Miller 2004).  
This paper is organized as follows.  The first section provides an overview of 
China’s financial sector and post-1998 measures initiated by the government to relieve the 
NPL burden.  The second section examines the root causes of the NPL problem and alerts to 
the buildup of new NPLs in the system.  The third section compares China’s NPL resolution 
                                       
1 I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to David Bednar, former head of Morgan Stanley’s bad loan business in China, 
and Kevin Young of Citigroup, who provided valuable information about their NPL investing experience in China. 
2 The major commercial banks include the four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and the joint stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs). 
3 Based on my calculation, the four AMCs purchased RMB 1.72 trillion of NPLs in total from the four SOCBs, China 
Development Bank, and Bank of Communications between 1999 and 2004.  CRBC reports that the AMCs have disposed 
RMB 675.06 billion of the assets through December 31, 2004.    
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efforts against East Asian economies that faced the same problem, analyzes the reasons for 
China’s shortfalls, and presents recent policy measures that are narrowing the gap.  The 
fourth section studies each of the main NPL resolution methods that China undertakes, 
evaluates their effectiveness and challenges, and highlights measures that could increase the 
likelihood of their success. 
 
II. Financial Sector Overview and Developments 
 With a thinly traded stock market and an almost non-existent corporate bond market, 
banks in China play a major role in intermediating private savings, which comprises 
approximately 40 percent of GDP (Rolnick 2003).   
 The major players in China’s financial system include state-owned commercial banks, 
joint stock banks, as well as urban and rural cooperatives.  The four SOCBs dominate the 
nation’s banking sector, collectively accounting for 54 percent of total assets and liabilities4.  
The four SOCBs are the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB).  
All the SOCBs were spun off from internal divisions within the PBOC, China’s central bank, 
in the late 1970’s.  Even after NPL transfers of RMB 1.6 trillion to the AMCs between 1999 
and 2004, the SOCBs collectively still carry RMB 1.7 trillion of NPLs on their books, 
representing 15.6 percent of total loans.  Table 1 summarizes the composition of China’s 
financial sector and the reported distribution of NPLs across different types of institutions. 
 
                                       
4 China Banking Regulatory Commission, December 31, 2004. 
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Table 1 
Financial Institutions in China, December 31, 2004 
 % of Total Assets & 
Liabilities 
 
NPLs 
 
NPL % of Total Loans 
State-owned Commercial Banks 54% RMB 1.58 trillion 15.6% 
Joint Stock Banks 15% RMB 143 billion 5.0% 
City Commercial Banks 5% N/A N/A 
Other Financial Institutions(a) 26% N/A N/A 
_________________ 
(a) Other financial institutions include policy banks, rural commercial banks, foreign banks, urban credit cooperatives, 
rural credit cooperatives, finance companies, trust and investment companies, financial leasing companies and postal 
savings. 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission Website, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn.  
 Since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the Chinese 
government has stepped up the country’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-oriented one.  At the heart of this migration, China committed to open up its 
domestic banking sector to full-fledged competition from foreign banks by 2007.  This 
planned transition heightened the need for a speedy resolution of the pervasive NPL problem 
in the financial sector. 
 Since 1998, the Chinese government has carried out a variety of measures to reduce 
the NPL burden.  These included the direct recapitalization of the SOCBs as well as the 
transfer of NPLs from the banks to AMCs that focus exclusively on the collection and 
resolution of the NPLs.  Table 2 summarizes these major actions. 
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Table 2 
Recapitalization/NPL Transfer Measures Undertaken by the Chinese Government  
Year 
 
Action 
1998 The government injected RMB 270 billion ($33 billion) of capital into the four SOCBs. 
1999 The government established four AMCs: Cinda, Huarong, Orient, and Great Wall.  Each of the four 
AMCs was originally matched up against each of the four SOCBs: Cinda with CCB, Huarong with 
ICBC, Orient with BOC, and Great Wall with ABC. 
The AMCs purchased RMB 1.4 trillion ($170 billion) of NPLs from the four SOCBs and the China 
Development Bank.  Transferred loans were primarily “substandard” or “doubtful” loans (under the old 
four-tier classification mechanism) made prior to 1996 and overdue for more than one year by the end of 
1998.  The AMCs purchased the NPLs at book value.   
2003 The government injected RMB 370 billion ($45 billion) of capital into CCB and BOC, both slated for 
public offerings in 2005. 
2004 Cinda AMC won the auction to purchase RMB 278.7 billion ($34 billion) in NPLs from BOC and CCB, 
at 50% of book value.  The ultimate recovery rate of 33 cents on the dollar for the loans is required by 
year-end 2005. 
2004 Cinda AMC bought RMB 41.4 billion ($5 billion) of NPLs from Bank of Communications at a 50% 
discount, funded entirely by a loan from PBOC.  Cinda has promised ultimate recovery of 30% to 40% 
of face value. 
Total bailout/transfer amount to date: RMB 2.36 trillion ($287 billion). 
 
_______________ 
Sources: Various News Releases.  
 Of note, for the 1999 NPL transfer, the recovery value of the NPLs will surely be 
below the full book value that the AMCs paid for the assets.  As a result, the AMCs will be 
unable to repay the ten-year bonds they issued to the banks, which accounted for RMB 1.2 
trillion, or approximately 84 percent of the AMC’s purchase price (Fung and Ma 2002)5.  
While China’s Ministry of Finance did not explicitly guarantee these bonds, it is widely 
anticipated that the government would not allow the AMCs to default on their bonds.  
Hence, any ultimate loss is likely to be absorbed by the government. 
 The speed of recovery at the AMCs, as indicated in Table 3 below, has been somewhat 
                                       
5 The remaining RMB232 billion was provided by the PBOC and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) (RMB 40 billion of 
paid-in-capital from the MoF and RMB 192 billion of loans from the PBOC).  
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disappointing to date.  Through year-end 2004, they collectively disposed of only RMB 675 
billion, or about 39 percent of the total NPLs they acquired.  This presents challenges for the 
government’s original mandate that the AMCs complete their missions by 2009.  Further, 
the AMCs’ cash recovery rate of only 20.3 percent, or recovery of RMB 137 billion to date, 
was insufficient to service the interest on the bonds they had issued and the loans they had 
acquired from PBOC in 1999 to fund the initial transfer of NPLs.  The AMC’s total interest 
obligation is estimated to be about RMB 30 billion annually for five years, or a total of RMB 
150 billion6.  Should NPL resolution continue at the current speed, the AMC could face 
considerable cash flow pressure.  
Table 3 
Disposal of Non-Performing Assets at China’s AMCs, December 31, 2004 
(RMB in Billions) 
 Total Huarong Great Wall Orient Cinda 
Accumulated Disposal 675.06 209.54 209.91 104.55 151.06 
Asset Recovery Ratio 25.5% 25.3% 14.4% 29.5% 38.3% 
Cash Recovery 137.00 41.34 21.57 23.29 50.81 
Cash Recovery Ratio 20.3% 19.7% 10.3% 22.3% 33.6% 
      
_________________________ 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
 
 As evidenced in Table 3, Great Wall AMC’s cash recovery ratio of 10.3 percent was 
among the lowest of the group.  This was due to the low quality loans it took over from the 
ABC, which historically financed a large number of rural enterprises.  On the other hand, 
Cinda AMC has the highest cash recovery ratio among the group.  Cinda was originally 
matched up with the CCB in 1999, which historically provided financings for capital 
construction projects and urban housing development.  These real estate assets are 
                                       
6 Both the AMC bonds and the loan from PBOC carry an annual interest rate of 2.25%, which translates into RMB 30.6 
billion of interest per annum. 
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substantially more liquid than other collaterals, thus maximizing the recovery value.  
According to Cinda’s website, more than 26 percent of the NPLs it purchased in 1999 were 
collateralized by real estate assets.  For the four AMCs in aggregate, this ratio was only 7 
percent. 
 
III. Main Causes of China’s NPL Problem 
 Unlike many other Eastern Asian countries, whose large NPL portfolios stemmed 
from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s closed capital market shielded it to a large 
extent from the crisis.  Instead, China’s huge NPL burden was largely a result of two 
functions: (a) sustained losses at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and (b) the lack of a 
commercial credit culture at major financial institutions. 
 The first side of the story is the SOEs, which represent over 40 percent of China’s 
manufacturing output, employing more than half of the industrial workforce (Norton and 
Chao 2003).  Having long suffered from technological obsolescence and excess capacity, the 
SOEs were squeezed by intensified competition as China gradually opened its doors to 
foreign capital in most industries.  In 1998, over two-thirds of all SOEs generated a loss for 
the year7.  The SOEs obtained the majority of their funding from the banks, in particular the 
four large SOCBs.  These bank lenders often continued to extend loans to the same debtor 
with little regard to the latter’s ability to repay its loans, under the perception that the ultimate 
loss will be borne by the government.  At the end of 2001, the total liabilities to equity ratio 
                                       
7 Financial Yearbook of China, 2002. 
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for China’s SOEs stood at 158 percent8.  SOEs in the construction, real estate, food, and 
textiles industries were among the most highly leveraged, with total liabilities to equity ratio 
in excess of 350 percent.  When adjusted for unhealthy assets, the total leverage ratio of 
locally-administered SOEs9 escalated even further, from 252 percent to 632 percent10.  The 
continuous losses of the SOEs and the unremitting credit support that they received from 
banks resulted in mounting bad loans in China’s banking system. 
 The other side of the coin is the lack of a commercially-oriented credit culture at 
major financial institutions, in particular the four SOCBs.  This mentality originated from 
the pre-1994 period, when the Chinese government routinely mandated that the SOCBs lend 
to SOEs for key infrastructure projects and social welfare subsidies, regardless of profitability.  
Under the “policy lending” guidance, poor documentation for loan collateral was common, 
and credit risk management skills were far from meeting international standards. 
 In 1994, the Chinese government established three development banks that took over 
the policy lending tasks from the SOCBs, leaving the latter with more healthy capital to 
develop a commercial lending orientation.  The administration also established a legal basis 
for commercial banking with the promulgation of the Commercial Banking Law in 1995.  
However, the intended market-oriented reform was hampered by a legacy loan classification 
system and the lack of a free-market interest rate regime. 
 Until 2002, loan performance had been classified mechanically based on the length of 
the past due period rather than based on the assessment of loan quality.  Under the legacy 
                                       
8 See supra note 7. 
9 Locally-administered SOEs are owned, and often to some extent, managed by the local governments. 
10 See supra note 7. 
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four-category classification system, only loans overdue by more than one year were 
considered non-performing, and only the overdue portion counted as an NPL11.  Thus, even 
if a company is deemed incapable of repaying its debt or has ceased operations completely, it 
may still be considered performing should the loan be overdue by less than one year.  
Furthermore, in certain instances, banks simply extended new loans to insolvent SOEs, so 
that they could use the new funds to fulfill existing debt obligations. 
 Secondly, instead of letting supply and demand determine interest rates, the central 
bank, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has traditionally set an arbitrary interest rate collar for 
both loans and deposits; this measure prevents the banks from effectively linking risks and 
returns.  They are unable to charge a lending rate above the interest rate cap on loans to 
high-risk clients in order to compensate for the risks.  Nor can they reward the low-risk 
clients with a lending rate below the interest rate floor.  As a result, the least creditworthy 
companies routinely resorted to bribing bank officials or furnishing fraudulent information to 
lenders in order to obtain a loan. 
 On January 1, 2004, the PBOC announced its decision to expand the collar of lending 
rate charged by financial institutions.  The lending ceiling charged by commercial banks and 
urban credit cooperatives was raised to 170 percent of the benchmark rate, although the floor 
remained at 90 percent of the benchmark rate12.  On October 28, 2004, along with its 
interest rate increase decision (see below), the PBOC removed the lending ceiling on RMB 
                                       
11 In 2004, the CBRC required that all SOCBs and joint-stock commercial banks to start adopting the five-tier loan 
classification system, which classifies loans as “Pass,” “Special Mention,” “Substandard,” “Doubtful,” or “Loss.”  The 
latter three loan categories – including loans overdue by more than 90 days and those likely to be impaired – are considered 
NPLs.  The new classification system was fully adopted in 2004. 
12 Previously, the ceiling had been 130 percent of the benchmark rate. 
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loans completely for all financial institutions except for urban and rural credit cooperatives13.  
This action demonstrated the central bank’s willingness to relax its control over interest rates 
and will allow banks to better price their loans by matching risks with returns.  
 While the government’s main focus is on addressing the existing “stock” problem of 
NPLs in the financial system, the creation of new bad loans, i.e. the NPL “flow” problem, 
should not be neglected.  The explosive loan growth in China over the last two years, 
especially to certain over-invested sectors – such as the iron and steel, aluminum, cement, 
and real estate development industries – has created piles of new NPLs in the system.  
According to the PBOC, fixed asset investment grew by 28% from 2002 to 2003 and 38% 
year-over-year in the first half of 2004, much of which was financed by banks.  Total bank 
lending of RMB 18.5 trillion at the end of June 2004 was more than double the figure at the 
end of 2001 (Wilson 2004). 
 In order to prevent a hard landing for the economy, the PBOC has instated a series of 
measures since the second half of 2003 to reduce credit expansion.  The central bank raised 
the deposit reserves requirement twice, initiated a tired reserve requirement system tied to 
each bank’s capital adequacy ratio, and imposed credit controls on certain overheated 
sectors14.  On October 28, 2004, the PBOC raised the benchmark rate for one-year RMB 
loans by 0.27% from 5.31% to 5.58%, and the benchmark one-year RMB deposit rate by 
0.27% from 1.98% to 2.25% - its first interest rate increase in nine years15.  While these 
measures have managed to curb over-investment and slow year-over-year GDP growth from 
                                       
13 “China’s First Interest Rate Hikes in Nine Years,” Hong Kong Trade Development Council, November 11, 2004. 
14 See supra note 13. 
15 See supra note 13. 
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a peak of 9.9% in the fourth quarter of 200316 to an expected 8.8% in the first quarter of 
200517, the excessive credit expansion has resulted in an increase in NPLs at major banks 
during the second half of 2004, as evidenced in Table 4. 
Table 4 
NPLs at Major Financial Institutions (a), 2003 – 2004 
(RMB in Billions) 
 1st Half  
2003 
Full Year 
2003 
1st Quarter 
2004 
2nd Quarter 
2004 
3rd Quarter 
2004 
4th Quarter 
2004 
NPLs 2,538 2,441 2,078 1,663 1,700 1,718 
NPL % of Total Loans 19.6% 17.8% 16.6% 13.3% 13.4% 13.2% 
___________ 
(a) Major financial institutions include the four SOCBs and the twelve JSCBs.  
 
IV. NPL Resolution: China versus other East Asian Economies 
 Many East Asian countries have been burdened with monstrous NPL portfolios since 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Among the countries that emerged with successful NPL 
recovery stories are Korea, Japan, and Thailand.  Similar to China, all of these countries 
created public AMCs as a primary vehicle to acquire distressed assets and focus on NPL 
resolution.  However, the asset recovery rate of these AMCs has generally outperformed that 
of China’s AMCs.  The Chinese authorities are aware that they have a lot to learn from other 
economies, and specifically retained Korea Asset Management Corporation as advisor to the 
four Chinese AMCs.  In this section, I would like to first study three countries’ NPL 
recovery experience, then move on to analyze the reasons for China’s underperformance 
compared to these countries, and finally discuss measures that are narrowing the gap. 
 While public AMCs are not the only type of NPL resolution vehicle in the countries 
                                       
16 “Table - China's economic indicators - March 16,” Reuters News, March 15, 2005. 
17 “China’s GDP Forecast to Grow 8.8 Percent in First Quarter,” Asia Pulse, March 29, 2005. 
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mentioned above, they play a leading role in NPL recovery efforts and the results of their 
actions are highly publicized.  I have thus chosen to focus on studying the activities of the 
public AMCs.  Another caveat to keep in mind is that, due to the differences in accounting 
rules and NPL definition, the NPL figures are not necessarily comparable across countries.   
IV.a. Cross-Country Experience 
IV.a.i. Korea 
 Korea’s NPL problem originated from the excessive leverage at domestic companies 
and the ineffective credit risk management of domestic financial institutions. The contagion 
effect of the Asian Financial Crisis in October 1997 triggered a wave of corporate 
bankruptcies and accumulation of NPLs in the financial sector.  The Korean government 
acted quickly, giving Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) the mandate of 
recovering NPLs in November 1997.  Between November 1997 and December 2003, 
KAMCO purchased Won 110.5 trillion worth of NPLs from the financial sector, including 
Won 33.2 billion from the chaebol Daewoo Capital in 2002 (KAMCO 2003)18.  KAMCO 
paid an aggregate amount of Won 39.7 trillion for the NPLs, or only 36 percent of face value.  
All of the NPLs were formed in the second half of the 1990’s. 
 By the end of 2004, KAMCO had resolved Won 71.8 trillion ($68.4 billion) of NPLs, 
representing 62.1 percent of the acquired loans.  Both the rate of recovery and the ultimate 
recovery price are very impressive.  The total sale price for the NPLs amounted to $32.7 
billion, equal to 117 percent of the original $27.9 billion that KAMCO had paid for these 
                                       
18 KAMCO 2003 Annual Report. 
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NPLs, for a profit of $4.8 billion19.  Strong legal and political backing, diverse recovery 
approaches, and KAMCO staff’s prior involvement with restructuring were among the factors 
that accounted for KAMCO’s success. 
  KAMCO’s major NPL disposition methods include bulk/individual sales to domestic 
and international investors, Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) issuance, bankruptcy auctions, 
debt collection, and workouts.  Additionally, KAMCO conducted massive debt-for-equity 
swaps, mergers and acquisitions, and spinoffs in order to rescue subsidiaries of Daewoo 
Capital.  Recently, KAMCO has moved its focus from NPL sale to managed workouts, as 
approximately three-quarters of the remaining unresolved NPLs are related to Daewoo 
loans20.  Table 5 shows KAMCO’s initial purchase price and sale price achieved through 
various NPL resolution methods.  It is evident that KAMCO has managed to generate a 
profit using almost every resolution method. 
Table 5 
KAMCO NPL Resolution by Method(a) 
December 31, 2004 (Figures in U.S. Dollars) 
 
Method 
 
Face Value 
Purchase 
Price 
 
Sale Price 
Purchase 
Price/FV 
Sale 
Price/FV 
FV % of 
Total 
International Bidding $5.79 $1.25 $1.53 21.6% 26.4% 8.5% 
ABS Issuance 8.31 4.42 4.60 53.2% 55.4% 12.2% 
Sale to AMC 2.46 0.63 0.88 25.6% 35.8% 3.6% 
Sale to CRC 2.08 0.38 0.75 18.3% 36.1% 3.0% 
Individual Loan Sale 3.23 0.75 1.23 23.2% 38.1% 4.7% 
Court Auction, Public Sales 8.15 2.69 3.32 33.0% 40.7% 11.9% 
Collection 14.40 4.54 6.46 31.5% 44.9% 21.1% 
Daewoo Loan Repayment 4.45 3.05 3.70 68.5% 83.1% 6.5% 
Workout Loan Repayment 0.69 0.38 0.46 55.1% 66.7% 1.0% 
Repurchase Cancellations(b) 18.79 9.81 9.81 52.2% 52.2% 28.7% 
     Total $68.35 $27.90 $32.74 40.8% 47.9% 100.0% 
________________ 
(a) Does not include debt-for-equity swap of $9.95 billion. 
(b) KAMCO negotiated put options that allowed it to put back certain portion of an NPL back to the original financial 
institution, should the returns not meet certain thresholds. 
Source: KAMCO’s website, www.kamco.or.kr/eng/.  
                                       
19 KAMCO website, http://www.kamco.or.kr/eng/.  
20 See supra note 18. 
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   Korea’s relatively mature legal framework and further reforms to its bankruptcy 
legislations are major factors that contributed to KAMCO’s accomplishments.  Although 
corporate liquidation and reorganization procedures have been in place in Korea since 1962, 
both the Bankruptcy Act and the Composition Act were amended soon after the Asian 
financial crisis, in 1998 and 1999, respectively (Zafft and Vassiliou 2002).  Finally, the 1998 
Agreement for the Promotion of Corporate Workouts and the 2001 Corporate Restructuring 
Promotion Law provided a standardized framework for out-of-court workouts for creditors 
(Zafft and Vassiliou 2002).  All of these measures improved the legal enforcement 
mechanism for creditors and helped KAMCO achieve a NPL recovery rate of almost 48 
percent.  
 One of the most noteworthy methods that secured KAMCO’s success was 
securitization.  Securitization is the act of transferring assets to a special-purpose vehicle 
(SPV) and issuing securities to investors with the backing of the stream of cash flows 
generated by the assets.  KAMCO’s use of securitization was supported by the promulgation 
of the Asset-Backed Securitization Act in 1998, followed by the Mortgage-Backed 
Securitization Company Act in 1999.  The regulations stipulated that (a) SPVs may purchase 
or issue securities using any receivables, real estate and other property rights, and (b) all 
rights to the securitized assets are directed to the transferee without retention by the transferor 
(EIU Country Finance South Korea 2004).  This latter provision set the foundation for a true 
sale of the securitized asset – an important prerequisite for securitization.  Foreign investors 
facilitated securitization efforts by contributing both their funds and expertise in 
securitization, which had been a relatively novel concept in Asia before 2000. 
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IV.a.ii. Japan 
 The major cause for Japan’s NPL problem was the banking system’s concentrated 
lending to the property sector through the 1980’s.  The subsequent explosion of the real 
estate bubble lowered the value of loan collaterals dramatically, affecting virtually all types of 
financial institutions.  Bank failures, occurring sporadically since 1991, escalated between 
1994 and 1998. 
 After an initial delay in responding to the NPL problem, the Japanese government 
created the Resolution and Collection Corp. (RCC) in 1998 to take over NPLs from 90 failed 
financial institutions at only 7.1 cents on the dollar (Fung et.al. 2004) – a substantial discount 
from book value.  This price approximated the true value of the real estate backing the 
acquired NPLs, given the distressed state of the property market in the late 1990’s.  RCC’s 
cash recovery rate is reported to be between 20 and 30 percent21, far exceeding its purchase 
price for the NPLs.  
 The RCC has historically resorted to straight loan collection, while turning only 
recently to restructuring.  Although securitization has so far represented only 1 percent of 
RCC’s total NPL recovery (Fung et.al. 2004), Japan has successfully completed two NPL 
securitizations, facilitated by important amendments to its legal framework.  The MITI Law 
of 1993 allowed SPVs to issue Asset Backed Securities using leases, credit card, auto, and 
installment sales contract receivables (Chen 2004).  The SPC Law of 1998 lowered the 
capital requirement for SPVs and reduced taxes by 50 percent (Chen 2004).  Finally, an 
                                       
21 “China Suffers Losses from Undervalued Bad Loans,” SinoCast China Financial Watch, October 28, 2004. 
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amendment to the SPC Law in 2000 expanded the range of assets that could be securitized 
and allowed the usage of a trust structure (EIU Country Finance Japan 2004). 
 Reorganization of companies has been a recent initiative facilitated by the Corporate 
Reorganization Law, effective as of April 2003.  This legislation was accompanied by the 
establishment of the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ), a joint-stock 
company with government-guaranteed loans to focus on reorganizations.  The IRCJ reviews 
reorganization plans and purchases loans from “non-main banks” – secondary or tertiary 
creditors – at the request of debtor corporations with excessive debts and their “main banks” 
(primary creditors).  Ten trillion yen of funds have been made available to the IRCJ to 
purchase NPLs, which has received requests from six companies as of September 2003 
(Takagi 2003).  
IV.a.iii. Thailand 
 Thailand’s NPL problem was triggered by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which 
affected many banks that issued foreign currency loans to debtors with local currency income 
streams.  Thailand accepted a rescue package from the International Monetary Fund valued 
at $3.9 billion, in exchange for agreeing to certain economic reforms.  The country’s NPL 
ratio, in excess of 45 percent of total loans in 1998, was successfully reduced to just about 12 
percent by March 2004 (Vongvipanond 2004). 
 The first reaction of the Thai government to the NPL problem was to create the 
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA), an agency that rapidly divested the assets of 
58 suspended finance companies through a series of bulk sales, 56 of which were 
subsequently shut down (Zafft and Vassiliou 2002).  These NPL sales stimulated activities in 
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the real estate sector and resulted in new legal procedures for the disposal of foreclosed 
assets. 
 Following FRA’s bulk NPL sales, Thailand focused on using restructuring as the main 
approach in resolving NPLs.  Two state agencies were founded to restructure NPLs: the Thai 
Asset Management Corp. (TAMC) and the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory 
Committee (CDRAC).  Each organization adopted a different approach in pursuing the 
restructuring, generating substantially different results.   
 The TAMC, established in 2001 under the sanction of TAMC Decree, was given 
extraordinary legal powers to unilaterally amend loan terms, conduct debt-for-equity swap, 
and foreclose on debtors’ assets – all without the debtor’s consent or court approval (EIU 
Country Finance Thailand 2004).  The TAMC was also given superpowers for 
reorganization and its workout officers were granted immunity from prosecution.  The 
TAMC acquired primarily substandard NPLs from state-owned institutions, in addition to 
secured NPLs from private financial institutions (Kosolkitiwang 2001). 
 By the end of November 2004, the TAMC had resolved Baht 767 billion of NPLs, 
over 98% of the total amount of loans it had acquired from state-owned and private financial 
institutions over the past three years22.  The expected recovery rate of 49 percent of the 
restructured loans far exceeds the 34 percent of book value that the TAMC had paid to 
financial institutions on average in exchange for the assets23.  A profit-sharing scheme24 
                                       
22 “TAMC Reports on Debt Restructuring Progress,” Thai News Service, December 23, 2004. 
23 See supra note 22. 
24 If the ultimate recovery yields a profit, the first 20% of the profit is shared equally by the TAMC and the financial 
institution; additional profit not exceeding the difference between the recovery value and the transfer price is absorbed by the 
financial institution; whereas any profits remaining is absorbed by the TAMC.  If the ultimate recovery yields a loss, the 
first 20% of the loss is absorbed by the financial institution; the second 20% is shared by the TAMC and the financial 
institution; whereas any loss remaining is absorbed by the TAMC (Pornavalai 2002). 
 34
between the TAMC and the financial institution further increased the incentive for the TAMC 
to maximize the realization value of the NPLs. 
 In contrast, the CDRAC was established as a committee to focus on out-of-court 
workouts.  It adopted the more traditional approach of encouraging private negotiations 
between creditors and debtors, with the objective of allowing enterprises to survive whenever 
possible.  The CDRAC took over Baht 2.84 trillion of NPLs between mid-1998 and 
September 2003, and has moved much more slowly than the TAMC.  By the end of 2004, 
the CDRAC has successfully restructured cases worth Baht 1.40 trillion, yet failed 
restructuring in cases worth Baht 413 billion (EIU Country Finance Thailand 2004). 
 The contrasting results of the TAMC and the CDRAC indicate a likely link between 
the success rate of recovery and the resolution approach undertaken.  Drawing from the 
TAMC’s success, China should benefit from awarding special legal powers to its AMCs, 
giving them the latitude to exercise more aggressive collection methods against the debtors. 
 On the legal front, Thailand introduced major reforms to its insolvency laws 
following the Asian financial crisis.  In 1998, the government amended its Bankruptcy Act to 
include a new reorganization procedure in addition to the existing liquidation provisions.  In 
1999, the Bankruptcy Act was amended again to eliminate the immunity of debt guarantors 
from bankruptcy cases, to establish a formal mechanism in determining classes of creditors, 
and to extend the definition of applications where “avoidance power” can be exercised25 
(Dasri 2003).  During the same year, a specialized bankruptcy court was formed to expedite 
                                       
25 The court can void payments that debtors made up to three months before the bankruptcy application, and for 
“advantaged creditors,” up to one year before the application. 
 35
the legal hearing process, followed by the creation of new foreclosure laws that allowed most 
foreclosure cases to be completed within 12 to 18 months (Dasri 2003). 
 Thailand also adopted securitization methods in its NPL disposal, facilitated by, 
notably, the 1997 Securitization Act, which permitted the creation of SPVs and the transfer of 
assets from issuers to investors without giving notice to debtors (EIU Country Finance 
Thailand 2004).  The investors of the securitized assets are further insulated from future 
problems of the issuer. 
IV.b. Challenges to China’s NPL Resolution 
 Both Korea and Thailand have worked through NPA resolution in a speedy and 
efficient manner, although the approaches they emphasized have varied.  Korea focused on 
securitization, direct asset sales, and debt collection, in order to maximize upfront cash 
recovery in a short period of time.  Thailand, on the other hand, chose to carry out debt 
restructuring and workouts almost exclusively, recovering little cash upfront yet expecting to 
maximize asset value in the future.  Compared to Korea, Thailand faces a higher residual 
risk of restructured loans, i.e., the restructured loans might not ultimately be repaid, 
especially if macroeconomic conditions suffer a downturn.  Disadvantaged by its huge NPL 
portfolio, low quality of assets, and limited expertise in restructuring, China should 
preferably adopt primarily Korea’s approach of emphasizing speedy resolution.   
 To date, China has largely followed KAMCO’ model, utilizing a variety of NPL 
resolution methods, including debt-for-equity swap, restructuring, liquidation, direct sales to 
investors, and securitization, to be discussed in detail in section V.  However, the speed of 
recovery in China has trailed the performance of both Korea’s KAMCO and Thailand’s 
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TAMC.  Through the end of 2004, the four AMCs collectively recovered only RMB 675 
billion of NPLs, or less than 40 percent of the NPLs transferred to them since 1999.  The 
banks have been even slower in their resolution, given regulations that prohibit them from 
selling NPLs at below book value (with the exception of settled assets).  In contrast, as of 
December 2004, Korea’s KAMCO resolved over 62 percent of loans it acquired since 
November 1997.  The cash recovery rate of the Chinese AMCs approximated 20 percent as 
of December 2004.  This performance was also substantially behind KAMCO’s actual cash 
recovery rate of 48 percent and TAMC’s expected recovery rate of 49%26, although closer to 
RCC’s estimated cash recovery of 20 percent to 30 percent.  Both the resolution speed and 
cash recovery rate of Chinese AMCs have lagged those of their counterparts, primarily as a 
result of (a) lower asset quality, (b) weak legal framework, (c) book value NPL transfer to 
AMCs, and (d) poor corporate governance and transparency at the AMCs.  
IV.b.i. Low Asset Quality 
 Except for the healthiest bad loans, the quality of most NPLs declines in proportion to 
the amount of time they stay in the system.  Out of the 1.7 trillion of NPLs transferred to the 
Chinese AMCs to date, 1.4 trillion were policy loans from the pre-1995 years.  This implies 
that the AMCs face the arduous task of recovering value from operations that had been 
suspended for as long as ten years.  Furthermore, investments into “redundant projects” – 
those that were halted due to the violation of land, environmental and other regulations – 
amounted to about RMB 800 billion, some RMB 300 billion of which originated from bank 
lending (Kynge 2004).  There is arguably little value to be extracted from such projects, 
                                       
26 Thailand has focused on debt restructuring instead of disposal, hence the realized cash recovery rate is very low. 
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where plants and equipment have stayed idle at length.  In comparison, KAMCO purchased 
most of its NPLs between the years 1998 and 2002.  All of these NPLs were formed during 
the second half of the 1990’s, suggesting a higher quality of the loans and thereby increasing 
the recovery potential. 
 Another problem with China’s NPL portfolio is the lack of physical collateral backing 
many of the NPLs, which automatically decreases the potential sale price of the loans.  In 
2001, the AMCs estimated that only about 22 percent of the RMB 1.4 trillion NPL portfolio 
they had taken over were secured by real estate, intellectual property rights, or other tangible 
securities (Pierce and Yee 2001).  Furthermore, the true value of the security backing the 
loans accounted for only about 42 percent of the amount of the total amount of secured debt.  
The substantial valuation differential between secured and unsecured loans can be 
demonstrated through KAMCO’s acquisition price of NPLs.  KAMCO offered only three 
cents on the dollar for unsecured NPLs, whereas secured NPLs were purchased at 45 percent 
of the senior lien on the appraised value of the collateral27 (Mulye et.al. 2002).   
 Among the types of collateral backing the NPLs, investors have an overwhelming 
preference for real estate due to its liquidity.  This was substantiated by my interviews with 
David Bednar, former executive at Morgan Stanley and Kevin Young, Citigroup executive, as 
well as PwC’s China NPL Investor Survey 2004.  According to Bednar, Morgan Stanley 
focused on being a real estate play in its NPL purchase from Huarong AMC, and exercised 
far more caution with loans backed by machinery, accounts receivable, and inventories.  The 
                                       
27 Except for initial purchases which were adjusted for the present value of projected cash flows multiplied by the discount 
rate. 
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valuation of the latter is more difficult to determine due to the deterioration of these assets 
over time and the insufficiency of loan documentation.  Unfortunately, real estate 
collateralized loans accounted for only seven percent of the NPL portfolio transferred to the 
Chinese AMCs in 1999, much lower in comparison to Thailand’s TAMC as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Sectoral Distribution of Assets Transferred to AMCs (Book Value) 
 Real Estate Manufacturing Commerce Import/Export Others 
China 7% 42% 18% 8% 22% 
Thailand 24% 28% 11% 10% 27% 
__________ 
(a) Represents only the non-performing loans transferred to the AMCs in 1999. 
Source: Fung, et.al. 2004; based on central banks, AMC publications, official estimates, and authors’ own estimates. 
IV.b.ii. Weak Legal Framework 
 Korea, Thailand, and Japan’s experiences demonstrate that a key factor to succeeding 
in NPL recovery is a transparent and user-friendly insolvency law framework that gives 
creditors adequate protection.  All of these countries have made significant improvements 
and/or additions to their bankruptcy and securitization legislations over the last six years.  In 
contrast, the main governing bankruptcy law in China, remains the Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law of the PRC (Trial Implementation), a legislation enacted almost 20 years ago and 
exclusively tailored to SOEs.  Although a series of legislations containing articles regulating 
non-SOEs' bankruptcies had been issued since then, including the 1991 Civil Procedure Law, 
the 1993 Company Law, and the 1996 Measures on Liquidation Procedures for Foreign 
Invested Enterprises, none of the legislations went into much details about the subject (PwC 
December 2004).  Until now, there have not yet been unified bankruptcy legislations 
applicable to both private and state-owned enterprises. 
 My interviews with Bednar and Young revealed that legal impediments are among the 
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top obstacles for NPL investors.  In reality, bankruptcy procedures are carried out on an ad 
hoc basis, and are heavily influenced by local political powers.  Many of the bankruptcies 
are “policy-directed,” or directly enforced by the government with little consultation of the 
1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.  There are also restrictions by region on the number of 
entities eligible for bankruptcy (Jones and Culler 2005).  Even when a company goes 
through the bankruptcy process, the court-appointed liquidation committee typically consists 
of governmental staff with limited expertise in the bankruptcy process and little regard for 
creditor rights (see the GITIC case study in Section V.b.iii.). 
 Unlike the other aforementioned East Asian economies, China does not have 
provisions regulating the reorganization process in the current bankruptcy legislations.  Nor 
are there real repossession or foreclosure laws, so that investors have generally been hesitant 
in acquiring NPLs when the foreclosure of assets is required in order to realize the value of 
the investment. 
IV.b.iii.Book Value NPL Transfers to AMCs 
 In 1999, the Chinese government mandated that the four AMCs complete their first 
NPL purchase at the full book value of RMB 1.4 trillion.  The transfer price of the NPLs 
was far from their true value, widely anticipated to be below 20 percent of book value.  This 
requirement prevented the four SOCBs from having to take immediate, large write-downs of 
their loan portfolios.  However, it also created an inevitable loss for the AMCs, hence 
providing disincentives for them to maximize the recovery price.  In comparison, Korea’s 
KAMCO, Japan’s RCC, and Thailand’s TAMC have, on average, acquired their NPL 
portfolios at 36 percent, 7 percent, and 35 percent of face value, respectively – all based on 
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formalized valuation methods.  The actual or expected recovery price exceeds the transfer 
price in each of these countries, thus establishing the public AMCs as profit-making entities 
and incentivizing them to maximize resolution potential.  Moreover, KAMCO’s put 
provision to financial institutions and the TAMC’s profit/loss-sharing arrangement with 
financial institutions (see footnote 24) allowed them to transfer some of the loss burden back 
to the banks, should the NPLs be lower in quality than envisioned.  Such mechanisms are 
unprecedented in China. 
IV.b.iv. Poor Corporate Governance and Transparency at the AMCs 
 As state-owned non-banking financial institutions, China’s AMCs answer to a 
multitude of political agencies whilst attempting simultaneously to act as commercial entities.  
Members from the CBRC, the Ministry of Finance, and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission sit on the Supervisory Board of the AMCs, all with separate agendas.  Perhaps 
the most controversial matter regarding corporate governance at the AMCs is the fact that the 
President of the four SOCBs also serve as the Party Secretary – a key position – at each of the 
four corresponding AMCs (Fung and Ma 2002).  This intertwining relationship between the 
banks and the AMCs points to the lack of independence of the AMCs, and may have 
attributed to the slow pace of NPL recovery.   
 The degree of information transparency among the AMCs is also deficient, especially 
compared to the Korean and Thai AMCs.  While two of the larger AMCs, Cinda and 
Huarong, regularly publish press releases and disclose some information on NPLs available 
for sale on their websites, the other two AMCs’ English websites are loaded with missing or 
outdated information.  In contrast, KAMCO and TAMC publish annual reports in addition to 
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providing regular updates on their websites (Fung et.al. 2004).   
 Unlike KAMCO and TAMC, the Chinese AMCs are exempt from external audits by 
independent parties.  Thus, corruption and inadequate controls are a widespread problem at 
the AMCs, similar to their banking counterparts.  According to a recent press release by IFR 
Asia (2005), the Chinese National Audit Office has uncovered 38 cases of illegal practices at 
each of the four AMCs – involving assets totaling approximately RMB 6.7 billion.  Industry 
insiders believe that such practices included “collusion, insider trading, connected 
transactions, improper appraisal processes, fraudulent bidding and auction processes, lack of 
internal controls, embezzlement and mismanagement of assets.”28  The AMCs are currently 
under investigation from the National Audit Office, the CBRC, and the PBOC.  
IV.c. Measures to Narrow the Gap 
 While there is little that can be done to upgrade the quality of its NPLs, the 
government has realized that it could undertake other proactive measures to improve the 
recovery speed and rate of its NPLs.  Over the last two years, China has started making 
progress towards reforming its legal framework, rationalizing NPL transfer pricing to AMCs, 
and revamping the cultures at its AMC.   
IV.c.i. Legislative Reform 
 A redraft of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law has been in the works, on and off for the 
last ten years.  In October 2004, a second version of the law was submitted to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, and is expected to be passed in 2005 after a 
third reading.  The new law represents the Chinese authorities’ willingness to move towards 
                                       
28 “China’s AMCs at the Crossroads,” IFR Asia, February 16, 2005. 
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international standards and cast some transparency on the worst-case scenario for NPL 
investors.  In fact, many of the provisions are similar to those found in the United States’ 
Bankruptcy Code (Jones and Culler 2005).  PwC’s report China’s Proposed New Bankruptcy 
Law: The Practical Implications (2004) outlined the following categories where the proposed 
bankruptcy law breaks new grounds: 
• Scope of Application: The law applies to all types of legal enterprises, including 
private, state-owned, and foreign investment enterprises.  This was a significant 
improvement from the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, which applied exclusively 
to SOEs. 
• Nature of Bankruptcy Test: While the new law recommends both the cash flow 
insolvency test and balance sheet insolvency test to support a bankruptcy petition, it 
also proposes that a creditor could file for involuntary bankruptcy on behalf of the 
debtor if the debtor fails to repay its debt obligations.  This implies that a cash flow 
test – typically more indicative of the debtor’s true solvency – could suffice for the 
creditor to file a petition.   
• Determination of Administrator: The law tightened the qualifications for the 
administrator, a trustee assigned to manage the debtor’s assets and oversee the 
liquidation/reorganization process.  Although the People’s Court makes the initial 
appointment, the administrator will report to a creditors’ commission, which has the 
power to remove the trustee or withhold fees from the administrator, if unsatisfied 
with the trustee’s actions (Jones and Culler 2005).  This contrasts with the current 
process, whereby bankruptcy procedures are administered strictly by government 
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officials.  The creditors’ rights to oversee and if necessary, to replace the 
administrator will clearly give them more confidence in the bankruptcy process.   
• Penalties for Foul Play: The law provides for the application of “avoidance powers,” 
i.e. the administrator can revoke payments made by the debtor within six months 
prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case, if the debtor entered into the 
transactions with the knowledge that it might damage other creditors’ rights.  
Debtors, administrators, or members of the creditors’ committees can also be subject 
to fines and criminal prosecution for negligence or deliberate offense. 
• Priority of Payments: The new law clarified the priority of payments in the following 
order: bankruptcy estate expense, secured property claims (up to the value of the 
collateral, with the remainder being treated as a common claim), labor claims 
(including salaries, social insurance and other fees), taxes, and common claims 
(Jones and Culler 2005). 
• Provisions on Reorganization: The new law established a new chapter on 
reorganization procedures, covering the application process, examination and 
approval of the application, business operations during the interim period, and 
reorganization plans.  The administrator has the exclusive right to propose a 
reorganization plan within six months after the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case.  All creditors who declare a claim are entitled to vote on a proposed plan, the 
approval of which requires the vote of at least two-thirds of the dollar claims in each 
class, and more than half of the creditors in each class – similar to the U.S. 
bankruptcy code stipulations. 
 44
 While the proposed bankruptcy law has taken huge strides on a variety of issues 
including reorganization and administrator designation, it is not without its problems.  First, 
given the untested nature of many provisions, it is yet to be seen whether the law could be 
successfully implemented in a society where local political forces have overwhelmingly 
impacted the bankruptcy process in the past.  Second, as PwC’s December 2004 report 
pointed out, the People’s Court is burdened with too many roles that will test its technical 
expertise and human resource capacity, especially when numerous clauses are still subject to 
interpretation.  Third, the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does not apply to all companies.  
It excludes about 1,800 of the nation’s largest SOEs in select sectors, which will continue to 
undergo “policy-oriented bankruptcy” within the next three to five years, according to PwC’s 
report China’s New Bankruptcy Law: The Start of Something Big? (2004). 
IV.c.ii.Fair-Value NPL Transfer to AMCs 
 The requirement for AMCs to purchase NPLs at book value underwent alteration for 
the first time in 2004.  In July 2004, Cinda AMC beat out the other AMCs in winning an 
auction to purchase RMB 278.7 billion of NPLs from CCB and BOC, paying 50 cents on the 
dollar and promising to recover 33 to 34 cents on the dollar by the end of 2005, according to 
PwC’s NPL Asia report (2004).  Cinda also won an auction to buy RMB 41.4 billion of 
NPLs from Bank of Communications, the fifth largest bank in China, at 50 percent of book 
value29.  The promised recovery value for that deal was 30 percent to 40 percent.  While 
the transfer pricing remains high and will likely exceed the ultimate recovery value – as 
indicated by Cinda’s promised recovery prices – this migration away from mechanical book 
                                       
29 “Cinda to Buy Bank of Communications’ Bad Loans at 50% Discount,” Business Daily Update, July 12, 2004. 
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value pricing implies the government’s willingness to draw the line between pure 
recapitalization and NPL carve-out, and is a right step towards providing the proper 
incentives to AMCs.  The Chinese government is also providing cash incentives to AMCs 
for maximizing returns and accelerating recovery rate, which should further help increase the 
commercial orientation of these entities. 
IV.c.iii.Revamping of AMC Cultures 
 The Chinese government encourages AMCs to partner with foreign investors and 
advisors with substantial expertise in management of distressed assets.  Through its first 
large-scale NPL auction, Huarong AMC formed two separate joint ventures with Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs, respectively, to collect, manage and dispose of NPLs.  The 
investors paid an initial price of about 10 percent of book value for the assets, and the joint 
ventures agreed to share the remaining proceeds from the sale of loans.  The joint ventures 
gave Huarong the valuable opportunity to learn from distressed asset specialists, while 
enabling the AMC to ultimately recover over 20 percent of book value on the NPLs.  Cinda 
AMC formed similar joint ventures with Deutsche Bank and Lone Star, a U.S.-based 
distressed asset fund.  The two AMCs also engaged international advisors Ernst & Young 
and Deloitte & Touche to assist in its activities, while all four AMCs retained KAMCO to 
explore asset-backed securitization opportunities. 
 The TAMC’s ability to restructure over Baht 700 billion of NPLs in just two years 
was largely attributable to its superior legal power in amending debt terms, foreclosing on 
assets, and reorganizing.  Since it will take some time for the new bankruptcy law to be in 
place and fully functional, the Chinese government should create a special decree for the four 
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AMCs to override the current legislations.  The new decree should award the AMCs with 
special legal powers, similar to those given to the TAMC, to enforce their creditor rights in a 
speedy manner.  
 
V. NPL Resolution Methods 
 The Chinese AMCs have primarily adopted the following recovery methods: 
debt-for-equity swap, restructuring of debt terms, debt collection, sale or lease of real 
property, direct sales of packaged or individual NPLs, and securitizations.  The banks 
themselves have also applied some of these measures in resolving their NPL portfolios, 
although they face much tougher regulatory restrictions, such as prohibition from selling 
loans at below book value. 
V.a. Debt-for-Equity Swap 
V.a.i. Background 
 In 1999, the Chinese government decided to implement a debt-for-equity swap 
program for large and medium-sized SOEs where it deemed that growth opportunities existed.  
This action wiped out the debt obligation of a SOE to its bank and substituted it with the 
equity ownership of the AMC(s) that took over the NPL in question from the bank.  AMCs 
would then be entitled to dividends and subsequent share repurchase from the SOEs at 
agreed-upon prices within ten years (Fung and Ma 2002), should the latter ever become 
profitable.  Furthermore, local governments were often required to guarantee that the AMCs 
get first priority in exiting their equity stake through public listings or a change of control 
event.  In addition to the AMCs, the banks themselves have also converted some of the 
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NPLs into equity, although the exact amount is unclear. 
 To date, around 580 SOEs converted more than RMB 400 billion of debt into equity 
rights held by the AMCs.  The short-term result of the program appears impressive.  The 
SOEs’ average indebtedness decreased from 73 percent in 1999 to 50 percent of total capital 
in 2000, and 80 percent of the companies turned a profit during the year (Ye and Zhai 2001).  
However, these figures were largely a result of the pure conversion of debt to equity and the 
termination of interest payments.  The new equity stakes that the AMC inherited could 
remain worthless under a new capital structure, if it is not accompanied by an improvement in 
the fundamentals of the SOEs. 
V.a.ii. Effectiveness 
 One major debate with the debt-for-equity swap scheme is whether it would 
ultimately improve the financial health of the SOEs over the long term.  The 580 SOEs that 
underwent the financial restructuring were handpicked by the State Economic & Trade 
Commission and subsequently approved by the State Council, the Ministry of Finance, and 
the central bank (Pierce and Yee 2001).  Given the lack of transparency in the qualification 
process, many question whether political influences may have outweighed commercial 
judgments in certain instances. 
 One of the measuring sticks of the debt-for-equity swap program is the level of 
improvement to corporate governance standards at the SOEs.  Historically, high-level 
decisions at such companies have typically been handed down by an individual or a 
bureaucratic entity.  Some SOEs established a Board of Directors to govern the 
decision-making process after undergoing the debt-for-equity swap.  As members of the 
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Board, AMCs were then able to exert real influence over the company’s operations and 
potentially manage to turn the company around over the long term.  One of the SOEs that 
made such progress was Xingang Steel, a subsidiary of the Capital Iron and Steel Company, 
which reincorporated as a limited liability company after the debt-for-equity swap.  Three 
AMCs, Huarong, Cinda, and Orient received nearly RMB 3.6 billion of debt-equity stock 
rights, controlling approximately 47 percent of the company together.  Xingang earned a 
profit of RMB 10.1 million in 2000, and Huarong, a 39 percent shareholder, was able to 
retrieve equity of RMB 44.5 million and receive a dividend totaling RMB 1.5 million during 
the year30.  
 While corporate governance standards have improved at some of the SOEs, most 
experienced limited changes of substance following the debt-for-equity-swap, especially 
when the AMC became the minority instead of the controlling shareholder at the restructured 
SOEs.  An example was Fu Shun Special Iron (Group) LLC which, despite its 
reincorporation and a 26.2 percent equity transfer to three AMCs, continued to operate 
without a Board of Directors and under the sole discretion of the Company’s President (Ye 
and Zhai 2001).  Fu Shun’s restructuring appears to be a mere formality, and the 
debt-for-equity swap did not improve the chance of ultimate cash realization for the AMCs 
through dividends and/or equity repurchase.  Thus, unless the debt-for-equity swap program 
fundamentally improves the operation of a SOE, this measure is merely a mechanical fix to 
the capital structure, and will have little impact on cash recovery over the long-term.  
                                       
30 “Debt-to-equity Swap Brings Economic Results to Steel Firm,” People’s Daily, June 7, 2001. 
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V.a.iii. Exit Options 
 For the Chinese AMCs and banks, there are three exit options for debt-for-equity 
shares: direct sale to investors, IPO listing, and equity buyback by SOEs.  The timing and 
likelihood of the latter two options are highly uncertain, while a direct sale to investors is the 
fastest way for the AMCs and banks to convert their equity rights into cash.  Based on 
public news releases and my discussions with various parties, however, there have been 
relatively few transactions of direct sales of debt-for-equity shares to investors31.  
Conceivably, this is because investors typically aim to realize their investments within a short 
period of time, an unlikely scenario for completely uncollateralized equity shares.  
Purchasing equity rights will also require the investor to take on the active day-to-day 
management of the company, given the limited protection for passive investors (Lawrence 
and Yee 2001).  Lastly, the dearth of equity rights transaction to date may point to the 
likelihood that investors have little conviction in the quality of the companies approved to 
undergo the debt-for-equity swap.  According to PwC’s NPL Asia report (2004), China 
Construction Bank is planning to hold an auction of debt-for-equity interests, with an 
estimated book value of RMB 46 billion ($5.6 billion).  The success of this auction may 
provide further insight into the likely value that investors place on debt-for-equity shares.   
                                       
31 One of the exceptions was Cinda AMC, which sold a majority debt-for-equity stake in a power plant in Anhui province to 
American Alliant Energy International Ltd. in 2001 (“Alliant Energy Takes Over Debt-Ridden China Power Plant,” Dow 
Jones International News, April 20, 2001).  In 2002, China Development Bank, one of China’s three policy banks, worked 
with UBS Warburg to manage and dispose of RMB 40 billion of debt-for-equity shares (“Banks Cooperate to Swap Debt 
Into Equity,” China Daily, April 6, 2002).  However, an inside source revealed that only 30 percent of the equity was 
transformed from NPLs, while the remainder consisted of secured and profit-making assets.   
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V.b. Other Restructuring/Liquidation Methods 
V.b.i. Background 
 Aside from direct sales and securitizations – to be analyzed next – the main NPL 
disposition methods adopted by the AMCs include debt collection, sale or lease of real 
property, restructuring of debt terms, and bankruptcy settlement. 
 Despite antiquated bankruptcy legislations dating back to the 1980s, approximately 
70,000 enterprises have gone bankrupt by the end of 2004 (PwC December 2004).  So far in 
China, bankruptcy usually means liquidation, and was mostly “policy-directed.”  Through 
April 2004, the Chinese government has closed approximately 3,500 insolvent SOEs, 
allocating about $6 billion to SOE bankruptcy subsidiaries, financing the settlement of 
laid-off liability relating to 6.2 million workers, and writing off about $27 billion of bad loans 
(PwC December 2004).  Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have taken the full 
brunt of these ownership transformations, in accordance with China’s 1999 4th Plenum 
Decision to “let go” small SOEs and “grasp” large SOEs (Mako and Zhang 2003). 
V.b.ii. Major Issues 
 One of the main obstacles that AMCs encountered in their debt collection efforts is 
created by their own status as SOEs.  A manager at Orient AMC was quoted as saying: “We 
go to a SOE and they say: ‘I am state owned, you are state owned. I don't have to pay you 
back because we are brothers.’  They always try their best to dodge the affair.  With foreign 
investors, although it will still be difficult, it will be different.” (Cockerill 2002)  Another 
impediment is the AMCs’ inability to seek remedy when companies reneged on the debt 
restructuring contracts they entered into – a recurrent phenomenon.  According to Zhang 
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(2004), as many as thirty percent of total contracts were breached for Huarong, and about 50 
percent of total contracts were breached for Orient and Great Wall.  This problem can be 
alleviated if the Chinese government awards the AMCs special legal powers to foreclose on 
assets immediately, as soon as a SOE reneges on a restructuring contract.   
 When it comes to bankruptcy, the proceedings in China have often been subject to 
political manipulation.  In order to evade their debt obligations, solvent companies were 
able to set up new entities, transfer all of their assets into the new company, and then declare 
bankruptcy on the original shell, which has been stripped free of any assets.  Companies 
have also misappropriated assets in other types of fraudulent insider transactions prior to 
declaring bankruptcy.  Orient AMC, for example, reported in April 2001 that SOEs had 
evaded about RMB 12 billion worth of debts through such methods (Lawrence and Yee 2001).    
Frequently, local governments were in collusion with such firms, and creditor rights have too 
often been set aside in the bankruptcy process, manipulated by liquidation committees 
usually consisting solely of governmental officials.  This was evidenced in the largest 
bankruptcy in China since 1949 – that of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp. 
(GITIC) in 1999. 
V.b.iii. Case Study – GITIC 
 Until its bankruptcy, GITIC was the second largest investment trust corporation in 
China, with assets exceeding RMB 20 billion at the end of 1996 (Shih 2003).  It was also 
one of the first major financial institutions to issue bonds overseas.  The company’s loans 
and investments were extremely diverse, ranging from MacDonald’s restaurants in 
Guangdong to stock brokerages to the Guangdong Exhibition Center, with projects extending 
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to other countries including the U.S. and Australia.  GITIC was headquartered in the tallest 
building in China at the time – the 63-story Guangzhou International Building, a five-star 
hotel, office and residential complex also owned and operated by the company. 
 Due to overextended real estate investments and misappropriation of funds, GITIC 
became insolvent.  When the company filed for bankruptcy in January 1999, it owed RMB 
46.7 billion ($5.6 billion) of debt to 494 domestic and international creditors.  Eighty 
percent of this amount was owed to international creditors (Shih 2003).  However, the 
bankruptcy court recognized only about $2.4 billion of the claims against the company 
(Mitchell 2003).  As of 2003 – following four years of bankruptcy proceedings – the 
creditors received only about $300 million, or 12.5 percent of the $2.4 billion.   
 Bottini’s 2003 article revealed a few controversial issues emerging from the 
bankruptcy process that undermined creditors’ – in particular foreign creditors’ – confidence 
in the Chinese bankruptcy system.  First, creditors, even the largest ones, were unable to 
obtain a list of the parties with claims against the bankrupt estate.  Many of these creditors 
on the list were other SOEs.   GITIC’s liquidation committee argued that such SOEs would 
experience difficulties in borrowing from state banks, should the list be made public.  
Ironically, this argument was directly opposed to the commercial orientation that the banks 
are supposed to adopt.  Ultimately, the creditor list was released, yet only after the 
bankruptcy court had already confirmed the list of claimants.  At that time, none of the 
creditors had the opportunity to challenge any of the claims.  To date, the identity of 
Guangzhou International Building’s buyer still remains a secret to many overseas creditors.  
 Second, GITIC’s liquidation committee refused to disclose the details of specific 
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assets, including assets that other companies owed to GITIC.  Many of these debtors were 
also other SOEs.  The confidential arrangement effectively prevented creditors from 
challenging any special status for specific assets. 
 Lastly, even though many of GITIC’s loans and investments were guaranteed by local 
governments, the Bankruptcy Court voided all of these guarantees on the basis of illegality.  
The court did order the governmental entities to pay 50 percent of total liability based on a 
“reliance type theory.” (Mitchell 2003)  However, most of these organizations declared 
inability to fulfill these obligations, which remain unpaid to date.  The total unpaid 
government compensation fees amounted to $360 million, which if paid, could have brought 
the recovery rate to 30 percent for creditors (Mitchell 2003). 
 The lack of transparency in the GITIC bankruptcy case revealed the urgency for the 
enactment of the new bankruptcy law and the involvement of qualified trustees untainted by 
political agendas to oversee the liquidation process.  Hopefully, under the new law, 
creditors’ rights could be strengthened by their ability to oversee and if necessary, reappoint 
the administrator. 
V.c. Direct Sales to Investors 
V.c.i. Background 
 The direct sales of NPLs to investors generally take two forms: sales of individual 
assets and bulk sales, including negotiated sales and auctions.  Assets available for sale 
include debt, equity (converted from debt), and real property, i.e. assets that banks seized 
from debtors as settlement.  Sales of debt rights are the most frequent type of transaction, 
followed by settled assets and to a lesser extent, equity rights.  Investors profit from the 
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difference between the purchase price and their ultimate recovery price, typically through 
either negotiated settlements with the debtor or sales/transfers to a third party.  Some 
investors manage to foreclose on assets backing the loans, although this is much more 
difficult due to legal and bureaucratic restrictions. 
 The primary benefit of the direct sales method is immediate liquidity to the bank or 
the AMC, somewhat at the expense of lower recovery value – a phenomenon demonstrated in 
other countries such as Korea.  Investors, in particular international ones, are showing strong 
interest in China’s distressed assets, as other Asian NPL markets (such as Korea and Japan) 
have matured and the Chinese government opened up its huge NPL market.  However, to 
date only about US$6.6 billion of NPLs were sold to foreign investors, representing a tiny 
fraction of the US$500 - US$650 billion in total NPAs.  Table 7 provides a summary of 
direct NPL sales to foreign investors.  Sales to domestic investors, in comparison, are not 
well publicized.  Upfront recovery value typically ranged between 7 and 15 percent, or 
about 10 percent on average for reported transactions, although the AMCs may be able to 
recover additional value through JV arrangements.  The two transactions with the highest 
recovery rates (around 34%) are both collateralized by real estate assets. 
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Table 7  
Direct NPL Sales to Foreign Investors 
AMC/ 
Bank 
 
Year 
Asset 
Nature 
 
Geography 
 
Book Value 
 
Sale Value 
Recovery/BV 
for the Seller 
 
Sale Type 
 
Investor(s) 
Cinda 2001   $145MM 
(RMB 1.2 Bn) 
  Negotiated Chenery 
Associates 
Orient 2001  Harbin $217MM 
(RMB 1.8 Bn) 
$21MM 
upfront 
10% upfront 
(50% JV after) 
Negotiated Chenery 
Associates 
Orient 2002  Yanjiang $210MM 
(RMB 1.7 Bn) 
  Negotiated Chenery 
Associates 
Huarong 2002 Debt rights, 
60% secured 
/guaranteed 
 $1.3 Bn 
(RMB 10.8 
Bn) 
RMB 877.5 
MM upfront 
8.125% 
upfront (exp. 
21% recovery) 
Open 
Auction 
Consortium led 
by Morgan 
Stanley 
Huarong 2002 Debt rights, 
60% secured 
/guaranteed 
 $240MM 
(RMB 
1.97Bn) 
RMB 197 
MM upfront 
10% upfront 
(exp. 21% 
recovery) 
Open 
Auction 
Goldman Sachs 
BOC 
(Cayman) 
2003   $1.8 Bn 
(RMB 14.9 
Bn) 
  Open 
Auction 
Citigroup 
Huarong 2004 Debt rights, 
40% secured 
/guaranteed 
 
 $2.2Bn (RMB 
18.4 Bn) 
 7 – 15% 
upfront 
(Huarong 
retained some 
interest 
through JVs) 
Open 
Auction 
Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup, UBS, 
Goldman Sachs, 
JP Morgan, 
Lehman, Ao Yi 
Er (domestic) 
CCB 2004 Settled 
Assets (Real 
Estate) 
160 assets 
over 18 
provinces 
$513MM 
(RMB 4.2 Bn) 
$178MM 
(RMB 1.5 Bn) 
34.75% Open 
Auction 
Morgan Stanley, 
Deutsche Bank 
Total Closed   $6.6 Bn     
CCB Signed 
2003 
Debt Rights  $524MM 
(RMB 4.3 Bn) 
 70% sold to 
MS, 30% JV 
Closed 
Auction 
Morgan Stanley 
Huarong Signed 
2004 
 Wuhan $215MM 
(RMB 1.8 Bn) 
  Closed 
Auction 
Morgan Stanley, 
GE 
Great 
Wall 
Signed 
2004 
 Guangdong $281MM 
(RMB 2.3 Bn) 
  Negotiated Citigroup 
Great 
Wall 
Signed 
2004 
  $1 Bn (RMB 
8.3 Bn) 
   Goldman Sachs 
Great 
Wall 
Signed 
2004 
Unsecured 
Debt Rights 
Guangdong About 
$140MM 
About $14 – 
15MM 
10 – 11% 
(unofficial) 
Auction 1 Domestic, 1+ 
Intl. Buyer(s) 
Orient Signed 
2004 
 180 firms 
in Harbin 
$290MM 
(RMB 2.4 Bn) 
  Open 
Auction 
CSFB 
Cinda Signed 
2004 
Debt rights 
Backed by 
Real Estate 
Tianjin $29.7MM 
(RMB 
246MM) 
$10.2MM 
(RMB 
85.1MM) 
34.6% Open 
Auction 
1 Domestic, 1 
Intl. Buyer 
Total Closed/Signed  $9.1 Bn     
______________ 
Sources: PwC China NPL Investor Survey 2004, PwC NPL Asia Report 2004, EIU Country Finance China (2004), and AMC website releases. 
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 A spur of NPL transactions were closed or signed in 2004, pointing to an acceleration 
in activity on the supply side.  During the year, Cinda AMC acquired RMB 278.7 billion 
($34 billion) of Category IV or “doubtful” NPLs from BOC and CCB, as well as RMB 41.4 
billion ($5 billion) of NPLs from Bank of Communications.  These NPLs, unlike the 
policy-oriented bad loans transferred to the four AMCs in 1999, are from the post-1995 years 
and are likely to be more attractive to investors in terms of quality.  Cinda has already 
announced plans to market RMB 21.5 billion ($2.6 billion) of NPLs from its newly acquired 
portfolio.  As many as 46 per cent of the tranche carries guarantees, and another 40 per cent 
is secured32.  This total proportion of guaranteed or secured loans is much higher than that 
the proportion in either of the Huarong auctions (40 to 60 percent of total loans).   
 The demand for NPL transactions from foreign investors also held its ground.  The 
early movers, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, closed or signed several NPL transactions 
in 2004 following their participation in the two Huarong auctions.  Deutsche Bank 
management announced that the bank expects to spend about US$1 billion on NPL purchases 
over the next three to five years33.  In addition to direct loan purchases, foreign investors 
adopted other creative measures to penetrate the Chinese NPL market.  Citigroup, for 
example, paid HK$845 million in 2004 to take a 16.4 percent equity stake in Silver Grant 
International Industries – an active, Hong-Kong based buyer of China’s distressed debt with 
close connections to Cinda AMC34 (Cheng and Miller 2004).  The U.S. bank became the 
                                       
32 “Cinda Pondering Massive NPL Sales,” Business Daily Update, February 1, 2005. 
33 “Deutsche Bank Plans NPL Outlay,” South China Morning Post, September 1, 2004. 
34 In September 2004, Silver Grant set the record of purchasing RMB 56.9 billion of “Category V” (lowest quality) NPLs 
from Cinda at only 1.5 cents on the dollar, with more than half of the purchase funded through a convertible note and the 
remainder in cash (Elliot Wilson, “Silver Grant Sees Gold in Bad Loans,” The Standard, November 9, 2004).  Silver Grant 
acts as a NPL middleman, purchasing NPLs from banks and AMCs, packaging them and reselling them to third-party 
investors. 
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second largest stakeholder in Silver Grant, behind Cinda which still owns 18.8 percent of the 
company.  According to a managing director at Citigroup, this joint venture with Silver 
Grant will provide Citigroup with “a platform to better understand underwriting, modeling 
and acquiring nonperforming loans in China.” (Cheng and Miller 2004)  
V.c.ii. Attractiveness to Investors 
 China’s NPLs can be extremely attractive to investors, despite their lower quality 
compared to assets in Korea and Thailand.  First, given the newness of the market, analyses 
of the true value of NPLs are scarce.  Investors willing to spend the effort and funds on due 
diligence have the prospect of purchasing the loans cheaply, sometimes at even pennies on 
the dollar, while gaining valuable understandings of China’s NPL market.  The first 
landmark NPL transaction in China was an auction held by Huarong AMC in 2001.  
Huarong sold RMB 10.8 billion of NPLs to a consortium led by Morgan Stanley at only 
8.125 percent of face value.  This transaction is expected to yield a cash recovery rate of 
above 20 percent35, which would imply a gross return in excess of 100 percent for Morgan 
Stanley (Li 2005).  Even taking into account the considerable due diligence, asset appraisal, 
legal, loan monitoring, office rental, and other fees, investors are still able to yield healthy 
post-tax returns.  Additionally, Morgan Stanley was able to obtain lending of about 30 
percent from International Finance Corporation (Li 2005), thereby defraying its upfront cost 
and further maximizing the returns on its own capital.  According to a banker at Goldman 
Sachs, Goldman also generated a venerable profit of $50 million on a $16 million investment 
                                       
35 As of year-end 2004, about 75 percent of the NPLs in the portfolio have been resolved, yielding a cash recovery rate of 
19%. 
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over a two-year period from the same Huarong auction (Slater 2005). 
 The purchase of NPLs creates special attraction to foreign investors, who still face 
substantial regulatory limitations in direct lending to Chinese companies.  Both analyst 
reports and my conversation with Bednar confirm that foreign investors see an important 
first-mover advantage in entering China’s NPL market ahead of competitors, both in terms of 
understanding the financial and legal aspects of a distressed asset purchase and gaining 
favorable access to future transactions.  This is a replay of Goldman Sachs’ story in Korea.  
Goldman made substantial returns on its investments by entering the Korean NPL market 
early – at a time when other investors hesitated due to the untested nature of corporate 
guarantees.  When its competitors finally decided to test the market themselves, Goldman 
relied on its advantage of a steeper learning curve to win four auctions in a row (Cockerill 
2002).  There are further investors that hope to capitalize on a potential revaluation of the 
RMB to higher levels, which may lead to an appreciation in the NPLs. 
 Second, certain non-performing loans originated from suspended projects after they 
ran out of funding.  When these projects are secured by real estate collateral, NPL investors 
may benefit from property price increases, especially in coastal areas such as Shanghai, 
where real estate prices have escalated in recent years.  For example, through the Huarong 
auction in 2001, Goldman Sachs acquired a loan collateralized by a piece of land in Pudong, 
Shanghai – a project that had been suspended since 1995.  The value of the land soared in 
2002, enabling Goldman Sachs to recoup its entire investment in the Huarong transaction 
through the sale of the land (Li 2005). 
 Third, certain NPLs are guaranteed by related corporate entities and local 
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governments, providing the potential for investors to negotiate a settlement price with the 
borrower and their guarantor that is below their acquisition price.  Both Bednar and Young 
noted that their firms had considered guaranteed loans on a case-by-case basis, requesting in 
each transaction a thorough understanding of the relationship of the parties involved as well 
as the strength of the guarantee.  According to Bednar, Morgan Stanley valued cases where 
important corporate relationships existed and preferred to invest in subsidiaries whose 
existence is of vital importance to their parent companies.  Danny Bao, a partner of a small 
NPL fund, Shanghai Global Partners Fund, also expressed great interest in a loan 70 percent 
guaranteed by a local government.  However, thorough due diligence of such relationships is 
crucial, since guarantees by local government are not always honored, as demonstrated in the 
case of GITIC. 
 Fourth, profit sharing arrangements and JV structures between the foreign investors 
and the AMCs create a “win-win” situation for both parties.  On the one hand, the AMCs are 
able to learn from foreign investors with distressed asset management expertise in the Asian 
region, while retaining some economic interest in the NPL transaction.  On the other, 
foreign investors gain assurance that their JV partners would help them with the debt 
collection process in a market where legal enforcement of creditor rights remains largely 
undefined. 
V.c.iii. Main Obstacles to Foreign Investors 
 Both Bednar and Young noted that the lengthy regulatory approval process, the 
nebulous legal protection for investors, and the poor transparency of loans are among the 
biggest challenges to NPL investors.  Various press releases and papers confirmed these 
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claims. 
V.c.iii.1.Protracted Regulatory Approval Process  
 At the very beginning, the cumbersome, multi-tiered government approval process 
has hindered transactions from closing quickly.  As a result, the first landmark NPL auction 
held by Huarong AMC in 2001 did not close until 16 months after its signing.  However, 
NPL investors are hopeful that the approval process is accelerating as the government 
remains committed to opening up the market.  For instance, Huarong’s second auction of an 
even larger scale was approved within 11 months to slightly over a year after signing for 
various parties.  CCB’s JV transaction with Morgan Stanley36, on the other hand, was signed 
in July 2003, yet still has not been approved.  A potential reason is that current regulations 
expressly prohibit state banks from selling NPLs directly to investors below their book values.  
As regulatory policies are silent on settled assets, CCB was able to complete a sale of RMB 
4.2 billion of settled assets to Morgan Stanley and Deutsche Bank in 2004. 
V.c.iii.2.Legal Barriers 
 Due to the lack of foreclosure and repossession laws, foreign investors typically 
choose to bid on deals whereby they are able to negotiate with the borrower to settle the 
NPLs at a reasonable price.  According to Bednar and Young, both Morgan Stanley and 
Citigroup have also accomplished exits by transferring assets backing the NPLs to interested 
third parties.  Foreign investors usually avoid the need to foreclose on assets due to the 
untested nature of the legal system.  Similarly due to weak bankruptcy legislations, foreign 
                                       
36 In July 2003, CCB agreed to sell RMB 4.3 billion of debt rights to Morgan Stanley.  Seventy percent of the book value 
was an outright sale, whereas both parties will resolve the remaining 30 percent of assets together in a joint venture (Sun 
2004). 
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investors have rarely been involved in any restructuring of debtor companies, although Young 
noted that restructuring might be the “next step” as the legal environment improves and the 
AMCs start to auction off NPLs from higher quality companies.  Foreclosure and 
restructuring efforts should be aided by the promulgation of the new bankruptcy law expected 
in 2005, although enforcement of the law in practice will be the real key to stimulating new 
interest in the NPL portfolios.  
V.c.iii.4.Asset Transparency 
 According to Bednar, information on NPL obligors’ loan documents and payment 
history are obtainable from the AMCs.  However, the information is more limited compared 
to those seen in developed economies, and even though they might be from official sources, 
extensive due diligence is necessary to gauge the true value of the loans.  The collateral 
nature and location of the debtors are crucial to getting the investors comfortable with a 
transaction.  For example, compared to small towns in inland areas, the information 
provided for debtors in coastal, economically developed cities such as Shanghai and 
Guangzhou tend to be significantly more transparent.  Court systems are also substantially 
more advanced in coastal areas and creditor rights are easier to enforce. 
 China’s current bankruptcy law places employee liability as top priority, ahead of 
creditor rights.  Hence, NPL investors are liable for laid-off employee liability for up to 
three years.  Bednar and Young both confirmed that they always factored the calculation of 
expected laid-off employee liability into their NPL valuation.  Another factor that could 
lower the NPL values is the conversion of allocated land-use rights.  Historically, the 
Chinese government has awarded certain SOEs with land-use rights to carry out specific 
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infrastructure projects.  An NPL investor wishing to convert the land for other commercial 
purposes would have to pay a fee of 20 to 40 percent of leasehold value to the government 
(Peiser and Wang 2002).  This fee will again be incorporated into the NPL valuation, further 
lowering the pricing that an investor could offer. 
V.c.iii.5.Hefty Fees 
 Li (2005) illustrated the hefty fees in NPL transactions through an example of 
Goldman Sachs’ purchase of approximately $240 million in NPLs from Huarong’s second 
auction in 2003.  The purchase price of the assets is estimated at roughly 10 cents on the 
dollar, or about $24 million.  The expected recovery price for the NPLs of 20% implies a 
gross return of about 100%, or $24 million for Goldman.  However, miscellaneous fees, 
expenses and taxes (Table 8) reduced the value of the net profits to about $13 million, 
implying a 56% return.  This rate of return is no doubt still an admirable accomplishment 
for Goldman Sachs.  However, this example is sufficient to illustrate that the hefty pre- and 
at-purchase expenses for NPL auctions are sufficient to scare away any investors without 
deep financial pockets. 
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Table 8 
Breakdown of Fees and Expenses for Goldman’s Huarong II NPL Purchase 
 Estimate 
Gross Profits   $24,000,000 
  
   Legal Fees for Loan Document Inspection (on 50% of Huarong II’s NPL Portfolios) (a)      500,000 
   Asset Appraisal Fees (on Secured and Guaranteed NPLs)      250,000 
   Travel Expenses for Due Diligence      250,000 
Total Pre-purchase Expenses     1,000,000 
   Legal Expenses for Drafting of Documents      400,000 
   Office Rental Expenses      120,000 
   Loan Monitoring Expenses      200,000 
Total Expenses During Purchase      720,000 
Servicing Fees to Huarong (5% of NPL Book Value)      120,000 
Total Fees and Expenses     1,840,000 
  
Profits Net of Fees and Expenses    22,160,000 
  
   Distribution of Huarong’s Share of Profits Net of Fees and Expenses (Est. 10%)     2,216,000 
  
Goldman’s Profits Net of Fees and Expenses    19,944,000 
  
   Taxes (33%)     6,581,520 
  
Net Profits for Goldman   $13,362,480 
  
Implied Net Returns     56% 
__________ 
(a) Legal fees for document inspection amounted to about $1,000 for each company.  Goldman inspected about 50% 
of the 1,000 companies in the Huarong II portfolio.  
Source: Zhenhua Li. “Are the AMCs Underselling China’s Assets?” 21 Century Business Herald, January 10, 2005. 
V.c.iv. Importance of Attracting Foreign Investors 
PwC’s China NPL Investor Survey 2004 estimates that foreign investors have roughly 
$10 to $15 billion earmarked for investment in the Chinese NPL market over the next three 
years.  While this figure is significant, I believe that in terms of the pure dollar amount, the 
contribution from overseas investors is not imperative to China’s NPL recovery effort.  In 
fact, the domestic investor base is more familiar with the Chinese market and often does not 
demand a risk premium for investing in China.  As a result, while few press releases cover 
domestic deals, it is conceivable that such investors are likely to bid a higher price for the 
 64
assets, especially when they are confident that they could restructure instead of 
selling/foreclosing on assets to realize value (Slater 2005).   
However, foreign financial institutions are the dominant players in auctions, given 
their deep financial resources and strong expertise in distressed asset management.  They 
tend to be more efficient in the collection process than the AMCs and domestic investors, 
who are likely to be state-owned and more politically motivated.  More importantly, foreign 
investors’ involvement increases the transparency of the NPL sale process and stimulates 
liquidity in the market.  Korea’s story testifies to this latter hypothesis.  In late 1998, 
KAMCO first started marketing NPLs to investors.  Domestic demand was non-existent 
then, and only American distressed debt investors participated in the sales (KAMCO 2003).  
Between 1999 and 2001, KAMCO and the domestic banks created bulk sales transactions 
targeting foreign investors, and domestic investors finally followed suit in 2002 (KAMCO 
2003).  Korea’s case demonstrates that the early involvement of foreign investors is essential 
in attracting domestic interest throughout the NPL resolution process.  Thus, the Chinese 
government should continue to reform regulatory processes to facilitate the participation of 
foreign investments. 
V.d. Securitization 
V.d.i. Background 
 Securitization is the creation of securities that are “primarily serviced by the cash 
flows of a discrete pool of receivables or other financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that 
by their terms convert into cash within a finite time period plus any rights or other assets 
designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to the security holders.” 
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(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)  In the case of NPL securitization, the 
securitized receivables are the expected stream of cash flows to be generated from the NPLs.   
Disparate recovery methods – such as debt collection, liquidation of property, corporate 
restructuring, and negotiated settlements – still have to be utilized to produce the cash flows 
in order to service the interest and principal owed to security holders.  However, the 
originators of the NPLs – in this case the banks or the AMCs – are able to recover a portion 
of the cash recovery value upfront, and may outsource the NPL recovery task to third party 
servicers. 
 Since the first securitization of NPLs by Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in the 
United States, this disposition method has played a growing importance in many countries’ 
NPL disposal programs.  KAMCO experienced the greatest success among Asian economies, 
securitizing one-third of its cumulative NPL disposal through the end of 200037.  China is 
increasingly looking to securitization as the next innovative solution to bulk NPL resolution, 
with various CBRC and AMC executives voicing strong support for the development of this 
financial instrument.   
 In the absence of a specific securitization law, securitization projects in China to date 
have been facilitated by the 2001 Trust Law, which allows securitization to be completed via 
a trust structure and enables sellers to retain upside residual benefits.  Table 8 summarizes 
securitization and “quasi-securitization” projects to date. 
                                       
37 “Asset Securitization: What did Cinda’s Experience Tell Us?”  Finance Daily, April 20, 2004, from Huarong AMC’s 
website, http://www.chamc.com.cn. 
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Table 9 
Primary Securitization / Quasi-Securitization Projects Overview 
 
Year 
 
AMC/Bank 
Securitized 
Assets 
 
Details 
2003 Huarong RMB 13.3 Bn 
($1.6 Bn) 
• Repackaged 256 NPLs 
• Sold only to domestic investors 
• Two classes of trust certificates: RMB 1.0 trillion of 
senior trust certificates were issued to investors Æ 
recovery rate of about 10%; the subordinated tranche was 
retained by Huarong 
• Interest rate on the senior trust certificates: 4.17% 
• 80% of senior trust certificates have changed hands 
• Used the Trust Law 
• Three-year maturity 
 
2004 Cinda RMB 2 Bn 
($240 MM) 
• Assets dispersed in ten regions 
• Engaged Deutsche Bank as servicer 
• Established offshore SPV to bypass Chinese legal 
restrictions  
• Sold to international investors (U.S. and Southeast Asia) 
• Promised term: three to five years 
 
2004 ICBC RMB 2.6 Bn 
($314 MM) 
• Assets in Ningbo  
• Securitized portfolio included non-performing and 
sub-performing loans 
• First securitization project by a commercial bank 
• Partnered with CSFB 
• Three classes of trust certificates: Class A Senior, Class B 
Junior, and residual equity position retained by ICBC 
• Class A and Class B, both rated AAA per 2 domestic 
rating agencies and guaranteed by ICBC 
• 820MM RMB ($99MM) in certificates issued to investors 
Æ recovery rate of 31.5% 
• Marketed only to domestic investors 
• Used the Trust Law 
______________ 
Sources: Various news releases. 
 In addition to these completed projects, Cinda is planning to launch a securitized 
product for its RMB 20 billion worth of bad assets in Guangdong, targeting domestic 
investors, although its planned first-quarter launch has been delayed due to legal obstacles 
(LeeMaster 2005).  PwC’s NPL Asia report (2004) also reported that one of the four SOCBs 
will conduct one to two securitizations totaling RMB 5 to 9 billion ($600 million to $1.1 
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billion) in the next few months.  These transaction(s) are likely to carry a similar trust 
structure and target domestic investors. 
V.d.ii. Advantages 
 Asset securitization repackages cash flows generated by a diversified loan pool into 
tradable securities and can target a broader investor base with different risk characteristics.  
In the early 1990’s, the RTC packaged roughly 500,000 loans for securitization, including 
home mortgages, commercial mortgages, manufactured housing loans, leases and installment 
contracts on personal property; 71 out of 74 transactions performed well (Peiser and Wang 
2002).  Given the large size of China’s NPL pool and the slow recovery rate to date, 
securitization could be a great solution, as it allows the pooling of a large number of assets 
and results in immediate cash recovery for the seller.   
 Securitization also enables the creation of security classes with different yields and 
maturity dates.  Each tranche has different levels of loss protection and could attract 
investors with varying risk appetite.  Usually, the issued securities are substantially 
overcollateralized.  For example, in the ICBC securitization (Table 9), only RMB 820 
million of AAA-rated securities were issued to investors, with the backing of RMB 2.6 
billion of assets.  The originating AMC or bank typically retains a residual equity position – 
in ICBC’s case over 68% of the securitized assets.  Furthermore, the low rate of 3.24% for 
three-year RMB deposits and the choppy performance of the stock market in China are likely 
to make this financial instrument extremely attractive to domestic investors.  Lastly, as 
PwC’s NPL Asia report (2004) points out, securitization allows the seller to retain the residual 
upside, which may help the AMCs or the banks defend themselves against accusations that 
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they are selling the state’s assets too cheaply, a recurring theme during NPL direct sales. 
V.d.iii. Challenges 
V.d.iii.1.Legal Constraints 
 The most significant challenge to securitization is the lack of a specialized legal 
framework in China for the financial instrument.  Normally, a securitization has to satisfy all 
of the following requirements: (a) legal true sale of assets to a SPV with narrowly defined 
purposes and activities; (b) reliance on the performance of the securitized assets instead of the 
seller’s credit for repayment; and (c) insulation of the SPV’s assets from the obligor’s 
potential bankruptcy (Henderson 1997). 
 Notably, current Chinese laws prohibit the use of a SPV as the securitization vehicle, 
a restriction that has already delayed Cinda’s planned RMB 20 billion securitization project. 
The 1993 Company Law requires that net assets of a bond issuer must exceed RMB 30 
million ($3.6 million), while the total bond issuance must be limited to 40 per cent of the 
issuer’s net assets.  The latter restriction makes the establishment of a SPV virtually 
impossible, as the only purpose of the SPV is to receive assets and facilitate their 
securitization.   
 Instead of using a SPV, two of the three securitization/quasi-securitization projects 
completed to date (Table 9) used a trust structure facilitated by China’s 2001 Trust Law, 
which allows the creation of a grantor trust instead of a SPV to hold assets.  For example, in 
the Huarong quasi-securitization (Table 9), Huarong transferred RMB 13.2 billion of NPLs 
into a grantor trust governed by CITIC; and the trust assigned the entire senior and 
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subordinated beneficiary interests in the assets to Huarong38.  Huarong then requested the 
CITIC trust to transfer the senior beneficiary interests in the assets (RMB 1.0 billion) to 
investors in exchange for cash.  Huarong and the CITIC trust issued joint notices to debtors 
that all the debt rights originally held by Huarong have been transferred to the trust39.  On an 
ongoing basis in the future, Huarong will service the NPLs and transfer recovered cash into 
the trust, which will then pay interest and principals to investors.  By retaining the 
subordinated beneficiary interest, Huarong will keep any cash remaining after the investors 
are paid in full.  The trust structure effectively isolated the securitized NPLs from Huarong’s 
other assets. 
 A major shortcoming of the trust structure is that the transfer of senior beneficiary 
interests to investors constitutes a transfer of rights to receivables.  It does not guarantee a 
legal “true sale” of the assets, whereby the investors in the trust are the only ones that hold 
legal ownership in the securitized receivables, unlike secured lenders to a company that could 
be challenged in a bankruptcy proceeding.  This provision is particularly important because 
unless the trust holds a perfected debt claim to the assets, a bankruptcy court could decide to 
prevent the obligor – the original SOE that owned the assets – from paying the trust.  The 
uncertainty of tax and accounting treatment for trusts further complicates asset transfers to 
securitization vehicles. 
V.d.iii.2.Capital Markets and Investor Characteristics 
 China’s debt market is underdeveloped and largely dominated by government bonds 
                                       
38 “Huarong Net – Huarong’s Bold Experimentation in NPL securitization,” Huarong website, September 12, 2003. 
39 See supra note 38. 
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that account for 95 percent of all traded debt (Bottelier 2003).  The corporate bond market is 
extremely small and has historically been reserved for large SOEs.  Coupon rates have 
ranged between 150 and 250 basis points above the 1-year RMB deposit rate (Bottelier 2003).  
This state of the bond market can be favorable for NPL securitization, as the securities can 
pay yields comparable to corporate bonds while carrying lower credit risks, if they are 
properly collateralized by diversified assets and overcollateralized.  However, domestic 
investors are still relatively unfamiliar with the concept of securitization, and further 
education is important to stimulate sufficient demand for the securitized products.   
 To complicate matters, Chinese financial institutions and insurance companies require 
special approval from the government to invest in securitized products, often constituting a de 
facto prohibition from their participation.  For example, in the 2004 ICBC transaction (see 
Table 9), only corporate buyers and high net-worth individuals were able to purchase trust 
certificates from the bank (Davies 2005).  
V.d.iii.3.Credit Enhancement 
 If the cash flows generated from the NPLs fail to meet the interest or principal 
obligations on the securities, investors could face a loss.  In order to protect investors again 
such risks, external credit enhancement is necessary in addition to internal collateralization.  
While third-party bond insurers such as MBIA and Ambac are active in the U.S. and other 
countries with mature securitization laws, they have not yet gained enough comfort with 
China’s legal system to provide credit enhancement for securitizations of Chinese NPLs.  A 
possible solution for China is to have the government use its huge foreign exchange reserves 
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– in excess of $600 billion at the end of 200440 – as credit enhancement for the senior 
tranche(s) of the securities issued by AMCs or banks (Chen 2004).   
V.d.iii.4.Lack of Asset Transparency 
 The value of traditional securitized products, such as credit card and auto loans, can 
be estimated by statistically extrapolating the historical loss data to forecast the expected 
probability of default and severity of loss for each loan pool.  The cash flows of the NPLs 
can be extremely difficult to estimate, due to a lack of transparency on historical loss data and 
the short credit history for consumer loans still in their infancy in China, such as mortgage 
and auto loans.  This substantially increases the difficulty of valuation for investors.  
Encouragingly, AMCs and banks are gaining proficiency in identifying and collating the 
historical cash flow data, which will become a vital part of the disclosure in securitization 
documents.  The establishment of consumer credit information services in China will also 
ease the securitization of non-performing consumer loans. 
 In his 2004 paper, Chen suggested using the “Changchun approach,” the separation of 
low quality assets from profitable assets, as a precursor to securitization.  The Changchun 
approach originated from a field study by Wang (2000).  After negotiations with its major 
creditor(s), a financially distressed SOE transfers its healthy assets to a new legal entity, also 
a SOE.  The main creditor(s) secure a claim on the assets transferred to the new enterprise, 
which then utilizes the cash flow stream generated by these assets to repay the original debts 
owed by the old SOE.  When applied prior to securitization, this method has the benefit of 
isolating the most profitable assets from the distressed assets, which substantially increases 
                                       
40 “FDI, Foreign Reserves See Huge Balance in China,” Sinocast China Financial Watch, March 18, 2005. 
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the transparency of the securitization to investors.  
 
VI. Summary 
 In this paper I explored China’s NPL resolution effort, both from a macro-level in 
comparison to other East Asian economies and from a micro-level in terms of specific 
resolution methods.  I found that while the resolution progress has been somewhat 
disappointing to date, the government’s commitment to maximizing and accelerating NPL 
recovery is strong, and bulk disposal activities, which require regulatory approval, have 
picked up considerably since 2004.  In order to overcome the inherent weaknesses of its 
lower-quality NPLs, China should continue to strengthen its regulatory and legal framework.  
If the government enacts the following actions, the likelihood of success in NPL resolution 
would increase significantly: 
1. Accelerate the NPL transfer process from banks to AMCs and continue the 
competitive bidding process among AMCs 
2. Allow state banks to sell NPLs below book value to third-party investors 
3. Award AMCs with immediate, special legal power for collection, foreclosure, and 
restructuring 
4. Improve the legal framework for foreclosure, liquidation, and reorganization 
5. Streamline the regulatory approval process for bulk sales/securitizations and limit 
the approving party to no more than one or two organizations 
6. Create a securitization law to enable the creation of SPVs and true sale of assets; 
clarify tax and accounting treatment for SPVs/trusts 
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 Among the various disposition methods, debt-for-equity swap appears to have only 
temporarily solved a capital structure problem for the restructured SOEs.  As few market 
purchases of debt-for equity shares have occurred, it is hard to gauge the ultimate value of the 
converted equity shares.  In order to maximize the speed of asset recovery, China has 
followed KAMCO’s model of adopting a wide variety of resolution methods, with a focus on 
structuring bulk sales and securitization transactions.  Such deals have yielded reported 
upfront recovery rates ranging from 7% to 35%, largely dependent on the asset nature (real 
estate vs. less liquid assets) and quality (geographic location, aging, etc.).  Various banks 
and AMCs have successfully accomplished direct NPL sales to domestic and foreign 
investors, although many transactions were slowed by the protracted regulatory approval 
process and legal impediments, among other obstacles.  Securitization, on the other hand, is 
being heavily researched and has already experienced successful experimentations despite the 
lack of a perfected legal structure.  Foreign investors have played an irreplaceable role in 
China’s NPL resolution program, both by providing the financial resources and, even more 
importantly, by contributing their intellectual capital and stimulating liquidity in the domestic 
market.   Given the large NPL portfolio remaining in China’s financial system and the 
inevitable creation of new NPLs from the recent surge in bank loans, it is essential for the 
government to continue improving the regulatory and legal process to retain foreign 
participation in the market. 
 A recurring theme in the resolution process is the difficult situation of the Chinese 
AMCs, who act as the intermediary between the government, ultimate owners of the NPLs, 
and investors.  Their status as state-owned enterprises obliges them to answer to a multitude 
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of political authorities and promise not to sell the country’s assets too cheaply, especially to 
foreign investors.  On the other hand, negotiating prices incessantly with investors slows 
down the disposition process and gives the AMCs the reputation of holding unrealistic 
expectations, with the consequence of eventually discouraging investor interest in the NPLs.  
This problem can be alleviated by the following actions: (a) increase transparency in the NPL 
sales process to defend against criticisms that the AMCs are under-selling assets; (b) 
introduce private sector involvement on the Board of the AMCs; and (c) clearly prioritize the 
objective of maximizing asset recovery value over maximizing the speed of asset resolution, 
or vice versa. 
 To the credit of the Chinese government, China is dealing with its NPL problem 
before a financial crisis hits, unlike the other Asian economies mentioned in this paper.  I 
believe that the country’s colossal NPL portfolio is largely a result of historical reasons, and 
that the governmental authorities are moving in the right directions to conform its financial 
system to international standards.  While the recent buildup of new NPLs due to rapid credit 
expansion is concerning, the government has again proven its determination to avoid a hard 
landing.  The country’s sustainable economic growth, its immense foreign exchange 
reserves, a closed capital market, and the healthy margin between lending and deposit rates at 
banks all point to the likelihood that China will be able to circumvent a financial crisis.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Female senior managers are becoming an increasingly widespread phenomenon, 
attracting a significant amount of media attention. For example, according to USA Today 
(2003), the average stock price performance of eight Fortune 500 companies run by 
female Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) significantly exceeded that of the S&P 500 
index in 2003.   
The primary question addressed by this paper is whether the performance of 
female CEOs is different from the performance of their male counterparts. This question 
is motivated by prior research discussed below suggesting that there are substantial “glass 
ceilings” for the promotion of women in corporate America. If so, it is arguable that those 
women who are eventually promoted to the CEO level possess superior skill sets 
compared to an average male CEO, which may translate into a superior performance. In 
addition to the main research question, the current paper also investigates whether female 
CEOs and male CEOs differ in their attitude towards financial risk. This second question 
follows from the findings of prior research documenting differences in risk tolerance 
between males and females (e.g. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1996)). 
Studying a sample of 58 companies run by female CEOs over the 20-year period 
between January, 1985 and December 2004, I find that the stock price returns of the 
companies run by newly appointed female CEOs, are significantly lower then the stock 
price returns of comparable companies run by male CEOs during the year following the 
female CEO appointment. Moreover, this paper doesn’t find evidence of leverage 
differences between the female CEO and male CEO run companies. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews prior research. Section III 
discusses research design, sample selection procedure, variable definitions and sample 
descriptive statistics. Section IV outlines the tests, discusses the results and highlights the 
limitations underlying the study. Section V summarizes research questions and major 
findings. 
I PRIOR RESEARCH 
In developing the first research question, I build on the strand of research 
investigating female status and performance in corporate America. For example, 
Zelechowski and Belemoria (2004), who study the characteristics of female and male 
corporate inside directors in the US, find that women insiders differ significantly from a 
random set of men insiders on several characteristics relevant to their dual positions as 
directors and officers of the corporation. While they do not differ on the experience-based 
qualifications of board tenure or corporate tenure, women insiders hold fewer 
directorships of other corporations, hold less powerful corporate titles, occupy 
disproportionately more staff functions, are less likely to be top earners of the 
corporation, and earn considerably less than men inside directors.  
 Another example, Cobb-Clark (2001) documents that women are less likely to be 
promoted than men, and that had men and women faced the same promotion standards, 
promotion rates would have been higher for women than for men. One way to interpret 
these findings is that there are substantial glass ceilings for female promotion to the 
highest levels of companies. Further, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) study the five highest 
paid executives in a sample of large US firms, and find that women represent only 2.5% 
of the sample and earn 45% less then their male counterparts. As much as 75% of the gap 
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could be explained by under-representation of women in larger companies and in the 
positions of CEO, Chairperson of the board, or President. The authors point out that the 
results of the research don’t rule out the possibility of discrimination via gender 
segregation and unequal promotion. 
This research leads me to my first research question: does the performance of 
female CEOs differ from the performance of male CEOs? 
Related research has also studied financial risk taking by women. Several studies 
such as Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1996), and Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1996) have 
found that women invest their pensions more conservatively than men. In addition, 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1996) studied the relationship between the percentage of risky 
assets to total assets and several explanatory variables including gender and wealth. Their 
study showed that single women are relatively more risk averse then men or married 
couples. The study also compared the self-reported risk tolerance among different groups 
and revealed that women also perceive themselves as being risk averse. Zinkhan and 
Karande (1991) surveyed MBA students using the Kogan and Wallach (1964) Choice 
Dilemmas Questionnaire as risk-taking behavior measurement tool. They found that 
female MBA students were significantly less likely to take business risks then males. 
This literature leads me to my second research question: do female CEOs have 
different attitude towards financial risk then male CEOs?  
II METHODOLOGY 
II.1 Research Design 
The main research question is whether the performance of companies run by 
female CEOs differs from the performance of companies run by male CEOs. There are 
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several different metrics that can be used to evaluate performance, such as return on 
equity, return on assets, stock performance, etc. I choose to measure company 
performance as abnormal buy-and-hold stock returns around the appointment of a new 
female CEO. To calculate abnormal return, I subtract the raw return from the expected 
return. Finance literature offers numerous ways to compute expected return such as the 
market model, CAPM, three-factor model, four-factor model, etc.  However, given my 
research question and my unique sample, I adjust for the expected return by computing 
the stock returns on a matched pair sample as in Bartov and Mohanran (2004).  
Specifically, each company from the female CEO sample is paired with a male CEO led 
company from the same 2-digit SIC code group. The pairings are then refined by sales 
and market capitalization to form a three-dimensional match based on data at the end of 
the calendar year preceding the respective female CEO nomination. I chose to match by 
both variables simultaneously in order to control for company size and potential under or 
over valuation, measured by the relationship between sales and market capitalization. To 
measure the proximity of two companies based on the above described variables I 
introduced the following variable: 
Z* = (ZSALES (female) – ZSALES (male))^2 + (ZCAP (female) – ZCAP (male))^2,  
where ZSALES and ZCAP are calculated as number of standard deviations from the sample 
average sales and average market capitalization for the respective 2-digit SIC code group 
in the given year.  
The above described matching procedure has an obvious limitation of not 
controlling for the CEO change. Prior academic research suggests that CEO transition 
might have a significant influence on stock price performance around the CEO 
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appointment date. For example, Berman and Lin (2000) demonstrate a negative market 
reaction to the announcements of top executive departures, especially when the CEO is 
dismissed or leaves to take up another job. In addition, a study of listed French 
companies by Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog (2002) finds that the nomination of an 
external manager following a performance related forced resignation of a CEO is 
rewarded by the market by a 2% increase in abnormal return, while promotion of an 
internal CEO in a poorly performing firm is followed by a 1% drop in abnormal return on 
the date of announcement. This research implies that, ideally, the match sample would 
have to consist of male CEO run companies that have experienced a CEO transition on 
the same date as the respective companies in the female CEO sample, in addition to being 
comparable on sales and market capitalization dimensions. Constructing such a matched 
sample, however, would be quite challenging due to data collection and matching 
difficulties, and thus is left for future research.  
The second research question is whether the attitude towards financial risk differs 
between female and male CEOs. I chose financial leverage as a measure of company risk 
since this variable can be promptly changed by the CEO. Financial leverage can be 
defined in several ways using either market value of debt, book value of debt or book 
value of long-term debt in the nominator and either market capitalization, book value of 
equity or book value of assets in the denominator. Since my sample period spans twenty 
years, I use the book value of debt because it is readily available in a machine readable 
form. Since Compustat does not provide a consistent measure of short-term debt, I use 
long-term debt in the nominator of the leverage ratio. I chose book value of assets for the 
  85
denominator of the leverage ratio since this measure is stable and does not fluctuate 
significantly with stock performance.  
II.2 Sample Selection 
Studying the companies listed on the AMEX, NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges 
allowed the gathering of a sample of 84 female CEOs. The sample data was collected 
from three sources. First, I retrieve the biographies of company officers, which in most 
cases determined a CEO’s gender, from the Hoover’s database. However, Hoover’s only 
provides the biographies of current CEOs. To retrieve the gender of CEOs who no longer 
held their position at the time of the study, I use the Compustat Execucomp database. 
Finally, I study the proxy statements of all sample companies to verify the CEO gender, 
as well as to collect the data on outsider/insider status of newly elected female CEOs. 
While the initial sample consisted of 84 companies, the final sample size is 58 
companies. I lost 26 sample companies due to data limitations. 
Monthly stock returns data were retrieved from CRSP. Accounting and stock 
price data were retrieved from the Compustat. The sample period spans from January, 
1985, to December, 2004. 
II.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The results in Table 1 demonstrate that the matching procedure described above 
has proved efficient. Specifically, the findings indicate that there is little evidence of 
statistically significant differences between the female and male samples on either of the 
matching variables. 
  86
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Sample Statistics 
III Results 
III.1 Tests of the First Hypothesis 
To test the first hypothesis of whether the stock returns of female CEO led 
companies are significantly different from the returns of comparable companies led by 
male CEOs, I perform a two-sided Student’s t-test for mean of return differentials as well 
as Wilcoxon test for the median of return differentials between the stock prices of 
companies in female and male samples. To separate the long-run effects of female CEO 
performance from the market reaction on the appointment of a new female CEO I study 
annual as well as monthly return differentials around the CEO appointment date. To 
examine the long-run effect of female CEOs on stock price performance, I study annual 
returns during a six-year period around the female CEO appointment. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
  
 
 
Table 2. The Test of Annual Return Differentials 
The results of both Student’s T-test and Wilcoxon test of annual return 
differentials indicate that the stocks of companies run by newly appointed female CEOs 
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Mean Median Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value
t-3 20.67% 7.80% 14.71% 10.00% 5.96% 0.703 -1.80% 0.799
t-2 19.36% 1.10% 14.42% 5.70% 4.94% 0.811 -6.50% 0.512
t-1 17.73% 4.70% 29.81% 18.80% -12.07% 0.312 -12.00% 0.247
t 1.15% 1.10% 26.70% 21.60% -25.55% 0.010 -21.00% 0.013
t+1 32.22% 16.60% 15.82% 9.10% 16.40% 0.259 6.90% 0.398
t+2 26.20% 20.20% 8.92% 9.00% 17.28% 0.100 11.00% 0.148
Year Relative to the Female 
CEO Appointment Date (t)
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Matching Variable Mean Mean Mean P-value
Sales 2276 2474 -197 0.876
Market Capitalization 2226 2048 177 0.899
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under-perform the stocks of comparable companies run by male CEOs by more than 20% 
over a one year period following the appointment of a female CEO. This result is 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. No statistically significant return 
differentials were observed in either second or third year after the female CEO 
appointment. This finding is inconsistent with the implications of prior research 
suggesting that female CEOs might have a more positive influence on company 
performance. 
To study the immediate effect of the announcement of a female CEO appointment 
on the stock price performance, I examine monthly returns in a six-month period around 
the announcement date. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. The Test of Monthly Return Differentials. 
Interestingly, the monthly return differentials during the three months following 
the announcement and the three months before the announcement are not statistically 
significant.  
One potential explanation for this observed pattern in the stock price returns may 
be that newly appointed CEOs engage in earnings manipulations as documented by Wells 
(2002). Using a sample of Australian firms, Wells demonstrated that incoming CEOs 
undertake earnings management using abnormal and extraordinary items to reduce the 
income in the year of CEO change. These activities aim at establishing a low earnings 
base against which the performance of a new CEO will be measured. Downward earnings 
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Mean Median Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value
t-3 8.18% 6.02% 5.91% 5.91% 2.27% 0.462 1.50% 0.554
t-2 8.15% 3.34% 2.85% 1.07% 5.30% 0.169 3.00% 0.280
t-1 -0.48% -1.95% -1.18% -1.74% 0.70% 0.846 -0.25% 0.932
t 3.10% 3.49% 5.12% 3.79% -2.01% 0.553 -1.05% 0.651
t+1 3.74% 1.08% 0.19% 0.34% 3.55% 0.240 2.00% 0.384
t+2 2.53% 1.79% 3.08% 0.46% -0.55% 0.848 -0.55% 0.818
Month Relative to the Female 
CEO Appointment Date (t)
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management in turn can depress company stock price. Therefore, if the newly appointed 
female CEOs as well as their male counterparts engage in earnings manipulations, and 
the write-offs are announced over the course of the year that could potentially result in 
underperformance of the stocks of the respective companies during the year after the new 
CEO appointment. 
III.2 Tests of the Second Hypothesis 
 To test the second hypothesis of whether the leverage of companies led by female 
CEOs is equal to the leverage level of comparable male CEO led companies I run a two-
sided Student’s T test as well as Wilcoxon test for the differences in leverage ratios 
between the female and male samples during a six-year period around the female CEO 
appointment. As Table 4 demonstrates, neither test shows statistically significant 
discrepancy between the two samples. Thus the null hypothesis of leverage equality 
cannot be rejected. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The Test of Leverage Differentials 
One way to interpret this result is that the attitude towards risk among female 
CEOs is not different from that of male CEOs. The results of the leverage test also have 
implications for the stock performance test. Since leverage after the female CEO 
appointment does not change comparative to male run companies, changes in leverage 
cannot explain the differentials in stock returns in the year following the female CEO 
appointment. 
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Mean Median Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value
t-3 25.70% 15.00% 17.81% 13.10% 7.89% 0.463 -0.50% 0.788
t-2 18.17% 16.40% 18.05% 13.00% 0.12% 0.969 -0.96% 0.576
t-1 15.95% 13.40% 17.06% 12.50% -1.11% 0.681 -0.92% 0.543
t 15.72% 12.10% 16.58% 12.69% -0.86% 0.805 1.07% 0.633
t+1 15.95% 15.80% 17.13% 13.80% -1.18% 0.711 -0.46% 0.851
t+2 14.29% 12.40% 16.88% 14.50% -2.60% 0.341 -1.29% 0.546
Year Relative to the Female 
CEO Appointment Date (t)
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III.3 Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
One limitation of this study is its small sample size. A second limitation concerns 
the matching procedure, which does not control for the effect of a leadership change in 
the female CEO sample. This limitation may be serious since the prior research suggests 
that such factors as voluntary versus forced resignation and insider versus outsider 
succession are significant explanatory factors of stock price performance.  
Recognizing the limitations of this research, I suggest several directions for future 
research. To separate the pure effect of CEO gender, the control sample could be 
constructed of companies that experienced a CEO transition during the same time period. 
Another approach could be to introduce additional explanatory variables suggested by 
prior research, such as the reason for the incumbent CEO departure and the successor 
CEO origin. However, given the relatively small sample size, explanatory power of those 
variables is not expected to be significant.   
 Still, to assess the possibility of incorporating additional variables into my 
current research design I run a regression of stock price return differentials on the 
successor CEO origin. I chose successor CEO origin as the explanatory variable since 
this variable is the most directly observable. The origin of a new female CEO was 
measured by a dummy variable Outsider, which is given a value of 1 if the successor 
CEO is an outsider and a value of 0 if the successor CEO is an insider. Out of 58 
companies in the sample only 13 incoming CEOs were outsiders. I use the annual returns 
one year after the female CEO appointment since only during this period the return 
differentials are statistically significant. The regression produced the following equation: 
Return Differential = -0.243 – 0.057 Outsider. This result is not statistically significant 
since the p-value of the Outsider variable is 0.808 with R2 of 0%. 
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Another approach to separate the effect of CEO gender is to add a random sample 
of companies run by newly appointed male CEOs matched with comparable companies 
run by continuing male CEOs to the current sample. After that the differentials between 
the stock price returns of sample companies run by newly appointed CEOs and sample 
companies run by continuing CEOs can be regressed on the successor CEO gender along 
with new CEO origin and the reason for the departure of the previous CEO. 
IV Summary 
This paper investigates whether there are gender related differences with respect 
to the CEO’s contribution to company performance and the choice of leverage. Based on 
prior research showing that women are discriminated when it comes to promotion to 
higher management positions, I hypothesize that women who ultimately reach the 
position of CEO possess superior skills relative to their male counterparts. Therefore, I 
predict superior performance from female CEO led companies. Another strand of 
research shows that women are more risk averse when financial decisions are concerned. 
To test the relevance of this phenomenon for women in CEO position this paper studies 
the differences in leverage between female CEO and male CEO led companies. 
This study demonstrates that female CEO run companies significantly under-
perform male CEO run companies in the year following the female CEO appointment. 
Starting from the second year after the female CEO appointment no statistically 
significant differences in stock price performance between female CEO and male CEO 
run companies was observed. However, this result is inconclusive since the 
underperformance can also result from other factors, such as the mere CEO succession 
itself or earnings management, which were not controlled for. This study also does not 
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find any statistically significant difference between the leverage levels of female CEO 
and male CEO run companies. 
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Appendix 
 
 Study Samples 
 
Female CEO Sample Male CEO Sample
Company Name SIC Code Sales Market Cap Company Name SIC Code Sales Market Cap
E.piphany Inc 7372 96.13 538.75 Interwoven Inc 7372 111.51 516.90
Allied Healthcare International 8082 294.38 139.03 Radiologix Inc 8093 257.01 73.72
Sonesta International Hotels 7011 90.13 17.00 Arlington Hospitality Inc 7011 76.53 17.17
The Boyds Collection 3942 131.34 393.09 Wms Industries Inc 3990 174.69 478.97
Alaska Communications Systems Group 4813 343.50 56.57 Talk America Holdings Inc 4813 317.51 153.83
Bitstream Inc 7372 8.47 14.03 Plm Equip Growth Fd V  -Lp 7359 9.28 11.87
Tower Automotive 3460 2,754.46 252.23 Silgan Holdings Inc 3411 1,988.28 449.94
Global Epoint 3571 0.18 5.34 Silicom Limited 3576 2.73 1.23
Rite Aid Corporation 5912 15,800.92 1,262.03 Toys R Us Inc 5945 11,305.00 2,125.00
Advent Software 7372 159.44 447.79 Open Text Corp 7372 152.48 456.15
Russ Berrie & Co Inc 3942 321.36 693.33 Yankee Candle Inc 3990 444.84 869.74
Cyberoptics Corp 3827 24.63 39.00 Mocon Inc 3829 19.93 38.78
The Phoenix Companies 6311 2,452.90 714.74 Landamerica Financial Gp 6361 2,586.55 650.47
Claire's Stores 5600 918.74 734.92 Pacific Sunwear Calif Inc 5651 684.84 669.18
Banta Corporation 2750 1,457.94 730.03 Standard Register Co 2761 1,187.64 514.26
Pathmark Stores 5411 3,963.30 741.13 Pao De Acucar Brasil  -Gdr 5411 3,515.39 1,090.98
Rubio's Restaurants 5812 112.94 29.09 Elxsi Corp 5812 105.40 30.69
Zale Corp 5944 2,068.24 1,458.05 Insight Enterprises Inc 5961 2,082.34 1,031.31
Salix Pharmaceuticals 2834 22.35 338.36 Novavax Inc 2836 24.07 328.46
Ihop Corp 6794 324.44 606.83 Colonial Properties Trust 6798 318.68 653.43
Axcelis Technologies 3559 365.26 1,255.16 Cirrus Logic Inc 3576 417.53 1,096.98
Edgewater Technology 7370 26.57 45.80 Mitcham Industries Inc 7359 27.18 39.82
Lucent Technologies 7370 21,294.00 21,509.25 Electronic Data Systems Corp 7370 21,543.00 32,719.94
Qrs Corp 7372 143.49 187.87 Pegasus Solutions Inc 7370 161.53 170.86
Argonaut Technologies 2835 17.45 155.30 Columbia Laboratories Inc 2834 13.17 131.51
Xerox Corporation 3577 18,701.00 3,092.16 Sanyo Electric Co Ltd  -Adr 3579 18,072.56 15,672.14
Cns Inc 3842 68.89 50.29 Candela Corp 3845 75.39 58.91
Immunomedics 2835 4.78 1,060.57 Cerus Corp 2836 1.85 1,057.41
Visx Incorporated 3845 200.25 634.14 Cooper Companies Inc 3851 197.32 576.59
Gymboree Corp 2300 448.61 389.06 Oshkosh B'Gosh Inc  -Cl A 2300 453.06 225.18
Lee Enterprices Inc 2711 422.14 1,306.09 Journal Register Co 2711 463.97 720.47
Carver Bancorp 6035 30.86 20.25 Independence Fed Svgs Bk 6035 25.99 16.97
Chester Valley Bancorp 6020 34.58 61.30 Sterling Bancorp/Ny 6020 97.73 133.84
Agl Resources 4924 1,068.60 970.70 Equitable Resources Inc 4923 1,062.74 1,092.36
Hot Topic Inc 5600 168.95 224.62 Christopher & Banks Corp 5621 143.40 141.73
Coachmen Industries Inc 3716 606.47 487.68 Orbital Sciences Corp 3760 461.44 554.78
Aspect Communications Corp 3661 489.11 1,935.20 Adtran Inc 3661 367.21 1,976.18
Alpharma Inc  -CL A 2834 732.44 910.60 Church & Dwight Inc 2840 730.04 1,036.97
Columbia Banking System 6020 94.50 139.16 Sterling Bancorp/Ny 6020 97.73 133.84
Ventas Inc 6798 149.93 826.91 Choice Hotels Intl Inc 6794 165.38 776.45
Avon Products 2844 5,212.70 11,616.55 Air Products & Chemicals Inc 2810 4,919.00 8,458.80
Zale Corp 5944 1,427.01 1,173.90 Systemax Inc 5961 1,435.65 844.49
Hewlett-Packard Co 3570 47,061.00 69,364.72 Nec Corp  -Adr 3571 40,334.00 14,724.44
Tennant Company 3580 389.39 366.50 Kulicke & Soffa Industries 3559 411.04 414.76
Johnson Outdoors 3690 328.53 74.87 Lamson & Sessions Co 3640 270.91 68.91
Cascade Bancorp 6020 23.15 116.82 Riverview Bancorp Inc 6035 22.78 103.11
Syms Corp 5651 352.96 211.96 Amern Eagle Outfitters Inc 5651 405.71 349.01
Vermont Teddy Bear 3942 17.04 12.26 Womens Golf Unlimited Inc 3949 8.56 2.07
Firstfed Financial Corp 6035 308.09 231.64 Webster Financial Corp 6035 291.06 291.28
Department 56 Inc 3260 252.05 826.83 Waterford Wedgwood Plc  -Adr 3260 551.20 667.84
Siebert Financial Corp 6211 21.04 8.02 Crown Financial Group Inc 6211 24.95 9.97
Avant Immuterapeutics 2835 3.96 62.13 Interferon Sciences 2836 3.31 46.84
Charming Shoppes 5621 1,272.69 681.67 Burlington Coat Factory Wrhs 5651 1,468.44 483.25
Theragenics Corp 2834 4.38 58.21 Interferon Sciences 2836 3.31 46.84
Autodesk Inc 7372 237.85 1,238.91 Cadence Design Systems Inc 7372 392.26 1,060.17
Playboy Enterprices 4841 161.77 118.75 Clear Channel Communications 4832 32.46 39.78
Pinnacle Systems 3577 331.08 540.70 Ionics Inc 3559 347.41 570.05
Books-a-Million 5940 460.16 106.30 Chronimed Inc 5912 435.71 106.35  
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I.   Introduction 
Electric power markets worldwide began to deregulate in the mid 1990s.  
Regulatory acts of the 1980s, such as PURPA in the U.S., had set the stage for 
independent power producers (“IPPs”) to construct power plants and contract directly 
with utilities and industrials.  As markets deregulated and the main industry players 
established themselves, energy trading became part of the industry.  Many of the 
independent firms began their own “merchant” power business, selling electricity at 
fluctuating market prices rather than through long term contracts. 
Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the power industry demonstrated 
enormous growth.  The enthusiasm that the IPPs showed for power plant construction 
was only bettered by Wall Street’s enthusiasm for financing them.  A downturn in the 
industry in late 2001 resulted in numerous defaults and financial distress1.  Figure 1 
shows the growth in liabilities of the distressed and bankrupt IPPs (all of which were 
‘distressed’ in 2002).   
Six firms in the industry defaulted with total liabilities at the time of default of 
$42B2 (listed in Appendix B).  However, an examination of the other public firms in the 
industry showed that virtually every other independent power producer was distressed 
(Appendix B).  Figure 2 shows the yield-to-maturity for a selection of bonds of the 
distressed companies, none of whom defaulted. 
                                                 
1 “Distress” – defined as having a yield to maturity at least 1000 basis points over High Yield Average for 
the year defined by Altman High Yield Bond Default and Return Report 
2 PG&E and Enron have been excluded from the sample because it is believed they are anomalies caused 
by poor government and fraud, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Liabilities of distressed and bankrupt IPPs3 
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Figure 2: Yields to Maturity for senior unsecured bonds of varying maturities4 
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The goal of this study is to try to determine whether the bankruptcies and 
financial distress experienced in the power industry could have been predicted using 
                                                 
3 Source:  Compustat 
4 Source:  Reuters (www.ejv.com) 
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known models.  Three firms are then examined in detail in an attempt to identify factors 
not captured by the model to illustrate why some firms declared bankruptcy while others 
did not.  The three firms are found to be similar in terms of common financial ratios.  
However, the main causes of bankruptcy are found to be relaxed ratings criteria that did 
not take increased risks into account as the industry changed and failure of management 
to act when faced with insolvency.  
II.   Bankruptcy Prediction Models 
Beaver (1967) was the first to use ratio analysis as a predictive tool for 
bankruptcy.  His univariate analysis set the stage for other methodologies developed 
including that by Altman in 1968.  Altman improved the technique of Beaver through the 
use of multi-discriminate analysis.  Altman determined five variables that reflected 
liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency, and activity.  These variables were chosen 
based on their contribution as univariate predictors, popularity amongst practitioners and 
correlation with other variables.  A later version of the Z-score was developed called the 
Z’’ (“Z double prime”).  It was developed specifically for firms in emerging markets, 
with unique financing structures or where asset turnover is potentially misleading.5  The 
final form of the Z-Score and the Z’’-score are in Appendix A.   
                                                 
5 Altman (2000) 
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Although it was developed in 1968, the Z-score continues to be relevant and 
accurate as a bankruptcy prediction tool.  In one study, it was found that the Type I6 
accuracy over three periods ranging from 1968 to 1997 ranged from 82%-94%.7 
Another study compared the accuracy of four bankruptcy prediction models: the 
Z-score, a cash flow “logit” model, a returns analysis model and a variance analysis 
model, on a sample of firms taken from the years 1980 to 1991. 8  The Z-score performed 
better than any of the other models resulting in a Type I accuracy of 80% and a Type II 
accuracy of 71% one period prior to default. 
Most bankruptcy prediction studies have focused on firms from a variety of 
industries, while few have focused on one particular industry.  Foreman set out to 
develop a new model based on bankruptcies of telecommunications firms (CLECS).9  It 
is unclear, however, how generic the model is and whether it can be applied to any other 
firm, or at any other time.  Ricci 10  tested the Z-score and a cash flow model 11  as 
predictors of bankruptcies.  The result was that the Z-score correctly classified 87% of 
bankrupt firms one period prior to bankruptcy however the model only correctly 
classified 30% of non-bankrupt firms, implying that the Z-scores for the entire telecom 
industry were very low and practically all firms were predicted to be bankrupt. 
                                                 
6 “Type I” accuracy refers to the correct classification of bankrupt firms as bankrupt;  “Type II” accuracy 
refers to the correct classification of non-bankrupt firms. 
7 Altman (2000) 
8 Mossman et al (1998) 
9 Foreman (2003) 
10 Ricci (2003) 
11 Foster and Ward (1997) 
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III.   Application of Bankruptcy Models to the Power Industry 
Following the lead of Ricci, the Z”-score was used to try to determine whether the 
bankruptcies in the power industry could have been predicted.  Figure 3 shows the Z’’-
Score for a sample of bankrupt firms in the power industry.  It appears that the Z’’-score, 
in general, declines for the year prior to bankruptcy for this sample.  However, the Z’’-
Score for distressed firms shows the historical range for this industry is low and the 
bankrupt firms are not significantly different than the distressed firms.   
Firms in the industry have continually operated in the “bankrupt” zone of the Z-
score.  There are two views that could be taken of this:  
1) The Z-score is inappropriate as a bankruptcy predictor for this industry.  
The natures of the firms are sufficiently unique that a model derived from other industries 
is meaningless. 
2) The Z-score is correct, and most firms are, and always have been, likely 
candidates for bankruptcy.  The markets of 2003 and 2004 were simply incredibly 
permissive and allowed bail-outs of those firms that made it through 2002. 
The Z-Score has not proven to be a conclusive indicator of bankruptcy for the 
power industry.  Three firms will be examined in detail in order to illustrate causes of 
bankruptcy that cannot be captured by a quantitative model.  Two of the firms to be 
examined, AES and Calpine, were distressed but did not default on their loans or become 
bankrupt.  The third firm, NRG Energy, defaulted on loans and subsequently underwent a 
Chapter 11 reorganization.  All three firms’ primary business is power generation. 
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Figure 3: Z''-Score for Bankrupt Firms 
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Figure 4: Z''-Score for Distressed Firms 
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IV.   Significant Events in the Industry 
Prior to delving into the details of the specific firms, a description is provided of 
some events that led to the downturn and distress in the power industry.  These events are 
relevant to all three of the firms that are discussed. 
California and PG&E 
Insufficient electric capacity in California caused power prices there to skyrocket 
during late 2000 and early 2001.  To appease consumers, PG&E was forced to sell power 
at low fixed prices regardless of the purchase price.  PG&E lost $9 billion in a matter of 
months and filed for bankruptcy in April 2001.  California embarked on a ‘witch hunt’ 
for the next two years bringing lawsuits against any and all merchant generators accusing 
them of trading improprieties. 
Weather 
The winter of 2001/2002 was particularly warm and then was followed by a cool 
summer in 2002, both of which are bad for energy trading.  Cold winters produce high 
gas prices and high electricity demand resulting in increased volatility.  Hot weather 
produces high electricity prices 
Oversupply 
During the expansion of the late 1990s, electricity demand grew at an increased 
rate and merchant generators constructed plants to meet the demand, often with the 
expectation that aging and polluting coal plants would be shut down.  The result of this 
enthusiasm was an over-supply of capacity and lower margins.  In addition, as the natural 
gas price increased, utilities became hesitant to shut down their coal plants due to lower 
prices for coal and therefore higher margins on sales.  
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Enron Bankruptcy 
When Enron declared bankruptcy in late 2001, not only did trading counter-
parties incur losses, but the result was increased scrutiny of all firms in the power 
industry and especially those with complicated financial structures.  Moody’s and S&P 
downgraded or put on credit-watch many of the merchant generating firms.  Bond prices 
declined immediately for all merchant generating firms. 
Worldcom 
On July 22, 2002, Worldcom filed for Chapter 11.  Although Worldcom had 
nothing to do with the power industry, it affected the credit markets and made it even 
more difficult to refinance debt.  The ratings agencies reacted, again increasing their 
scrutiny of firms with a lot of debt and complicated structures. 
V.   Applied Energy Services Corp (AES) 
History 
AES was founded in 1981 and originally built power and steam plants for 
industrial customers.  By the mid 1980's, AES was also providing electric utilities with 
power under long-term contracts that was below the utility's "avoided cost".  At this time, 
the company established its trademark project structure with significant reliance on "non-
recourse" project financing.12   
In the late 1980s, AES began its global expansion into the UK. Early in the 1990s, 
AES also entered Argentina, Pakistan, China, Australia and Kazakhstan, and later 
                                                 
12 Non-recourse financing is debt that is held at the subsidiary level and is non-recourse to the parent, 
meaning that if the subsidiary defaults, the parent is not liable for the debt.   
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acquired distribution companies and electric generating companies in countries such as 
Hungary and Brazil.  AES was added to the S&P 500 in 1998, and in 2000 the stock price 
exceeded $70 per share (market cap ~$28B).  
AES 1998-2001 
AES was in the middle of a period of extreme growth in 1998 operating plants 
generating 14,500 MW worldwide, with 5,254 MW under construction for a total of 
approximately 20,000 MW.  Most (or all) of this capacity was contracted.  AES had 
become one of the largest of the world’s independent power producers. 
By year-end 2001, AES had ownership of over 50,000 MW of capacity, an annual 
compounded growth of 60% since 1998.  Assets had grown to $36B, with total debt of 
$22B. 
Table 1: Breakdown of AES Net Income 
% of Pre-tax Income 
 
2001 2000 
Contract Generation 31% 31% 
Competitive Supply 9 % 21% 
Large Utilites 51% 46% 
Growth Distribution 9% 2% 
 
AES, in 2001, had diversified into four business units Growth Distribution, Large 
Utilities, Contracted Generation and Competitive Supply.  Growth Distribution represents 
generation and transmission assets in growing (emerging) economies.  Large Utilities 
represents five integrated utilities located in the US, Brazil and Venezuela.  Contracted 
Generation is their traditional business where power is sold forward through long-term 
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contracts and comprised 42% of capacity in 2001.  Competitive supply includes all plants 
with less than 75% of its capacity contracted or with power contracts less than 5 years 
and comprised 38% of capacity in 2001.  Competitive supply is used here as a proxy for 
merchant power, since it is hedged incompletely or only short-term.  The collapse of UK 
and US electricity prices resulted in competitive supply making up a smaller portion of 
AES revenues in 2001 compared with 2000. 
Table 2:  Overview  for AES (Consolidated), 1998 vs 2001 
 YE 1998 YE 2001 
Number of Projects 96 179 
Total MW 145,00 50,764 
MW in construction or 
pending acquisitions 5,254 7,500 
EBITDA (millions) 929 2,827 
LTD/Assets 54% 62% 
EBITDA to Int Exp 1.7x 2.0x 
Total Debt to EBITDA                 6.0x                8.0x  
Recourse Debt to EBITDA 1.8 1.9 
Corporate Unsecured Rating  BB  BB  
 
Capital Structure 
AES is organized as a holding company that is parent to over 100 international 
subsidiaries.  AES has always maintained a “project finance” structure whereby each 
subsidiary is financed by project level debt that is non-recourse to the parent company.  
The project level debt is secured by the assets of the subsidiary which typically consists 
of a single power plant.  These subsidiaries are financed with anywhere from 60%-85% 
debt and the remainder equity.  At the parent level, AES supplies the “equity” to the 
projects through traditional equity and unsecured, recourse debt.  Although the end result 
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is a firm that is highly levered, it is rationalized that the parent level debt is secured by 
the residual cash flows from numerous diversified projects.   
Some argue against a project finance structure because it is intrinsically expensive.  
As a firm grows, new projects do not take advantage of the lower cost of borrowing that a 
large firm with corporate level debt enjoys.  The result is higher interest costs and more 
frequent transacting costs.  However, a benefit to this structure is its inherent optionality.  
Should the project not perform as planned, the parent firm has the option to “put” the 
project back to the lenders without direct recourse (besides reputational damage). 
On a consolidated basis, AES has maintained a ratio of liabilities to assets of 
approximately 85%.  Non-recourse debt increased from 33% to 40% of assets from 1998 
to 2001, perhaps as a result of lower interest rates and thus a higher capacity for projects 
to take on debt or alternatively, due to the lending markets newfound comfort in the 
power industry. 
AES is one of few firms that provides both a consolidated and an unconsolidated 
balance sheet, which allows some insight into just the parent corporation without the 
subsidiaries.  On an unconsolidated basis, the amount of recourse debt on AES’s Balance 
Sheet increased from 40% to 49% of assets, or from 50% to 67% of Investments in 
Projects from 1998 to 2001.  AES (parent) has let its current assets grow in the form of 
notes receivable from subsidiaries indicating that non-performing subsidiaries are being 
funded by AES.  The net result is that AES has increased its leverage as it has expanded. 
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Table 3: AES Corp - Balance Sheet (Consolidated)  - 1998/2001 
Consolidated Balance Sheet (AES) Common Size
 1998 2001 1998 2001
Current Assets             1,254             4,653 12% 13%
Net PP&E             5,545           23,434 51% 64%
Investments in Projects             1,933             3,100 18% 8%
Other Non-Current Assets             2,049             5,549 19% 15%
Total Assets           10,781           36,736 100% 100%
  
Current Liabilities             1,976             5,041 18% 14%
Minority Interest                  -              1,530 0% 4%
Non-Recourse Debt             3,597           14,673 33% 40%
Recourse Debt             1,644             5,891 15% 16%
Other Non-Current Liabilities             1,770             4,062 16% 11%
Total Liabilities             8,987           31,197 83% 85%
  
Retained Earnings             1,120             2,809 10% 8%
Total Equity             1,794             5,539 17% 15%
Total Liabilities and Equity           10,781           36,736 100% 100%
 
Table 4: AES Corp - Balance Sheet (Unconsolidated) - 1998/2001 
Unconsolidated Balance Sheet (AES) Common Size 
 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Current Assets            446          3,172 11% 26% 
Net PP&E              -                -  0% 0% 
Investments in Projects         3,390          8,697 83% 72% 
Other Non-Current Assets            244             172 6% 1% 
Total Assets         4,080        12,041 100% 100% 
  
Current Liabilities             65             611 2% 5% 
Minority Interest              -                -  0% 0% 
Non-Recourse Debt              -                -  0% 0% 
Recourse Debt         1,644          5,891 40% 49% 
Other Non-Current Liabilities            577               -  14% 0% 
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Unconsolidated Balance Sheet (AES) Common Size 
 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Total Liabilities         2,286          6,502 56% 54% 
  
Retained Earnings         1,892          2,551 46% 21% 
Total Equity         1,794          5,539 44% 46% 
Total Liabilities and Equity         4,080        12,041 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 5: Debt coverage ratios for AES (recourse debt) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Parent-EBITDA 285 (est.)  871 1038 
Int Expense Net 48  133 240 
Interest Coverage 5.9x  6.5x 4.3x 
Recourse Debt 1,644  4,694 5,891 
Debt/EBITDA 5.8x  5.4x 5.7x 
 
AES reports its Operating Cash Flow to Parent (also called parent-EBITDA). 13 This is a measure 
that is relevant to the recourse debt, whereas Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) or other 10-K data 
will generally be consolidated and relevant only to total recourse and non-recourse debt.   
 
Table 5 shows that Debt/EBITDA has remained relatively constant but the 
interest coverage ratio declined in 2001. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Parent-EBITDA was not stated in 1998 or 1999 and has been estimated for 1998 as Dividends from 
Subsidiaries and Affiliates.   
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Timeline 
The following contains a timeline summarizing AES path into financial distress, 
and the actions that were taken to restructure. 
Dec 2001 AES bond prices decreased with the rest of the industry over fears of 
another Enron (see Figure 5 for stock and bond prices). 
Jan-Jul 2002 Political turmoil in South America had caused considerable depreciation 
in the Brazilian, Venezuelan and Argentinian currencies.  AES had 
approximately 30% of its consolidated revenues and 30% of its gross 
margin generated in South America. 
In Argentina, the government had rescinded its energy policy such that 
all payments would be made in Argentine pesos rather than USD and 
removal of pesos from the country would be limited. 
In the US, the spark spread (the spread between power prices and natural 
gas cost) had declined substantially from its highs in 2000.  
In the UK, the power markets had collapsed, and cash flows from the 
AES Drax plant would be significantly reduced. 
AES announced that it expected a decrease in distributions to the parent 
corporation of approximately $100 million (10% of parent level 
EBITDA). 
May 2002 Downgrades of Calpine, Mirant, and Dynegy caused bond prices to 
decrease further.  There are speculations of liquidity concerns due to debt 
maturing in December 2002.  AES announces that it is in negotiations to 
sell subsidiary CILCORP generating $540MM of cash. 
July 2002 Worldcom filed for Chapter 11.  AES bonds decreased to the low levels 
that would remain until October (~$0.40). 
Jul-Oct 2002 AES has $300 million in Senior notes coming due December 15, 2002.  
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In addition, it has an $850 million revolver coming due March 2003, and 
$200 million in notes in Jun 2003.   
Following Enron, and Worldcom, the credit markets are particularly 
tight.  Most firms in the industry are trying to refinance current debt.   
After a number of years of expansion, there had been little contemplation 
of credit drying up. 
There is speculation whether AES has the liquidity to repay the maturing 
debt particularly with cash flows declining.  AES bonds steadily decline 
in price to lows of $0.30. 
Jul 2002 Announces sale of subsidiary for $240 million (New Energy).  This is 
well received but liquidity is still an issue and bond prices remain low. 
Oct 24, 2002 AES proposes a refinancing plan.  All debt coming due in 2002, and 
early 2003 will be refinanced with new 10% senior notes due in 2005 and 
a $1.6 million credit facility.   
It is proposed that holders of the $300 million notes due in December 
2002 will receive 50% of the face value in cash, and another 50% in new 
notes.  Receiving $0.50 immediately is a good deal for the bond holders 
since the bonds are currently trading around $0.30.  Bond prices increase 
substantially. 
Holders of the $200 million notes coming due in June 2003 will 
exchange at face value for the new notes, which are more senior and have 
a higher coupon.  It is not clear how much more these holders gain from 
this exchange. 
The $1.6 million credit facility will repay the revolver and several loans 
of AES subs.  Half of it comes due in Nov 2004, and half in 2005. 
Further details are given in Appendix C 
Nov 2002 Announces sale of CILCORP for $1.4B, generating $540 million cash. 
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Dec 13, 2002 The refinancing plan is accepted.  The only change is that the 
$300 million noteholders will receive 65% cash and 35% new notes, 
further improving their deal. 
May 2003 AES secures a $1.8 billion private placement to pay off part of credit 
facility from December and extend maturity of some notes coming due 
2008-2011.  The new debt matures 2013 and 2015. 
2003 Announced $1.0 billion of asset sales.  Refinancing of more debt, which 
included extended maturities and consolidating all short term loans into a 
$700 million term loan due 2008.  Also completed an equity offering of 
$337 million. 
2004 AES continues to sell assets.   
Refinances high interest rate debt with longer term, lower coupon notes.  
Repays December credit facility.  Extends term of revolver to 2007. 
2005 Stock is trading at above $16, up from lows of $2 in 2002.  Bonds are 
trading at or above par. 
Figure 5 shows the stock and bond prices for AES from 1998 to 2004.   The 
events described were clearly reflected in the market prices of these securities.  Bond 
prices reacted abruptly as AES refinanced and threats of insolvency were removed.  
Stock prices did not change as drastically, but began increasing when the bonds returned 
to par. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of AES Stock and Senior Unsecured Bond14 prices 
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Further details of AES’ restructuring are included in Appendix C. 
VI.   Calpine Corporation 
Overview 
Calpine was founded in 1984 by Peter Cartwright to participate in the independent 
power industry.  By 1992, Calpine had total assets of $55 million.  Their business 
strategy was to build the most efficient plants and become the low-cost producer in any 
given market.  Peter Cartwright is a solid believer in electricity deregulation and believes 
that the consumer will ultimately receive lower prices.  His goal, as of 2001, was to build 
70,000 MW of capacity entirely of highly efficient gas fired power plants15. 
                                                 
14 AES bond prices refer to (1) Senior Unsecured Bond Due 2011, 8.875% Coupon  and (2) Senior 
Unsecured Bond Due 2008, 8.5% Coupon and (3) Senior Subordinated 8.375% Coupon, due 2007 
15 Wall St. Transcript, 2001. 
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Calpine vertically integrated by purchasing natural gas resources, turbine parts 
manufacturers, and a trading organization.  In addition, significant economies of scale 
and expertise have been developed in construction and plant operations. 
CPN: 1998-2001 
Between 1998 and 2001, Calpine had grown at a compounded annual rate of 
130% (assets) and 80% (capacity in operation and construction).  Calpine grew their 
installed MW base from 2,200MW to 12,000MW between 1998 and 2001 through an 
aggressive construction and acquisition strategy.  As of 2001, Calpine had an additional 
14,000MW under construction or pending acquisitions.  Their goal was to reach 
70,000 MW by 2005. 
In 1998, virtually all of its capacity was contracted.  By 2001, Calpine had 65% of 
its capacity sold forward, or otherwise contracted, with the remaining amount unhedged, 
merchant capacity. 
Table 6: Overview  for Calpine 1998 and 2001 
($millions) YE 1998 YE 2001 
Number of Projects 22 54  
Total MW 2,065 12,089  
MW in construction or pending 
acquisition 
2,206 14,142  
EBITDA $255 $1,595  
LTD/Assets 68% 60% 
EBITDA to Int Exp 2.9x  9.7x  
Total Debt to EBITDA 4.3x 8.0x  
Total Recourse Debt to EBITDA 3.7x 8.0x 
Corporate Unsecured Rating BB+ BB+ 
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Capital Structure 
Calpine, unlike AES, holds most of its debt at the corporate level.  Although 
Calpine has some debt that is titled non-recourse or project level, it has provided a 
corporate guaranty, meaning that the debt will be covered by Calpine on default.  In 
addition Calpine has “cross-default” provisions on its non-recourse debt, meaning that 
default at the project level will result in default of the parent, or, default of the parent will 
result in default at the project level.  Calpine plainly states these cross-default provisions 
in both its 2000 and 2001 10-K and therefore analysts treat all of Calpine’s debt as being 
recourse debt. 
Table 7:  Calpine Corp. - Cash Flows and Debt Service 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
EBITDA 282 433 1,016 1,600 
Int Expense 96 103 75 165 
Total Debt 1,216 2,262 4,757 12,728 
Interest Coverage 2.9x 4.2x 13.5x 9.7x 
Total Debt/EBITDA 4.3x 5.2x 4.7x 8.0x 
 
Much of Calpine’s recent construction has been financed by two loans called 
CCFC I and CCFC II (Calpine Construction Finance Corporation) that are secured by the 
assets under construction until completion at which time corporate debt will be used to 
take out the construction revolver. 
Calpine has maintained a capital structure with approximately 85% liabilities to 
assets from 1998 through 2001.  This leverage ratio has not changed as the firm moved 
from contracted assets to a blend of contracted and merchant plants.  
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Table 8: Calpine Corp- Balance Sheet - 1998/2001 
Balance Sheet (CPN) Common Size
 1998 2001 1998 2001
Current Assets                209             4,007 12% 19%
Net PP&E             1,094           15,385 63% 72%
Investments in Projects                221                378 13% 2%
Other Non-Current Assets                205             1,539 12% 7%
Total Assets             1,729           21,309 100% 100%
  
Current Liabilities                122             3,228 7% 15%
Minority Interest                  -                  47 0% 0%
Non-Recourse Debt                114             3,393 7% 16%
Recourse Debt                951             9,553 55% 45%
Other Non-Current Liabilities                255             2,078 15% 10%
Total Liabilities             1,442           18,299 83% 86%
  
Retained Earnings                118             1,196 7% 6%
Total Equity                287             3,010 17% 14%
Total Liabilities and Equity             1,729           21,309 100% 100%
 
Calpine provides, as part of its financial statements EBITDA as a proxy for cash 
flow for debt and fixed charge coverage (Table 7).  Calpine’s total debt to EBITDA ratio 
has increased substantially from 2000 to 2001 and is now at a high of 8.0x EBITDA.  
This may be due to the massive construction program it is undertaking which requires it 
to take on debt for assets that are not yet generating revenues.  Interest coverage as of 
2001 remains substantial at 9.7x. 
Timeline 
The following timeline summarizes the events that lead to Calpine’s distress and 
the actions taken to maintain solvency. 
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Dec 2001 Fitch downgrades Calpine from BBB- (lowest investment grade) to BB+ 
(highest non-investment grade), bond prices decline, and stock price is 
declining from ~$20 (see Figure 6). 
Calpine issues $1.2B in convertible senior notes. And repurchases 
$315 million of zero coupon bonds. 
Jan 2002 Calpine secures a $1B credit facility.  In addition to their $400M facility 
that comes due May 2003, there is little risk of bankruptcy for the near 
term although bond prices decline to $0.80. 
They announce that only the 14,000MW that are currently under 
construction will be completed and other development will be put on hold, 
resulting in reduced capital expenditures of $2.0B for 2002.  To put this to 
scale, Calpine had plans to have a total of 70,000 MW in operation by 
2005, up from the current 11,000 MW.  
Calpine renegotiates gas turbine purchases reducing capital expenditures 
by $1.2B in 2002 and $1.8B in 2003. 
Feb-Mar 
2002 
In mid-February there were concerns that January’s $1B credit facility was 
not going to close (stock price drops to $6.80).  In March it was 
announced that they had secured a $1.6B credit facility, $1B of which 
would come due in May 2003 along with their existing $400M credit 
facility and the remainder in 2005 (stock price rebounds to $12.83).    
Bond prices drop to $0.73 in mid Feb and rebound to $0.80 but remain 
below the $1 from late 2001. 
Apr 2002 Sells power and plants to Wisconsin Public Service (WPS) and 
renegotiates existing contracts with California DWR.  Issues equity for a 
total of $800MM.  Bond prices rise to $0.80 and the stock hovers around 
$12. 
Jul-Aug Expectations of a cool summer lead to revised EPS estimates, and renewed 
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2002 liquidity concerns.  Calpine is downgraded along with Dynegy and Mirant 
late June 2002 with NRG in July.  The summer ultimately is quite cool and 
earnings are low.  Bond prices in August drop to $0.43 with implied yields 
to maturity of above 25%.  Stock prices drop to $3.40. 
Sept-Dec 
2002 
Stock prices continue to plummet to below $2 and are valued merely at the 
option value of the plants.  Bond prices fall to the low $0.30’s with yields 
above 30%.   
In response Calpine manages to sell several assets including a number of 
natural gas assets, complete a number of project financings, and monetize 
some of its Canadian assets through an income fund. 
Jan-March 
2003 
The main obligations coming due are $400MM of a $1B revolver in May 
2003 and $1B in October 2003 for its CCFCI construction facility.  CCFCI 
is secured by approximately $3.0B in assets, and it is likely that the banks 
will roll this over. 
Calpine has not been as successful as planned in selling assets, or raising 
money through contract securitizations, sales leasebacks, and project 
financings.  There are $3.5B in obligations coming due n 2004. 
Despite the dire news, bond prices have increased to approximately $0.50 
perhaps due to other industry participants’ refinancings giving some 
glimmer of hope. 
May-Jul 
2003 
June 24 Calpine announced that they had signed a termsheet for 
refinancing a $1.0B revolver with another $1.0B revolver.   
June 27 Calpine announced that instead they were looking for a $1.8B 
private placement.  July 11 they announced $3.3B of refinancing 
(summarized in Appendix D). 
Simultaneously with the $3.3B refinancing, Calpine secured a new 
$500MM working capital revolver.  $200MM of which is a four year term 
loan and $300MM is a line of credit which was undrawn as of year end 
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2003.   
Following this event, bond prices moved up to high $0.70s and low $0.80s 
with yield of ~13-15%. 
Aug-Dec 
2003 
Throughout the rest of the year, Calpine continued to sell projects and 
monetize assets, albeit at a slow pace. 
In Nov 2003, Calpine issued another $1.3B of debt to repay debt coming 
due.  Part of the new debt includes $660MM of new convertibles (with a 
lower conversion price and a longer maturity than prior issues).  The 
remainder of the offering consisted of $900MM of 2011 notes. 
At this point, the end of 2003, Calpine has removed all impediments to 
insolvency for the short term.  In 2004, the largest item coming due is the 
CCFCII construction loan which is secured against 14 plants under 
construction with a value substantially higher than the face value of the 
loan.  Their bonds are trading at around $0.80 implying a yield of 
approximately 13%. 
2004-2005 Calpine has continued to issue debt, monetize and sell assets.  There is 
speculation that they are nearing their debt capacity and the power markets 
fail to improve.  Senior Unsecured bonds are currently (Mar 30, 2005) 
trading at approximately $0.70, implying a yield of 16% (Sr. Unsecured, 
8.75% due 2011), and the stock is trading at an option value of $2.60 
down from its highs of $55. 
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Figure 6 shows the stock and bond prices for Calpine from 1998 to 2004.   The 
events described are reflected in the market prices of these securities. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Stock and Unsecured Bond Prices for Calpine16 
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Calpine has shown considerable skill in accessing the capital markets and has 
used the flexibility that it had maintained in its capital structure as of 2001 to generate 
cash and maintain solvency.  It has still not recovered because of the overcapacity that 
remains in the US power industry.  AES on the other hand had a considerable amount of 
international exposure of both contracted and uncontracted assets that were uncorrelated 
with the US markets and to that extent were able to recover.  It is questionable what the 
next few years will bring for Calpine. 
                                                 
16 Calpine Senior Unsecured Bond, 8.5% Coupon, due 2011 
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VII.   NRG Energy Inc. 
History 
NRG Energy Inc. began business in 1989 as a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Northern States Power (NSP).  On June 5, 2000, NRG completed its initial public 
offering.  In August 2000, NSP merged with New Century Energies to become Xcel 
Energy.  Xcel owns interests in a number of non-regulated businesses, the largest of 
which is NRG.  In March 2001, Xcel owned 74% of the common stock of NRG which 
represented 96.7% of the voting shares.  On June 3, 2002, Xcel completed its exchange 
offer for the 26% of NRG’s shares that had previously been publicly held.  Xcel 
purchased the remainder of the shares due to their low price and with the intent of 
injecting more equity into NRG to maintain its investment grade credit rating. 
NRG 1998-2001 
In the 1990’s NRG pursued a strategy of growth through acquisitions.  Starting in 
2000, NRG added the development of new construction projects to this strategy.  The 
strategy required significant capital much of which was satisfied with third party debt.  
As of Dec. 31, 2001, NRG had 9.4B$ of debt on its consolidated balance sheet including 
$4.0B of corporate debt and $5.4B of consolidated project debt.   This is an increase from 
Dec 31, 1998 where NRG had just over $500MM of both non-recourse and recourse debt 
on its balance sheet.  During that time, the generating capacity owned by NRG had 
increased from 3,300MW to over 20,300 MW. 
In the 1998 Annual Report, NRG first announced that several of their new 
projects would operate on a “merchant” basis, including projects in Australia and the US.  
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The announced merchant projects would amount to approximately 50% of NRG’s 
capacity in 1998.   By 2001, NRG had over 20,000 MW in operation and over 3,000 in 
development.  Of this, approximately 45% was merchant.   In 2000, NRG also added new 
construction to their business activities. 
Table 9: Corporate Statistics for NRG, 1998 vs 2001 
 YE 1998 YE 2001 
Number of Projects 40             75  
Total MW 3,300       20,733  
MW in construction or pending 
acquisitions -  3,460  
EBITDA (millions) $83   $954  
LTD/Assets 48% 65% 
EBITDA to Int Exp 1.63x  2.15x  
Total Debt to EBITDA 7.6     8.8  
Recourse Debt to EBITDA 6.2 3.1 
Corporate Unsecured Rating (S&P) BBB- BBB- 
 
NRG 2001-2002 
In November 2001, NRG was negotiating the purchase of four coal plants for 
$1.5B.  Industry analysts were in favor of the transaction: 
“We believe NRG can achieve solid long-term compounded annual EPS growth 
of 15%...... We are confident that NRG can achieve our conservative growth 
targets given the quality of its assets, hedging strategy, fuel diversification, risk 
management skills and current pipeline of projects.”17  
In December 2001, following the bankruptcy of Enron, Moody’s placed NRG’s 
Senior Unsecured notes on review for a potential downgrade citing the effect of the 
                                                 
17 UBS Warburg Equity Research, Nov. 30, 2001 
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aforementioned acquisition as the reason.  In an effort to maintain an investment grade 
credit rating, Xcel purchased the 26% outstanding shares of NRG and provided a 
$500MM cash infusion. 
During July and August 2002, NRG’s credit rating was lowered from BBB-, to 
BB and then B by Standard and Poor’s and to Baa3 to B1 by Moody’s.   
NRG had provided corporate guarantees for the debt of some of its projects with 
the stipulation that cash collateral or letters of credit would be provided if its credit rating 
were to be reduced by Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s to below investment grade. The 
credit downgrade caused a requirement for $1.85B of collateral to be posted immediately.  
Collateral was needed to cover project level debt service reserve accounts, 
trading/marketing activities, and a Contingent Equity Guarantee on a construction 
revolver. 
In November 2002, NRG Energy and its subsidiary NRG NorthEast filed petitions 
for Chapter 11.  NRG defaulted on the payment of $127.6MM of interest on recourse 
debt issues and $138.2MM in interest and principle payments on non-recourse debt in 
2002 and early 2003.   
Capital Structure 
The assets of NRG grew at a compounded rate of 120% during the period 1998-
2001.  In 1998, NRG’s Balance Sheet looked more like that of a passive investor having 
62% of its assets as non-controlling (<50%) investments in projects accounted for using 
the equity method.  Liabilities made up 55% of assets and equity the remainder. 
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In 2001, liabilities had increased to 83% of assets, which  was typical of other 
firms in the industry.  Projects were more often being financed by non-recourse debt.  
NRG had begun to construct its own projects, and generally owned a majority stake in the 
projects. 
Table 10: NRG Energy - Balance Sheet 1998/2001 
Balance Sheet (NRG) Common Size
 1998 2001 1998 2001
Current Assets                  92             1,187 7% 9%
Net PP&E                205             9,432 16% 73%
Investments in Projects                801             1,051 62% 8%
Other Non-Current Assets                196             1,224 15% 9%
Total Assets             1,293           12,895 100% 100%
  
Current Liabilities                  51             1,951 4% 15%
Minority Interest                  14                 68 1% 1%
Non-Recourse Debt                113             4,871 9% 38%
Recourse Debt                381             2,972 29% 23%
Other Non-Current Liabilities                156                795 12% 6%
Total Liabilities                714           10,657 55% 83%
  
Retained Earnings                130                635 10% 5%
Total Equity                579             2,237 45% 17%
Total Liabilities and Equity             1,293           12,895 100% 100%
 
Some might argue18 for the inclusion of a pro-rata share of assets and liabilities 
rather than the equity method of accounting, however, doing so does not change the ratios 
substantially.  For example, the total liabilities on the balance sheet for 2001 would 
increase by $2.2B and the assets by $3.6B. 
                                                 
18 Singleton (2000) 
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An “adjusted CFO” measure was used as a proxy for cash available to service 
interest payments.  It can be seen that the results for 1998 and 1999, while NRG was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of NSP (now Xcel), are nonsensical.  Moreover, NRG’s interest 
coverage ratio had decreased and the debt/CFO had increased from 2000-2001.  NRG had 
a number of assets that did not perform and as such were restricted from distributing cash 
to their parent.  Also, this is a reflection of the exposure to the declining merchant 
markets.   
Table 11: NRG Energy - Interest Coverage Ratio 
($millions) 1998 1999 2000 2001 
adjusted CFO $47 $56 $748 $752 
Int Exp $50 $93 $294 $443 
Total Debt $520 $2,346 $3,803 $9,173 
Int Coverage 1.0x 0.60x 2.54x 1.7x 
Debt/ adjusted CFO 11x 42x 5.1x 12.2x 
 
Timeline 
The following timeline provides a summary of events from late 2001 through 
NRG’s default and bankruptcy filing. 
Oct 2001 Morgan Stanley has a buy rating with a 12 month price target of $42 
from the current $17.  Buy reduced to Hold in December as it lowers 
rating on entire industry. 
Nov 2001 NRG announces that it will purchase 2500MW from First Energy for 
$1.5B.  UBS reiterates a Strong Buy. 
Dec 2001 Moody’s placed NRG credit rating on review (currently at Baa3 – the 
lowest investment grade).  Incidentally, S&P ‘confirmed’ a BBB- rating 
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at this time.    
A downgrade to below investment grade would result in NRG having to 
post approximately $960MM of collateral within 30 days due to 
guarantees posted by NRG parent to its subsidiaries.  The guarantees are 
required for: $200MM for debt service coverage, $400MM required for 
power marketing activities, and $360MM for the Contingent Equity 
Guarantee that goes with its corporate revolver which could increase by 
the end of 2002 as NRG draws down the revolver bringing the total 
potential collateral required to $1.85B. 
Dec 2001 Xcel as primary shareholder sought to preserve NRG’s investment grade 
rating and contributed $500MM to NRG.  
Feb 2001 A plan is announced to maintain NRG’s credit rating that includes 
primarily a cash influx from Xcel but also non-aggressive plans to begin 
selling assets 
June 2002 Xcel buys remaining 26% of NRG shares.  On June 25, 2002, S&P 
downgraded Xcel to from BBB+ to BBB-, NRG unsecured bonds begin 
downward decline. 
July 2002 July 1 S&P affirmed the senior unsecured debt of the NRG Energy unit at 
BBB-, S&P's lowest investment grade, but took it off CreditWatch- 
Positive where the company was put Feb. 11, 2002, after Xcel announced 
plans to reacquire it. S&P's outlook on NRG is now negative.  There are 
also other downgrades including Dynegy Mirant and Calpine19 
July 2002 Worldcom files Bankruptcy July 21, 2002. 
S&P and Moody’s downgraded NRG to below investment grade on July 
26 and July 29 respectively, thus resulting in immediate collateral call of 
                                                 
19 Power Market Week, July 2002 
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approximately $1.0B (never actually posted). 
Xcel actually has cross-default provisions with NRG and one of the 
reasons they offer to eventually offer to contribute cash to settle 
creditor’s bankruptcy suitspony up money.  Xcel manages to renegotiate 
this term in Aug 2002. 
Aug 7, 2002 NRG downgraded again to B by S&P 
Sept 2002 Sept, 16, 2002 NRG didn’t make interest payments due resulting in the 
immediate acceleration of approximately $1.85B.  
Nov 22, 2002 NRG files Chapter 11 
Feb 2003 An additional $1.0B of payments accelerated under corporate revolver. 
Mar 2003 It is agreed that Xcel will pay NRG creditors $640MM for release of any 
and all claims against it. 
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Figure 7: Stock and Unsecured Bond Prices for NRG Energy (prior to Bankruptcy)20 
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Figure 7 shows the stock and bond prices for NRG from 1998 to 2004.   As the 
events unfolded their effects were reflected in the market prices of these securities. 
On Re-Emergence from Bankruptcy 
The Plan of Reorganization for NRG Energy Inc. resulted in recovery of 50% of 
Unsecured Claims (Class 5) and 43.9% of PMI Unsecured Claims (Class 6) for total 
relief of $3.3B.   In addition, Xcel Energy was accused of numerous misdeeds and settled 
all suits with the contribution of $640MM to the reorganized NRG Energy. 
NRG re-emerged from bankruptcy Dec 3, 2003.  The share price increased from 
$24 to $35 (as of April 2005) giving a market capitalization of $3.5B.  The Dec 31 2003 
                                                 
20 Source:  Thomson - Datastream 
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Balance Sheet is shown compared to the BS from 2001 in Appendix E.  They currently 
have interests in 72 power projects totaling 18,200MW. 
Balance sheet changes from year-end 2001 and the emergence from Chapter 11 in 
2003 include: 
 An addition of $500MM of equity in early 2001 by Xcel 
 A payment of $640MM in 2003 by Xcel to settle lawsuits and allegations 
 Asset sales, and a writedown of assets of over $3 Billion 
 forgiveness of over $3 Billion in debt 
VIII.   Discussion 
Overview 
AES, Calpine, and NRG were compared to illustrate the complexities within the 
unregulated power sector particularly during the year 2002.  AES participates primarily 
in international markets and its financial distress was caused by crises in South America, 
UK, and the US.  Calpine operates natural gas-fired power plants in the United States and 
had to scale back its massive development plans due to weak fundamentals in that market.  
NRG operates worldwide however its exposure to the US market combined with a capital 
structure contingent on ratings caused sudden and unpredictable insolvency. 
Other factors that differentiate the firms are discussed below. 
Financial Analysis 
Financial data is presented for the period from 1998 onwards for the three firms in 
order to compare the structure and risk associated with each of the firms. 
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Figure 8: Comparison of financial measures for Calpine, AES and NRG 
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It can be seen from the upper left chart in Figure 8 that in years 2000 and 2001, 
the CFO/Total Liabilities of Calpine and NRG are approximately the same.  
Inconsistencies and generally poor reporting in earlier years may account for the 
variability between firms.  The market capitalization ratio (upper right), shows that all 
three firms were similarly capitalized, with Calpine relatively less levered during 2000 
when stock prices were at their peak.   The firms have virtually identical book 
capitalization ratios also (lower left).  And finally, the Z’’score shows again that these 
three firms have remarkably similar values.  NRG exhibits more volatility over the period 
which could be in part due to their changing capital structure (full ownership and 
consolidation).  It is interesting that the Z’’-Score has not increased from 1998 to 2001 as 
the industry became more mature and the risk characteristics of the business increased as 
firms began selling uncontracted, merchant power. 
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Table 12: Operating Comparison 
 AES Calpine NRG 
Merchant 
Capacity 38% 35% 45% 
% of Operating 
Capacity in 
Construction 
15% 115% 17% 
 
A comparison of operating makeup of each company is shown in Table 12.  As of 
year end 2001, NRG has an estimated 45% of its capacity as merchant generation, 
whereas AES and Calpine have somewhat less.  This would have had a significant effect 
on NRG as the US power market collapsed.  The more capacity that was contracted, the 
more able to withstand the downturn a firm would be.  Calpine on the other hand, has a 
massive amount of capacity in construction, with 14,000 MW in construction and 
12,000 MW operating. One would expect the capacity in construction to strain a firm as it 
is not yet generating revenue but has incurred expenditures. 
A comparison of a number of measures of leverage and risk show that the firms 
are similar in many respects. 
Management Commitment 
All firms in the industry were faced with the same scrutiny, declining market 
conditions, and restrictions in capital markets.  Using asset sales and other liquidity 
enhancements as a proxy, the commitment and seriousness of management can be 
measured.  Table 13 shows what measures were taken by Calpine and AES prior-to and 
post- the downgrade of NRG in July 2002.  
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Table 13: Comparison of measures to improve liquidity 
  Calpine AES
Prior to July 2002 Reduction in Capital Spending 
(includes planned turbine purchases) 
$3,200 
(millions) 
unspecified
 New Financing $2,522 $0
 Monetization of assets21 negotiations $260
 Asset Sales $0 $780
Post July 2002 New Financing  $1,600
 Sale of Plants and Gas Properties  $471 $174
 Monetizing assets $362.5 $0
Total 2002  $6,555 $2,814
 
AES responded quickly with asset sales.  It announced the agreements to sell its 
CILCORP utility and New Energy marketing business generating $780MM cash 
(transactions closed post July).  Calpine took on $2.5B in new debt, perhaps sensing the 
coming liquidity crisis and drastically cut its development program, of which, the 
renegotiation of turbine purchase commitments alone saved $1.2B for 2002 and $1.8B in 
2003. 
In February 2002, NRG reacted slowly to threats of a downgrade, more like a 
staunch utility rather than an independent upstart.  It announced a plan consisting of four 
elements: 1) financial support from Xcel; 2) asset sales (by the end of 2002); 3) capital 
spending reductions, and 4) combining systems with Xcel.  By July when NRG was 
downgraded, Xcel had contributed $500MM to NRG, they had not sold any assets, and 
all capital spending reductions had been scheduled for 2003 and 2004.  In fact, NRG was 
still aggressively pursuing acquisitions including the $1.5B acquisition that caused the 
original credit concerns. 
                                                 
21 Includes project financing, sale/leaseback transactions, income trusts (Canada), and other 
 132
The behavior of management is obviously a determinant in whether a firm can 
restructure or not.  In this case, NRG management either disregarded the threats of 
downgrade or lacked the ability to follow through with liquidity-enhancements.   
Capital Structure 
The three firms illustrate the range of capital structure available.   
AES maintains a ‘classic’ project finance structure where debt is held at each 
project that is non-recourse to the parent firm.  There are ongoing financial disadvantages 
as discussed previously however, a key advantage is that the parent firm can ‘put’ the 
project back to its lenders if it doesn’t perform as AES did with its Drax UK facility and 
threatened to with AES Gener in Brazil.   This provides the firm with some significant 
value during difficult times. 
Calpine has virtually no project level, non-recourse debt.  A key advantage to this 
structure is the level of flexibility it provides to the parent firm.  Calpine was able to sell 
assets, as well as monetize facilities through income trusts, sale/leaseback transactions 
and other means.   
Table 14: Comparison of Recourse Debt to Total Debt 
 Calpine AES NRG 
Recourse Debt 
 to Total Debt 
~100% 27% 38% 
 
NRG originally looked like an investment firm with few consolidated assets.  
However by 2001, it had a structure that was a hybrid of Calpine and AES with a large 
amount of non-recourse debt at the subsidiary level.  Some of the subsidiaries consisted 
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of a ‘pool’ of assets (NRG Northeast for example) perhaps as a means of reducing 
transaction costs or providing risk reduction through diversification.  A key inconsistency 
of the financing structure is the guarantee of the subsidiary debt, and in this case doing so 
through “contingent liabilities’ – guarantees based on credit rating.  Not only do cash 
flows get trapped at the projects, a disadvantage of the project-finance structure, but the 
parent firm is ultimately liable for the debt repayment.  Also a certain amount of 
flexibility to sell assets is removed as lenders are secured against those assets and may be 
opposed to full or partial disposition of their security. 
One cannot conclude that one financial structure is better than another, however, 
on balance, NRG may have had the least flexibility to make it through tough times. 
IX.   The Role of the Ratings Agencies 
Perhaps the most interesting part of this study has been the role of the ratings 
agencies during this period and particularly with respect to the bankruptcy of NRG.   
This study leads one has to fundamentally question the value of a credit rating.  
NRG had an investment grade rating but a downturn in the industry resulted in the 
bankruptcy of the firm in less than one year.  Ironically, the cause of the bankruptcy was 
a downgraded rating. Moody’s Rating Action of Dec 2001 22  did not mention the 
contingent liabilities that would be triggered by a downgrade.  This leads one to believe 
that it was either so commonplace it needn’t be mentioned, or, perhaps the existence or 
magnitude of the liability was unknown or unappreciated.  Incidentally, AES also had 
                                                 
22 Moody’s Rating Action, December 4, 2001 (note: the first public mention found was after an NRG 
analyst call December 15, 2001). 
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contingent liabilities relating to its trading arm NewEnergy, which was sold in July 2002, 
amounting to $260MM which is considerably less than NRG, especially given the 
relative size of the two firms.   
Prior to the bankruptcy of Enron, firms in the industry continued to receive 
accolades from analysts and the ratings agencies.  For example, Moody’s had upgraded 
Calpine in Oct 2001 and in doing so commented on the other investment grade firms 
(such as NRG): 
“Moody’s upgrades CPN to investment grade as per the following. This morning, 
October 2 [2001], Moody's Investor Services upgraded the senior unsecured debt 
of Calpine Corporation ... to investment grade -- from Ba1 to Baa3. Moody's 
outlook is stable. * Moody's listed 6 primary reasons for the upgrade, including: 
1) strong management 2) focused growth, vertical integration and operational 
commoditization strategies 3) demonstration of ability to implement those 
strategies 4) disciplined risk management 5) significant contracted power sales 
and gas hedges 6) Moody's projections demonstrating debt service coverage 
solely from contracted power sales of over 1x and debt service coverage 
comparable to other investment grade independent power issuers.”23  
Moody’s downgraded Calpine less than two months later in December, 2001 and then 
again in June 2002.  By October 2002, Calpine’s bonds were trading at yields greater 
than 30%.   
The management of NRG and Xcel, on the other hand, did not seem to believe 
that it was possible to be downgraded.  They did not commit to take action to improve 
their liquidity even after being put on credit watch.  In fact, NRG continued to pursue the 
large acquisition that caused the December credit watch.  Xcel, NRG’s parent, was so 
sure it would not be downgraded that it bought the remaining shares of NRG to 
                                                 
23 Deutsche Banc Alex Brown Research Report on Moody’s downgrade (Oct 2, 2001) 
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restructure it in-house which lead to its own downgrade.  Even the bond markets did not 
anticipate the possibility of the downgrade; NRG Senior Unsecured bonds traded 
approximately at par until late June 2002 when Xcel’s rating was lowered.   
The bankruptcies of Enron and Worldcom brought in a new era of increased 
scrutiny where behavior that had been justified or ignored in the past was now 
unacceptable.  Enron filed for Chapter 11 on Dec 2, 2001; days afterwards, all firms in 
the industry were downgraded or put on credit watch.  Worldcom filed for Chapter 11 on 
July 22, 2002; NRG’s credit rating was downgraded only four days later on July 26, 2002.    
X.   Conclusion 
This paper looked at the financial distress within the power industry particularly 
in the year 2002.  A commonly-used bankruptcy prediction model, the Z-score, was 
applied to firms in the industry to determine whether it could have predicted the ensuing 
bankruptcies.  The Z-scores for all firms in the industry were very low and therefore did 
not discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.  However, as a measure of 
default risk for the industry, the Z-score may be perfectly accurate.  Although most firms 
had had low Z-scores historically, the level of risk and exposure to cyclicality had 
increased as business models changed to embrace the new deregulated merchant energy 
era.  Capital structures, leverage, and thus Z-scores should have changed to reduce that 
risk but did not.  As such, a sudden industry downturn resulted in distress and 
bankruptcies. 
Three firms were compared to understand the intricacies of the industry during 
2002.  AES and Calpine were distressed during 2002 and undertook restructuring; NRG 
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filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The firms had exhibited similar growth over the past 
several years, and showed similarities in financial ratios.  There were differences 
however in their business models, capital structures, and reaction to the downturn in the 
market. 
The bankruptcy of NRG Energy however, was due to its reliance on an 
investment grade credit rating which caused it to amass an undue amount of contingent 
liabilities.  The management of NRG showed flagrant disregard for the warnings of the 
credit rating agencies, and did not attempt to restructure.  Even the bond markets did not 
believe that NRG would be downgraded.  When NRG was eventually downgraded, the 
contingent liabilities were triggered resulting in almost immediate insolvency and filing 
for Chapter 11. 
There has been a significant amount of value destruction related to the growth of 
this industry.  Enthusiasm by Wall Street, and relaxed ratings policies have resulted in 
significant over supply and difficult conditions that will persevere.    
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Appendix A :  Altman’s Z-Score 
The final form of the original Z-score is:  
Z = 1.2·X1 + 1.4·X2 + 3.3·X3 + 0.6·X4 +1.0·X5 
Where:  X1 = working capital/total assets, 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
X5 = sales/total assets, and 
Z = overall index where a score of less than 1.81 will predict 
bankruptcy and a score above 2.675 will predict not-bankruptcy. 
A later version of the Z-score called the “Z-double-prime” (Z’’) was developed 
which has the form: 
Z" = 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 
Where: X1 = working capital/total assets, 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
X4 = book value of equity/book value of total liabilities, 
Z" = overall index where a score of less than 1.1 will predict 
bankruptcy and a score above 2.6 will predict not-bankruptcy. 
Functionally the Z’’ is the same as the original z-score although the X5 term has 
been eliminated which allows a better comparison of firms/industries where asset 
turnover is unique or irrelevant.   
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Appendix B :  Firms Studied 
 Defaults Date of Default Total Liabilities
1 York Research Corp 2001 223
2 Covanta Energy Corp (formerly Ogden) 2002 3,180
3 NRG 2002 10,657
4 PG&E NEGT 2003 8,927
5 Northwestern Corp (Montana Power 2002/2003 3,129
6 Mirant 2003 16,460
 Total 42,576
 Distressed Date of Distress Total Liabilities
1 Calpine 2002 18,299 
2 Dynegy 2002 19,349
3 Williams 2002 32,862
4 Reliant 2002 6,308
5 Aquila 2002 9,397
6 El Paso 2002 38,815
7 Allegheny Energy 2002 8,384
8 AES 2002 31,197
9 CenterPoint Energy Inc. 2002 23,822
10 MidAmerican Energy Holidings 2002 10,907
11 Edison Mission Energy 2002 9,153
 Total 208,493
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Appendix C :  Further Detail of AES Restructuring 
AES Refinancing 
The refinancing consisted of three steps. 
1) Refinance current and near-term debt with “super” seniority notes and secured 
credit facility with short term debt giving generous terms for noteholders and new credit 
providers. (Compare 2001 to 2002 debt profiles) 
2) Refinance mid-term debt to create a flatter debt profile.  AES accomplished 
this with the May, 2003 private placement and continuing asset sales. (Compare 2002 to 
2003 debt profiles) 
3) Repay high interest rate debt and lower carrying costs.  AES continued to cut 
debt through 2004 with asset sales and an equity offering. (Compare 2003 to 2004 debt 
profiles.) 
All of the steps of the refinancing involved a commitment by management to 
improve liquidity by selling assets.  Selling assets will always involve a tradeoff between 
liquidity and cash flows.  Selling assets will inevitably reduce cash flows and may limit 
the firm’s ongoing viability.  An examination of Figure 9 shows consolidated revenues 
and gross margin by region and year for AES, indicates that cash flows are at or above 
pre-distress levels even after asset sales.  Gross margin and revenues from South America 
however, have increased substantially, indicating a larger exposure to these economies. 
AES’ debt maturities have been pushed substantially into the future.  
Approximately $500 and $600MM come due in 2007 and 2008 respectively.  They have 
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decreased their cost of debt and have substantial liquidity.  Their current revolver is 
virtually undrawn with a 650MM limit doesn’t come due for renewal until 2007.  
Figure 9: AES Revenues and Gross Margin by Region 
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Table 15: Details of December 2002 Refinancing (AES) 
Retired debt New debt Details 
300MM, 8.75% Dec 15, 2002 305MM  10% Sr. Secured 2005 
200 MM , 7.375% Jun 2003   
- 65% of FV in cash immed. (300) 
- 35% new 10% notes  (300) 
- exchange at FV (200) 
850MM, L+200 Mar 2003 
425MM, L+250 Aug 2003 
262MM, L+238 Jul 2003 
52.2GBP, L+250 2004 
1,600MM Sr. Secured 
Credit Facility 
LIBOR+650 
Nov-04  
Jul-05 
-50% due Nov’04 and 50% due 
Nov’05 
-1st lien on 100% of AES equity in 
subs 
 
 
New notes and credit facilities are secured against 100% of equity in AES domestic subs and 65% of equity in certain 
overseas businesses 
Cash from all new debt issuances, equity issuances, assets sales and parent level EBITDA must in part go to pay down 
new debt 
Required to repay $810mm of credit facility by Nov 25, 2004 
Increase in interest expense of $65MM per year. 
 
Table 16: Details of May 2003 Private Placement 
Retired debt New debt Details 
475MM Sr.Sec.Credit 2005 
49MM Sr. Notes (8%) 2008 
180MM Sr. Notes (8.75%) 2008 
1,200MM (8.75%)  
600MM (9%) 
2013  
2015 
2nd priority to Senior Notes 
and credit facility issued Dec 
2002 
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Retired debt New debt Details 
283MM Sr. Notes (9.5%) 2009 
463MM Sr. Notes (9.375%) 2010 
250MM Sr. Notes (8.875%) 2011 
   
Total = $1.7 billion Total = $1.8 billion  
 
Table 17:  Summary of AES Debt Structure before and after distress 
    After 
Refi 
After Pvt 
Pl 
 Int Rate Mat. 2001 2002 2003 
Corporate Revolving Bank Loan Var 2002 70   
Corporate Revolving Bank Loan 8.10% 2005  228  
Corporate Revolving Bank Loan 8.10% 2007    
Senior Secured Term Loan 5.13% 2008   300 
Senior Secured Term Loan 5.32% 2008   400 
Term Loan  2003 425   
Term Loan  2002 188   
Term Loan (50% due 2004) 8.12% 2005  500  
Term Loan (50% due 2004) 7.99% 2005  427  
Term Loan (50% due 2004) 7.94% 2005  260  
Total First Priority   683 1,415 700 
First Priority as % of Total   11% 21% 12% 
      
Senior Notes 8.75% 2002 300   
Senior Notes 8% 2008 200 199 150 
Senior Notes 8.75% 2008 400 400 223 
Senior Notes 9.50% 2009 750 750 470 
Senior Notes 9.38% 2010 850 850 423 
Senior Notes 8.88% 2011 600 537 313 
Senior Notes 8.80% 2011 196 217 170 
Senior Notes 10% 2005  258 232 
Senior Notes (2nd priority) 8.75% 2013   1200 
Senior Notes (2nd priority) 9.00% 2015   600 
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    After 
Refi 
After Pvt 
Pl 
 Int Rate Mat. 2001 2002 2003 
Remarketable or Redeemable Sec. 7.38% 2003 200 26  
Total Senior Notes   3,496 3,237 3,781 
Senior Notes as % of Total   55% 48% 64% 
      
Sr. Sub. Notes 10.25% 2006 250 231  
Sr. Sub. Notes 8.38% 2007 325 316 210 
Sr. Sub. Notes 8.50% 2007 375 349 259 
Sr. Sub. Notes 8.88% 2027 125 125 115 
Conv. Jr. Sub. Debentures 4.50% 2005 150 150 150 
Conv. Jr. Sub. Debentures 6% 2008 460 460 213 
Conv. Jr. Sub. Debentures 6.75% 2029 518 518 517 
Total Sub. Or Jr. Sub   2,203 2,149 1,464 
Subordinated as % of total   35% 32% 25% 
      
Total Recourse Debt   6,382 6,801 5,945 
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 146
Appendix D :  Further Details of Calpine Restructuring 
 
Table 18: Summary of July 11, 2003 $3.3B refinancing: 
Old Debt   New Debt   
May 2004 Term Loan $950  4 year term loan $750  
2005 Corporate Revolver $450  2007 2nd Priority Secured $500  
2004 Puttable Convertible $400  2010 2nd Priority Secured $1,150  
Effective debt retirement 
@$0.90 $1,450  2013 2
nd Priority Secured $900  
Fees $50    
Total $3,300  Total $3,300  
Increase in pre tax interest cost: $43MM 
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Appendix E :  NRG Balance Sheet After Restructuring 
Balance Sheet Common Size 
 2001 2003 2001 2003 
Current Assets      1,187 2,113 9% 23% 
Net PP&E      9,432 4,416 73% 48% 
Investments in Projects      1,051 745 8% 8% 
Other Non-Current Assets      1,224 1,986 9% 21% 
Total Assets     12,895 9,260 100% 100% 
  
Current Liabilities      1,951 2,026 15% 22% 
Minority Interest           68 37 1% 0% 
Non-Recourse Debt      4,871 0 38%
Recourse Debt      2,972 3,661 23%
40% 
Other Non-Current Liabilities         795 1,099 6% 12% 
Total Liabilities     10,657 6,823 83% 74% 
  
Retained Earnings         635 11 5% 0% 
Total Equity      2,237 2,437 17% 26% 
Total Liabilities and Equity     12,895 9,260 100% 100% 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
By the last quarter of 2001, Argentina entered into one of the most important 
financial and economic crises of its history. The crisis was characterized by huge bank 
deposit withdrawals, a significant decrease in Central Bank reserves, the abandonment of 
the Argentine peso peg against the dollar, the country’s formal declaration of the largest 
debt default in history, and a GDP decrease of 4.4% in 2001 and 10.9% in 2002. 
Paradoxically, in the middle of this financial and economic collapse, the Argentine stock 
market boomed, shown by an increase in the MERVAL index (local index) of 115% (in 
Argentine pesos) between the end of November 2001 and the end of March 2002. This was 
contrary to what happened in other emerging countries’ financial crises, such as Mexico, 
Malaysia or Korea during the 90’s, whose stock markets declined by roughly 50%. 
At the beginning of December 2001, before the debt default declaration and 
devaluation, extensive restrictions on bank deposit withdrawals and international transfers 
were imposed, in order to stop the severe decline in government reserves and local bank 
deposits, as well as to prevent a speculative attack to the local currency. This group of 
restrictions was named the Corralito. Under the Corralito’s restrictions, it was legal to 
purchase Argentine stocks using frozen bank deposits, including stocks that were cross-
listed in international stock markets.  
This paper analyses the impact of the introduction of capital restrictions as an 
explanation of the stock market boom during this period. In particular, through the stock 
market, investors were able to evade the capital controls and transfer their wealth out of 
Argentina. The mechanism worked as follows: Argentine investors purchased stocks in the 
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange (BCBA – “Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires”) using their 
frozen bank deposits, converted them into American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in U.S. 
 151
stock markets, and finally sold the ADRs and deposited the proceeds in the U.S. banking 
system. This paper also compares and analyses the differences of the Corralito’s impact on 
cross-listed stocks (ADR stocks) and non cross-listed stocks (non-ADR stocks).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the Argentine 
crisis and a detailed description of the capital controls introduced by the Corralito. Section 
III analyses the price impact of the Corralito on ADR and non-ADR stocks. Section IV 
qualitatively and quantitatively examines the reasons for the stock price distortions 
generated by the capital controls by decomposing the premium on ADR and non-ADR 
stocks. Finally, Section V analyses how local and global factors that have influence in stock 
pricing changed after the Corralito introduction and during the period in which Argentine 
stock market was closed.  
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II. OVERVIEW OF ARGENTINE CRISIS AND CAPITAL CONTROLS  
 
II.1 Brief History of 2001-2002 Argentine Crisis 
 
The 2001-2002 Argentine crisis was among the most severe of its history. The 
currency-board, under which the Argentine peso had been pegged at parity against the U.S. 
dollar since 1991, collapsed in January 2002, and by the end of March 2002, the Argentine 
peso was trading at 3 pesos per U.S. dollar. The crisis came after three years of economic 
recessions and had a devastating economic and social impact, reflected by the fall in GDP 
of about 20% over a three year period (2000 - 2002), the default of government debt, the 
collapse of the banking system, a deep corporate crisis, social unrest, and violent 
demonstrations against the government. In the following graph, we show the quarterly 
evolution of Argentine GDP and the peso price of the dollar from 1991 to 2002. 
Graph 1: GDP and Exchange Rate Evolution 
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II.2 Description of Capital Controls introduced by the Corralito 
 
 Through the Corralito, the government imposed several restrictions on bank deposit 
withdrawals. In particular, only 250 pesos (250 U.S. dollar at the time it was implemented) 
per week per account could be withdrawn from banks’ accounts and only 1,000 pesos were 
allowed to be taken abroad. An official permit was required to make foreign payments 
above this amount. In addition, all investors were prohibited from transferring funds outside 
the Argentine banking system. The Corralito was established on December 3, 2001, and 
was announced as a temporary measure to stop the significant capital outflows that the 
country was suffering. From July 2001 to November 2001, more than $15 billion was 
withdrawn from Argentina’s banks. In particular, in the three days from November 28 to 
November 30, 2001, $3.6 billion, 6% of total deposits, left the banking system. 
 Under the Corralito, it was allowed to use the frozen bank deposits in excess of the 
250 pesos per week to buy stocks that traded in the Argentine stock market. If the 
purchased stock was also listed in the U.S., it could be converted into an ADR and sold in 
the U.S., depositing the dollar proceeds in the U.S. banking system.  
 
II.3 Stock Market Boom 
 
As we can see in Graph 2, until the introduction of the Corralito, Argentine local 
index, the MERVAL, was decreasing at a significant rate, reflecting the economic 
conditions of the country. From June 1, 2001 to November 30, 2001, the MERVAL 
dropped by 53.5%. However, after the Corralito’s introduction, the Argentine stock market 
increased significantly, even though the Argentine economy was collapsing. In fact, the 
MERVAL increased by 69.5% since the Corralito introduction on December 3, 2001 until 
the beginning of January 2002, just before the currency peg abandonment. In Argentine 
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pesos terms, the MERVAL increased by 115% from the Corralito imposition to the end of 
March 2002. 
Graph 2: MERVAL Evolution 
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II.4 Time Line of Important Economic, Financial and Political Events 
  
In order to analyze the impact of the introduction of capital controls on the local 
stock market, it is important to know the time line of the main economic, financial and 
political events during the period December 2001 - March 2002.  
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Table 1: Main Events in Argentine Crisis 
Date Events 
December 3, 2001 The Corralito’s restrictions are imposed. 
 
December 19, 2001 Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo resigns. 
 
December 20, 2001 President Fernando De La Rua resigns. President of the Senate Ramon Puerta 
becomes interim President. Stock market is closed since December 21, 2001. 
 
December 23, 2001 Adolfo Rodríguez Saá is elected President by Legislative Assembly. He 
announces partial suspension of external debt payments. 
 
December 28, 2001 Stock exchange is re-opened after being closed for 7 days. 
 
December 30, 2001 Rodríguez Saá resigns. Head of Lower House Eduardo Camaño becomes 
interim President. 
 
January 1, 2002 Eduardo Duhalde is elected President by the Legislative Assembly. 
 
January 4, 2002 Financial press suggests that devaluation is imminent. Devaluation estimate is 
approximately 40%. 
 
January 6, 2002 The convertibility law (currency board) is abolished by the Congress. A dual 
exchange rate regime is introduced; one fixed at 1.40 pesos per U.S. dollar for 
foreign trade operations, and the other freely determined by the market. 
Financial markets are closed since January 7, 2002. 
 
January 11, 2002 The exchange rate market is re-opened and the new exchange rate regime is 
implemented. 
 
January 17, 2002 Stock exchange is re-opened after being closed for 10 days. 
 
February 3, 2002 U.S. dollar deposits are “pesoized”1 at 1.4 pesos per U.S. dollar. The dual 
exchange regimes established in January 6 are unified in a floating exchange 
rate regime.  
 
March 25, 2002 ADRs conversion restrictions are announced with the objective of regulating 
capital outflows through ADRs. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Mandatory conversion of dollar-denominated deposits to pesos-denominated deposits at 1.4 pesos per dollar 
rather than at the prevailing market exchange rate. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF IMPACT OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON LOCAL STOCK 
MARKET  
 
III.1 Description of Data 
 
 In order to analyze the impact of the introduction of capital controls on stock prices, 
we separated Argentine stocks in two groups: 
 Stocks traded in the local stock market and cross-listed in U.S. stock markets, and 
 Stocks only traded in the local stock market. 
As at December 2001, 25 Argentine firms were cross-listed in U.S. stock markets: 
11 in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 3 in the NASDAQ and 11 were private 
placements only available to institutional investors. 
Based on these groups of stocks, we created three portfolios: 
 ADR Stock Portfolio: Equally weighted portfolio denominated in U.S. dollar and 
composed by the following 11 stocks that traded in the BCBA and were cross-listed 
in the NYSE. 
Table 2: Stocks included in ADR Stock Portfolio 
BBVA Banco Frances 
Cresud 
Grupo Galicia 
IRSA 
Metrogas 
Petrobras 
Siderca 
Telecom Argentina 
Telefonica Argentina 
Transportadora Gas del Sur 
YPF 
 
 ADR Portfolio: Equally weighted portfolio denominated in U.S. dollar and 
composed by ADRs representing the cross-listed stocks included in the ADR stock 
portfolio. To be comparable with the other portfolios, ADR prices were converted to 
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a per share basis by dividing the ADR price by the number of Argentine shares that 
the ADR represented.  
 Non-ADR Stock Portfolio: Equally weighted portfolio denominated in U.S. dollar 
and composed of the 28 most traded stocks in the BCBA, excluding cross-listed 
stocks. The following firms were included in the portfolio.  
Table 3: Stocks included in Non-ADR Stock Portfolio 
Acindar Industria Argentina de Aceros SA 
Agrometal 
Aluar 
Atanor SA 
Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires 
Banco Hipotecario SA 
Banco Macro Bansud SA 
Boldt 
Carlos Casado SA 
Celulosa Argentina 
Central Puerto SA 
Cynba 
Dycasa SA 
Gas Natural BAN (Argentina) 
Grupo Consorcio del Oeste 
Hipotecario 
Juan Minetti SA 
Ledesma SA 
Longvie 
Molinos Rio de la Plata 
Polledo SA 
Quickfood SA 
Renault Argentina 
SA Importadora y Exportadora Patagonia 
San Miguel 
Sociedad Comercial del Plata SA 
Solvay Indupa SAIC 
Transener SA 
Acindar Industria Argentina de Aceros SA 
 
Local stock prices were converted to U.S. dollars using the dollar/peso spot 
exchange rate at the close of each day. 
 
III.2 Evolution of Cross-Listed Stock Prices  
 
In the following graph, we show the price evolution of the ADR stock portfolio and 
the ADR portfolio between October 2001 and May 2002. Note that in order to compare 
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local stock prices with ADR prices, ADRs were converted to the number of underlying 
shares using the ADR conversion factor. Transaction costs of ADR conversions were 
ignored.  
Graph 3: ADR Stock Portfolio and ADR Portfolio 
(at the Corralito imposition on 11/30/01 = 100)  
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 Source: DataStream 
 
As we can see from the graph, before the introduction of the Corralito, the gap 
between local share prices and ADR prices was minimal and may be explained by 
transaction costs. The weighted average deviation between local share prices and ADR 
prices was 0.16% during the period from June 1, 2001 to November 30, 2001 (see Table 4). 
The fact that ADRs and their underlying securities moved together is in line with finance 
literature that suggests that the law of one price hold for cross-listed stocks after adjusting 
for exchange rate differences and transaction costs, leading to no arbitrage opportunities.  
However, after the Corralito introduction in December 2001, the deviation between 
local share prices and ADR prices increased significantly. While ADR prices were stable, 
local share prices were increasing at an astonishing rate. This gap between the local shares 
and the ADRs represented the premium that investors were willing to pay to transfer their 
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wealth from their frozen bank deposits in Argentina into the U.S. financial system, and 
explained the violation of the law of one price. The premium reached a peak of over 40% 
just before the peso peg abandonment in January 2002, implying the significant premium 
that investors were willing to pay to avoid losses in their frozen peso-denominated deposits 
that a potential devaluation would cause. Table 4 shows that for 7 of the 11 stocks analyzed 
in this portfolio, their maximum premium was reached on January 3 or January 4, 2002, 
days before the currency peg collapse, implying that a significant component of the 
premium was due to investors’ expectations of an imminent devaluation. After Argentine’s 
devaluation, the premium, though significant, decreased to lower levels and it tended to 
disappear, by the end of March 2002, after the announcement of certain restrictions that 
diminished Argentine investors’ incentives to continue using the ADR vehicle. 
In Exhibit 1, we show the evolution of the ADR premium for the two most liquid 
cross-listed stocks: Telecom Argentina and Petrobras. 
In the following table, we show the average premium of the local shares over the 
ADRs for the 11 stocks and ADRs included in the ADR stock portfolio and ADR portfolio. 
Note that days where the BCBA was closed (December 21 – December 27, 2002 and 
January 7 – January 16, 2002) were excluded from the calculation. 
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Table 4: Premium per ADR Stock23 
 
Pre-Corralito Post-Corralito and Pre-Devaluation Post-Devaluation Post-ADR Restriction
6/1/01 - 11/30/01 12/3/01 - 1/10/02 1/11/02 - 3/25/02 3/26/02 - 5/31/02
Average Peak Average Peak Peak Day Average Peak Average Peak
BBVA Banco Frances -8.62% -2.52% 16.03% 48.29% 1/21/2002 6.79% 64.79% -3.05% 9.95%
Cresud 0.77% 4.44% 8.58% 40.50% 1/4/2002 10.74% 38.98% 3.49% 13.11%
Grupo Galicia -4.27% 2.60% 24.32% 61.07% 1/21/2002 8.10% 85.37% -2.43% 11.11%
Irsa 2.13% 5.71% 19.54% 37.99% 1/3/2002 13.37% 28.60% 4.40% 13.34%
Metrogas -2.67% 4.00% 5.19% 33.33% 12/20/2001 7.62% 28.27% -1.07% 26.32%
Petrobras 0.14% 5.56% 28.49% 76.68% 1/4/2002 14.25% 39.80% 6.12% 15.87%
Siderca 0.07% 4.12% 30.54% 66.88% 1/3/2002 14.74% 33.81% 5.51% 14.57%
Telecom Argentina 0.19% 7.10% 26.97% 53.38% 1/4/2002 13.27% 36.90% 4.64% 16.67%
Telefonica Argentina -0.46% 21.11% 17.27% 30.75% 1/29/2002 11.27% 32.71% -8.24% 14.29%
Transportadora Gas Sur -0.02% 7.22% 26.88% 57.79% 1/4/2002 12.11% 28.99% 0.88% 12.90%
YPF 1.61% 11.80% 19.16% 46.60% 1/4/2002 17.76% 43.55% 11.48% 33.29%
Average -1.01% 20.27% 11.82% 1.98%
Weigthed Average 0.16% 21.62% 14.39% 4.53%  
 
Source: DataStream 
 
 
III.3 Evolution of Non Cross-Listed Stock Prices 
 
  Although local stocks that were not cross-listed in U.S. stock markets did not 
represent, for Argentine investors, a vehicle to shift their wealth from Argentina to the U.S., 
they represented a better investment option than investors’ current status quo of 
maintaining their frozen bank deposits. In particular, Argentine stocks were more liquid 
than Argentine bank deposits and were a better hedge alternative against a potential 
devaluation or “pesoization” of bank deposits.  
 In the following graph, we show the price evolution of the non-ADR stock portfolio 
compared with the price evolution of the ADR stock portfolio between October 2001 and 
May 2002. Note that a comparison between these two portfolios is meaningful as they are 
very strongly positive correlated. In particular, before the Corralito the correlation between 
the non-ADR stock portfolio and the ADR stock portfolio was 0.994, while after the 
Corralito introduction it slightly declined to 0.947. 
                                                 
2 Premium was calculated as (Stock Price – ADR Price) / ADR Price and was not adjusted for transaction 
costs. ADR Price was calculated on a per share basis using the ADR conversion factor. 
3 Weighted average based on market capitalization. 
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Graph 4: ADR Stock Portfolio and Non-ADR Stock Portfolio  
(at the Corralito imposition on 11/30/01 = 100) 
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 Source: DataStream 
 
 As in the case of the ADR stock portfolio, the non-ADR stock portfolio reached a 
peak during the days before of the currency peg collapse, showing the significant impact of 
expectations of devaluation on the premium of non-cross listed stocks. However, the 
increase in stock prices was not as high as in the case of cross-listed stocks. 
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IV. DECOMPOSITION OF STOCK PREMIUM 
 
IV.1 Estimated Composition of ADR Stock Premium 
 
Under an efficient market, the price of local stocks reflects the fundamental value of 
the firms, and is the main factor that determines the price of ADRs. However, in the 
presence of capital controls, such as the Corralito, local stock prices were distorted as local 
stocks represented a vehicle for Argentine investors to move their deposits out of 
Argentina. As the Corralito only affected Argentine investors, and not foreign investors, 
ADR prices were not distorted and, under this scenario, could be considered a close 
estimate of the fundamental value of the stocks. 
Under the hypothesis that ADRs reflected the fundamental price of the stock, the 
deviation between local share prices and ADR prices should represent the premium that 
Argentine investors were willing to pay to: 
 Convert its frozen deposits, that could be partially or totally lost in value (by a 
potential reprogramming of deposits or bankruptcy of the financial institution), into 
liquid stocks (liquidity premium), 
 Transfer wealth from Argentina to the U.S. (control capital avoidance premium), 
and 
 Convert its peso-denominated deposits (or U.S. dollar-denominated deposits), 
which had a high probability of losing value through the local currency devaluation 
(or a significant threat of “pesoization”), into U.S. dollar-denominated securities or 
deposits in the U.S. banking system (exchange rate hedge premium). 
As analyzed in Section III, the expectation of the abandonment of the currency peg 
was key in explaining the ADR stock and non-ADR stock price peak by the beginning of 
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January 2002, just before the exchange rate collapse. In order to estimate investors’ 
devaluation expectations, we calculated the daily-expected devaluation rate as the 
percentage difference between the spot exchange rate and the one-week non-deliverable 
forward (NDF) exchange rate (mid bid-ask).  
In order to estimate the average premiums previously described, we regressed the 
value of the ADR stock portfolio (SA) against the value of the ADR portfolio (A), the 
expected devaluation rate (D) and two dummy variables (0 or 1) according to whether the 
data analyzed was before or after the Corralito imposition (X1), and before or after the ADR 
restriction announcement (X2):  
SA = β 0 + β 1 A + β 2 D + β 3 X1 + β 4 X2 +ε  
While β 2 should reflect the impact of a D percent expected devaluation on the 
value of the ADR stock portfolio (exchange rate hedge coefficient), β 3  should represent 
the liquidity and control capital avoidance premium created by the Corralito, and β 4  the 
control capital avoidance premium that should have disappeared when ADR conversions 
were restricted. This analysis assumes that the exchange rate hedge coefficient, and the 
liquidity and control capital avoidance premium are constant during the period. Under this 
assumption, we can estimate the individual premiums: 
Exchange Rate Hedge Premium = β 2 D 
Control Capital Avoidance Premium = -β 4 
Liquidity Premium = β 3 + β 4 
The period regressed was from June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002, excluding the days in 
which the local stock market was closed (13 business days). The following regression was 
obtained (see Exhibit 2 for regression details): 
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SA = - 0.49 + 0.98 A + 0.87 D + 7.15 X1 - 5.68 X2 +ε     (R2 = 99.4%) 
 Based on the above regression, the control capital avoidance and liquidity premium 
imbedded in the ADR premium were 5.68% and 1.47% respectively. The estimated 
exchange rate hedge coefficient was 0.87, which implies that an expected devaluation of 
the Argentine peso of 1% generated a 0.87% increase in the ADR stock portfolio value. In 
the following graph, we show the evolution of the ADR premium based on its three 
components compared with the observed premium caused by the Corralito introduction.  
Graph 5: Estimated Premiums for ADR Stock Portfolio  
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Source: DataStream 
 
 Our assumption of constant premiums over the period is an explanatory reason for 
certain deviations between the sum of our estimated premiums and the observed premium. 
In particular, the exchange rate hedge coefficient should be higher before the “pesoization” 
of U.S. dollars bank deposits in February 2002, and in particular previous the currency peg 
collapse. In fact, the exchange rate coefficient was β 2 = 1.11 before the peso-peg 
abandonment and β 2 = 0.64 after it. Moreover, even though the ADR conversion 
restrictions were announced by late March 2002, the easing of bank withdrawals 
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restrictions in February and March 2002 should have lowered the control capital avoidance 
and liquidity premium, partially explaining the gap between the sum of our estimated 
premiums and the total observed premium during this period. 
 
IV.2 Estimated Composition of Non-ADR Stock Premium 
 
While by buying non-cross listed stocks, investors were not able to transfer their 
wealth from Argentina to the U.S. (control avoidance premium), local shares, in theory, 
provided higher liquidity than frozen bank deposits and a partial hedge against the 
exchange rate risk. We have to note that even though stock prices in the BCBA are 
denominated in Argentine pesos, investors would be willing to pay a partial exchange rate 
hedge premium considering that part of the firms’ cash flows are in foreign currencies.  
In order to estimate the average liquidity and exchange rate hedge premiums, the 
value of the non-ADR stock portfolio (SN) was regressed against the value of the ADR 
portfolio (A), the expected devaluation rate (D), and a dummy variable (0 or 1) according to 
whether the data analyzed was before or after the Corralito imposition (X1): 
SN = β 0 + β 1 A + β 2 D + β 3 X1 +ε  
This analysis also assumes that the exchange rate hedge coefficient and the liquidity 
premium are constant during the period, and therefore: 
Exchange Rate Hedge Premium = β 2 D 
Liquidity Premium = β 3 
The period regressed was from June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002, excluding the days in 
which the local stock market was closed. The following regression was obtained (see 
Exhibit 3 for regression details):  
SN = 29.6 + 0.73 A + 0.52 D – 0.19 X1 +ε     (R2 = 98.4%) 
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 The exchange rate hedge coefficient obtained for the non-ADR stock portfolio is 
0.52, implying a 0.52% increase in the price of non-ADR stocks for every 1% of 
devaluation expected. This is lower than the coefficient obtained for the ADR stock 
portfolio, but it is reasonable considering that non-cross listed stocks did not completely 
eliminated the exchange rate risk, but only partially mitigated it. The results from the 
regression imply that the capital controls did not introduce a liquidity premium on non-
cross listed stocks, as its coefficient (β 3) is close to 0 and is not statistically significant. 
Cross-listed stocks are naturally more liquid than non-cross listed stocks (one of the main 
reasons for issuing ADRs in international markets is to increase the stock’s liquidity), and 
investors may have been willing to pay a premium only for the extra liquidity offered by 
stocks with ADRs traded in the U.S. Therefore, Argentine investors were disposed to 
purchase non-cross listed stocks only to have a partial hedge against the devaluation, but 
they were not willing to pay an additional premium for the extra liquidity that these stocks 
may offer compared to investors’ frozen bank deposits. 
 Selling pressures after the acquisition of non-cross listed stocks may partially 
explain the lower price increase in this group of shares. Investors that used their frozen 
bank deposits to purchase these stocks may have sold the shares acquired if they were able 
to move the peso proceeds out of the financial system and convert them into U.S. dollars in 
the exchange rate black market. This issue was not quantified in this analysis, and would 
require further investigation. 
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V. ADR MARKET PRICING CHANGES INTRODUCED BY CAPITAL 
CONTROLS  
 
In Section III and Section IV, we showed the pricing distortions in local shares 
resulting from the introduction of capital controls. In this section we analyze whether or not 
the Corralito caused significant changes in the pricing of ADRs, particularly during the 
days in which the underlying securities were not trading, as the local stock market was 
closed. 
We regressed the ADR portfolio returns (RA) against a local index returns 
(MERVAL in U.S. dollar - RM) and an international index returns (S&P500 - RS&P) before 
and after the Corralito introduction (June 1, 2001 – November 30, 2001 and December 3, 
2001 – May 31, 2002, excluding the periods in which BCBA was closed): 
RA = β 0 + β 1 RS&P + β 2 RM + ε  
We also analyzed the ADRs pricing during the two periods in which the underlying 
local stock market was closed, but the ADRs were trading in the NYSE: December 21 – 
December 27, 2001, and January 7 - January 16, 2002: 
RA = β 0 + β 1 RS&P + ε  
In the following table we show the results from the regressions (see exhibits 4, 5 
and 6 for regression details): 
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Table 5: ADR Pricing Regression Results  
 
 Pre-Corralito Post-Corralito BCBA Closed 
    
β 1 0.230 0.406 0.824 
β 2 0.622 0.098 N.A. 
    
SE β 1 0.091 0.246 0.751 
SE β 2 0.038 0.043 N.A. 
    
t-stat β 1 2.530 1.650 1.100 
t-stat β 2 16.380 2.300 N.A. 
    
R2 70.60% 10.70% 9.90% 
 
N.A. : Not Applicable 
 
The results suggest that the Corralito introduction made the ADR portfolio more 
dependent on the international market than the local market, which reflected a premium 
over the fundamental value of the stocks. In fact, the beta on the local market portfolio 
decreased from 0.62 before the Corralito to 0.10 during the Corralito. On the other hand, 
the ADR portfolio was more affected by international market conditions during the 
Corralito, as the beta on the international market portfolio increased from 0.23 before the 
Corralito to 0.41 during the Corralito. This is reasonable, as the Corralito’s restrictions only 
affected Argentine investors, and not investors in the U.S. Argentine investors’ incentives 
to invest in their local stock market were not in line with the market conditions that foreign 
investors were facing in the U.S. stock markets, where the ADRs trade. It is important to 
mention that while the local and international indexes explained more than 70% of the 
variance of the ADR portfolio returns before the Corralito, they only explained 11% of the 
variance of the ADR portfolio returns during the Corralito. 
During the period in which the underlying local stock market was closed (13 
business days), the ADR portfolio correlation with the international market increased 
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significantly. In particular, the beta on the international market portfolio increased to 0.82. 
It is important to consider that the regression is based on only 13 data points, that the t-
statistic of the coefficient was not statistically significant and that the international index 
explained only roughly 10% of the variance of the ADR portfolio returns. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
 
 The introduction of capital controls in the middle of the Argentine crisis created a 
significant distortion in both cross-listed and non cross-listed local stock prices. Argentine 
investors used the local stock market to escape the capital controls imposed by the 
Corralito. In particular, by purchasing ADR stocks, converting them into ADRs and selling 
them in U.S. stock markets, Argentine investors were able to transfer their wealth from 
their frozen bank deposits in Argentina to the U.S. banking system. By doing so they were 
not only able to avoid the local capital controls, but to completely eliminate the devaluation 
risk that the Argentine peso was suffering, while increasing the liquidity of their 
investment. For these reasons, Argentine investors were willing to pay a significant 
premium for the local stocks, assuming an instant loss when they converted the stocks into 
ADRs that trade in the U.S. This premium varied during the period December 2001 – 
March 2002 according to the significance of the control capital, devaluation and liquidity 
risks, reaching a peak of over 40% just before the currency peg abandonment at the 
beginning of January 2002. 
 Even though their increase was lower than the one observed in ADR stock prices, 
non-ADR stock prices were also significantly impacted by the Corralito. While local stocks 
that were not cross-listed did not represent a vehicle for Argentine investors to transfer their 
funds abroad, they represented a partial hedge for a potential devaluation. According to our 
estimates, Argentine investors were willing to pay an average premium of 0.87% per every 
1% expected devaluation for ADR stocks, but only an average premium of 0.52% per every 
1% expected devaluation for non-ADR stocks during the analyzed period. Our analysis 
shows that, even though non cross-listed stocks should have higher liquidity than frozen 
bank deposits, Argentine investors were not disposed to pay a premium for this concept 
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when buying these stocks. However, as stocks that are cross-listed have a significant higher 
liquidity, an average liquidity premium of approximately 1.50% was attached to these 
stocks during the analyzed period. Finally, according to our calculations, an average capital 
control avoidance premium of approximately 5.70% was paid by Argentine investors when 
buying cross-listed stocks during the analyzed period. 
 The introduction of the Corralito not only distorted local stock prices, but also 
produced changes in the pricing of Argentine ADRs traded in the U.S. While before the 
Corralito, most of the variation on the returns of Argentine ADRs was explained by the 
Argentine stock market, after the introduction of capital controls, local conditions explained 
very little the changes in ADR returns. On the contrary, during this period, the correlation 
of Argentine ADR returns with the international market increased. This trend was even 
more significant during the period in which the local stock market was closed. 
 Some of these features result from the specific policies adopted in Argentina, but 
others may reflect the general distortions that follow from capital controls. In part, they 
produce sharp differences between local and international prices of capital, and potentially 
distort the allocation of capital internally. These costs would need to be considered when 
evaluating the overall impact of capital controls on the economy. 
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EXHIBIT 1 – PREMIUM FOR TELECOM ARGENTINA AND PETROBRAS4 
ADR-Stock Premium - Telecom Argentina
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ADR-Stock Premium - Petrobras
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Source: DataStream
                                                 
4 Premium was calculated as (Stock Price - ADR Price) / ADR Price and was not adjusted for transaction 
costs. ADR Price was calculated on a per share basis using the ADR conversion factor. 
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EXHIBIT 2 – REGRESSION ADR STOCK PORTFOLIO PREMIUM 
 
 
ADR Stock Portfolio = - 0.49 + 0.985 ADR Portfolio + 7.15 Corralito 
                      - 5.68 ADR Restriction Announcement 
                      + 0.867 Exp Devaluation (%) 
 
 
Predictor                         Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                        -0.489     1.231   -0.40  0.692 
ADR Portfolio                 0.984883  0.007846  125.52  0.000 
Corralito                       7.1546    0.8406    8.51  0.000 
ADR Restriction Announcement   -5.6794    0.7623   -7.45  0.000 
Exp Devaluation (%)            0.86702   0.04183   20.73  0.000 
 
 
S = 3.57796   R-Sq = 99.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.4% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF      SS      MS        F      P 
Regression        4  487994  121999  9529.77  0.000 
Residual Error  243    3111      13 
Total           247  491105
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EXHIBIT 3 – REGRESSION NON-ADR STOCK PORTFOLIO PREMIUM 
 
 
Non-ADR Stock Portfolio = 29.6 + 0.730 ADR Portfolio - 0.193 Corralito 
                          + 0.523 Exp Devaluation (%) 
 
 
Predictor                Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant               29.608     1.476  20.06  0.000 
ADR Portfolio        0.730231  0.009388  77.78  0.000 
Corralito             -0.1932    0.9804  -0.20  0.844 
Exp Devaluation (%)   0.52301   0.04780  10.94  0.000 
 
 
S = 4.42478   R-Sq = 98.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 98.3% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF      SS     MS        F      P 
Regression        3  285493  95164  4860.61  0.000 
Residual Error  244    4777     20 
Total           247  290270 
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EXHIBIT 4 – REGRESSION PRE-CORRALITO ADR RETURNS 
 
 
ADR Portfolio Return = - 0.00212 + 0.230 S&P500 Return + 0.622 MERVAL Return 
 
Predictor           Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       -0.002121  0.001100  -1.93  0.056 
S&P500 Return    0.22977   0.09087   2.53  0.013 
MERVAL Return    0.62169   0.03795  16.38  0.000 
 
 
S = 0.0123221   R-Sq = 70.6%   R-Sq(adj) = 70.2% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF        SS        MS       F      P 
Regression        2  0.046412  0.023206  152.84  0.000 
Residual Error  127  0.019283  0.000152 
Total           129  0.065695 
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EXHIBIT 5 – REGRESSION POST-CORRALITO ADR RETURNS 
 
 
ADR Portfolio Return = - 0.00306 + 0.406 S&P500 Return + 0.0983 MERVAL Return 
 
 
Predictor           Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       -0.003063  0.002582  -1.19  0.240 
S&P500 Return     0.4063    0.2461   1.65  0.103 
MERVAL Return    0.09832   0.04281   2.30  0.025 
 
 
S = 0.0216564   R-Sq = 10.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 8.1% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF         SS         MS     F      P 
Regression       2  0.0038367  0.0019184  4.09  0.021 
Residual Error  68  0.0318918  0.0004690 
Total           70  0.0357286 
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EXHIBIT 6 – REGRESSION ADR RETURNS WHEN UNDERLYING STOCK 
MARKET WAS CLOSED 
 
 
ADR Portfolio Return = - 0.00745 + 0.824 S&P500 Return 
 
 
Predictor           Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       -0.007454  0.005102  -1.46  0.172 
S&P500 Return     0.8237    0.7505   1.10  0.296 
 
 
S = 0.0177143   R-Sq = 9.9%   R-Sq(adj) = 1.7% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF         SS         MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.0003780  0.0003780  1.20  0.296 
Residual Error  11  0.0034517  0.0003138 
Total           12  0.0038298 
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